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ABSTRACT 
 
This study looks at multiple expressions of indigenous agency in Filipino nation-
state building from the attainment of Filipino independence in 1946 under the Third 
Republic. The study begins with postwar reconstruction under the Roxas administration, 
through the crisis and challenge years of the Quirino years, and the emergence of the 
strongman of the people, Ramon Magsaysay. Under whom, Filipino nation-making 
reached its peak years. The study concludes in 1957 with the untimely end of the 
Magsaysay administration, but with the emergence of a united Filipino people where 
citizens from all sectors came to be involved. This study argues that Filipinos possessed 
a natural aversion to communism, which the Third Republic used to consolidate Filipino 
support, and which prevented the Huks from taking over. Sources of Filipino unity 
included consolidating all ethnicities. Other sources were overcoming challenges, such 
as the Huk rebellion and integrating Chinese-Filipinos, Tagalog, and revisions in the 
educational curriculum. There were many debates surrounding Filipino sovereignty over 
US bases in the islands. Filipinos participated in regional organizations, such as SEATO 
and the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. Major issues involved corruption, security, 
bridging the urban and the rural, and economic development. Also, many scholars have 
often overlooked the multiple, diverse Filipino perspectives that lay underneath 
traditional Cold War superpower-centric narratives. This study disproves the notion that 
Filipino nationalism can only be studied through the artificial lens of class, which is an 
oversimplification. The purpose of this study is to show that Filipinos worked together 
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and built a unified Filipino nation-state that is multicultural, multiracial, and hostile to 
collectivists.    
This study uses official government documents, personal papers, memoirs, 
diaries and newspapers from the Filipino and American archives. These sources contain 
the involvement of state and non-state actors who contribute to the complex mosaic of 
Filipino nation-state making. These sources reflect the presence and diversity of Filipino 
perspectives that point to sources of Filipino unity. The study concludes with the Third 
Republic, as the ultimate expression of Filipino indigenous agency, having consolidated 
the ethnic and linguistic groups in the islands, appealing to shared Filipino visions, 
values and interests.         
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                                  
INTRODUCTION:  MYTHS AND ILLUSIONS OR, WHY FILIPINOS ARE NOT 
AMERICA’S ASIANS  
 
 “To see Asia though Asian eyes and Africa through African eyes-that is the 
prime requisite for American policy toward Asia and Africa. You cannot assume that a 
policy which works satisfactorily in Europe will work equally well in Asia and in 
Africa.”1 The Filipino diplomat Carlos P. Romulo issued his criticism of American 
policy towards developing countries in the wake of the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference 
in 1955. Filipinos during the Cold War oftentimes had been viewed and treated in 
popular and academic circles as puppets of the United States. For many outsiders, 
Filipinos were but an appendage in the worldwide anti-communist crusade. It was as if 
American anti-communism and forms of power obscured Filipino agency. The idea that 
Filipinos had their own agency was often not present in academic and popular literature 
due to long-held assumptions that centuries of Spanish and American colonialism had 
transformed Filipinos into Westernized Asians. In truth, Filipinos needed to view the 
Philippines through Filipino eyes to see the active and rich indigenous agency that 
existed underneath traditional narratives and perspectives. This study examines the ways 
in which ideas of race and ethnicity interacted with Filipino nation-state building and 
Filipino identity.   
                                                 
1 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1956), 46. 
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This work on “nation-making” argues along the lines of Global South scholar 
Odd Arne Westad’s Global Cold War, Christopher Goscha and Christopher Ostermann’s 
edition Connecting Histories, as well as Vijay Prashad’s Darker Nations, in locating 
Filipino agency within the broader histories of the darker peoples, who struggled against 
colonialism and communism. These works pioneered a new turn towards indigenous 
perspectives and narratives of formerly colonized peoples such as Filipinos. Many 
scholars would define state-building in terms of the national government and its 
affiliated organs using various instruments of power to pursue a collective national 
objective. State-building, here meaning the construction of institutions that take over or 
create existing institutions, or at the very least appropriate functions that existed locally. 
This study would look at state-building in terms of how Manila pursued a project of 
consolidating Filipinos and worked to build bridges to unite Filipinos and to encourage a 
common identity.  State-building involved the branches of government, the organs of 
state and political leaders (at the national, provincial and barrio level), who worked 
together with other elements such as the Constabulary/ military, newspapermen and the 
wider society. State and nation-building (or “nation-state building”) was part of an 
ongoing quest to define Filipino identity and how the streams of interacting Filipino 
nationalisms, both elite and non-elite, came together to unite the nation. This act of 
uniting the nation was undertaken by the state, but also entailed the active participation 
of Filipinos of various backgrounds. Nation-making was therefore inherently 
participatory. Manifestations of citizens’ participation involved the use of freedom of 
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speech, freedom of assembly, and the participation in presidential and legislative 
elections that gave citizens a stake in the Filipino national project. 
Many scholars have criticized the idea of state-building. Some left-wing scholars, 
such as Renato Constantino and Stephen Shalom, argued that the use of “state power” to 
achieve nation-building ends was used solely to “bolster” the power of the elites. On the 
other hand, nation-building as a term was meant to be more inclusive and involved not 
only the state but all Filipinos involved in working for common goals and with a vision 
of a prosperous multicultural and multiracial new nation. This study therefore 
approaches nation-building through a collective effort not only by the state to bring 
Filipinos together but for Filipinos to voluntarily participate in the national project as 
stakeholders. Another term that could be used, “nation-making,” involved collective 
efforts to unify the people. Nation-making took place simultaneously in in the big cities 
and in the small rural villages. Nation-making could also serve to divide, as various 
interest groups tried to co-opt one another, vie for dominance, or maintain their 
entrenched positions in society. These were especially true with Third Republic efforts 
to integrate the Huks, the Chinese, the indigenous, and the non-elite Filipino majority in 
the rural communities.  
 The state served as the major expression of indigenous agency. The Manuel 
Roxas, (1946-1948) Elpidio Quirino, (1948-1953) and Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957) 
administrations consolidated Filipino nation-building and were guided by articulated 
state ideologies that many scholars have overlooked. This study follows the lead of 
Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso’s State and Society in the Philippines. Abinales 
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and Amoroso’s work assumed that the state interacted with society, and played a critical 
role in shaping the development of the nation-state.2 But Abinales and Amoroso limited 
their examination of the indigenous to the state. This study goes further than Abinales 
and Amoroso by looking at multiple voices expressed and the diverse groups that 
worked together in society, aside from the state, that enabled Filipinos to unite and 
express indigenous agency.  
The state used its power to consolidate people and institutions. The state 
promoted the rise of organizations such as the National Movement for Free Elections 
(NAMFREL) that oversaw Filipino presidential elections and used state agencies to 
promote community development in the rural areas. Other manifestations of state power 
involved the deployment of government workers, barrio workers, volunteers, local 
provincial leaders and the Filipino military to be used for local development. The state 
also encouraged participatory forms of community-building in the rural villages during 
the early to the mid-1950s. These helped bridge the gap that existed between Manila and 
the barrios, as well as between elite Filipinos and non-elite Filipinos. Members of the 
general public in the urban and the rural areas also formulated and expressed their 
thoughts and opinions regarding the role of the state in Filipino nation-building. Editorial 
opinions published in newspapers, interview transcripts, and speeches aid in the 
reconstruction of the narrative of popular participation.    
                                                 
2 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005).  
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This study explores how Filipinos came together to build a united, thriving 
country during the critical first decade of independence in the midst of a decolonizing 
Cold War Third World in Asia. This study would look at trends, patterns and trajectories 
of the main players, their ideas, perspectives, and efforts that shaped and reshaped 
Filipino nationalisms during the first decade. Looking through the literature, contending 
narratives often ignored Filipino agency during the Cold War. Dominant narratives 
privileged focus on American power that supposedly continued to control and influence 
events in the archipelago. Others such as the neo-colonialist school retold the Filipino 
nationalist narrative through the lens of class, and alleged collusion between elite 
Filipinos and the United States. Using Filipino and American sources, this study 
explores the continuous evolution of Filipino nationalisms during the first post-
independence decade.  It pieces together the various evidence of models and visions of 
Filipino nationalisms.   
 Building on indigenous Filipino and American sources, this study seeks to 
explore and explain convergences and similarities of the nation-state building goals of 
Filipinos and of Americans. This study shows how existing brands of Filipino 
nationalisms point to the presence of indigenous agency on the part of Filipinos. The 
Philippines, as so many past scholars including Paul Kramer’s Blood of Government and 
Al McCoy’s Policing America’s Empire pointed out, has always been depicted as a 
collectivity of ethnicities and regions and with little sense of national consciousness. The 
Spanish and American colonizers classified the inhabitants of the archipelago based on 
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tribe, blood, and empire, which the Third Republic based in Manila inherited.3 The 
complex interactions between the elite and the non-elite strains of nationalism have been 
overlooked by scholars who tend to focus on a supposed US involvement in Filipino 
affairs after 1946, or those who viewed the emergence of Filipino nationalisms as an 
affair primarily of elite Filipinos.  
This study finds two broad streams of Filipino nationalism in the archipelago, as 
the Third Republic engaged in the state and nation-building project. Elite nationalism 
incorporated not only the Manila-centric perspective or the upper class in Filipino 
society, but also forms of interaction that privileged articulation by Filipinos who had 
access to communications media. For the purposes of this study, elite nationalism would 
be defined as the kind of nationalism articulated by Filipino leaders (who had access to 
various forms of media) both in Manila and in the provinces. For the purposes of the 
study, non-elite nationalism would refer not only exclusively to the Filipino lower 
classes but to all Filipinos whose voices articulated themselves even if only occasionally. 
These ordinary Filipinos’ voices would be just as critical in the expression of indigenous 
agency. Filipinos would use the republican state and their society as a platform to 
collectively assert being an independent country with their own visions.   
This study looks at how the state engaged in state- and nation-building in Manila 
and in the communities. This involves looking at the national government, the local and 
municipal officials in the provinces across the archipelago, organizations engaged in 
                                                 
3 Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 15.  
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community-building by working under the government, and ordinary citizens of various 
backgrounds who actively participated in the different modes of nation-building. This 
study would look at Filipino state and nation-building during the three administrations, 
their similarities and differences in approach, the extent of public participation, 
individual thoughts and opinions on community mobilizations and on national issues. 
The main premise of this study is that nation-state making initiatives progressively 
sought to consolidate Filipinos across the archipelago regardless of individual, familial, 
ethnic, regional, occupational and ideological differences. These were true for state and 
for non-state actors in society. The study assumes that nation-state making entailed the 
broad-based and inclusive participation of the government, its agencies (such as the 
Presidential Assistant on Community Development and the Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement), national and regional newspapers, intellectuals, universities, 
political parties, politicians, diplomats, soldiers in the military, the Church, oligarchs, 
businessmen, traders, market vendors, landowners, farmers, tenants, leading clan 
families, people who live in the rural communities, government and volunteer workers 
who went to work with people in the barrios, town halls, aid groups, organizations such 
as NAMFREL, local warlords, the aboriginal tribes, the Moros, the Chinese-Filipinos, 
the ex-Huk guerillas, and most critically, public participation during national elections. 
When ranked, the most critical challenge for Filipino nation-state making was how to 
unite all the ethnicities in the archipelago. This was especially true for the Chinese-
Filipinos and for the former Huk guerillas. Respecting and taking advantage of 
differences and diversities in the islands ensured that anti-communism served as a 
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unifying ideology and a means for the expression of indigenous agencies. This study 
would define indigenous agency as the collective Filipino act of creating a multicultural,  
multiracial people who would view themselves as one people and one nation with a 
common purpose, vision, objective and undertaking. This study integrates themes such 
as race and ethnicity, the postcolonial state, urban-rural relations, community-building, 
transnational dynamics and Filipino relations with the United States under the Truman 
administration. Upon being granted independence on July 4, 1946, Filipinos realized that 
possession of Filipino citizenship in a nation-state framework entailed new obligations 
and responsibilities. Citizenship in the midst of diverse ethnicities and backgrounds 
presented Filipinos with new opportunities to express indigenous agency.  
The available literature on Filipino nationalisms, indigenous agency and nation-
state building could be broadly grouped together into the America-centric perspective, 
which largely relied on American sources and the American post-colonial and Cold War 
perspectives; the neo-colonial perspective, which looked at class as the basic unit of 
analysis in studying societies; a Manila-centric school, which stressed the role which 
government played in nation-building; and a growing school of postmodern scholars 
who increasingly placed emphasis on themes such as race, ethnicity, empire, and 
transnational ties and regional community development. 
Theoretical definitions of Filipino state-building and nation-building can be 
found in works such as Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, which also argues 
that while waves of nationalisms get transplanted across societies over time, there are 
variations in national experiences, as well as Prasenjit Duara’s Rescuing History From 
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the Nation, which looked at contending, multiple narratives of the nation-state that 
embodied its essence. Similarly, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe, 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference looked at the role of the “nation –state” 
in pushing narratives on citizenship and modernity through the use of state power to 
define narratives and modes of knowledge production.4  
Many works examine the role of the United States in the Philippines from the 
standpoint of Cold War objectives after empire. These included H.W. Brands’ Bound to 
Empire, Stanley Karnow’s In Our Image, Mark Gallichio’s The Scramble for Asia and 
Robert McMahon’s Limits of Empire.  These argue that America’s colonial experiment 
in the Philippines was a success and that it was Filipinos, upon attaining independence, 
who were responsible for their mistakes during the post-war era. Filipino aims, 
ambitions, aspirations, and culture were not prominent in these narratives, except in so 
far as the Philippines was seen as part of the US-led Cold War anti-communist coalition. 
The main pitfall of these works was the tendency to overlook indigenous agency and 
perspectives in favor of more visible instruments of American power such as bases, 
embassies, money, treaties, and regional organizations.  
The neocolonial school looked at Filipino nationalism from the perspective of 
class struggle. What these scholars’ works had in common was the assumption that to be 
nationalistic was to be revolutionary and to be anti-American. These works generally 
painted the Huks in a favorable light. These works included Renato Constantino’s A 
                                                 
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 41.  
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History of the Philippines, and former American communist guerilla William Pomeroy’s 
The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration and Resistance! These works and others 
collectively argued that the independence attained by Filipinos in 1946 was allegedly a 
sham and did not result in large scale political, economic and social reforms due to a 
perceived collusion between colonial era Filipino elites and American power. Similarly, 
Benedict Kerkvliet’s The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines 
looked at the colonial-era roots of peasant discontent and how it manifested itself in the 
form of a full-blown agrarian revolt during the Roxas and the Quirino years from the 
perspective of the Huks and their sympathizers in the peasant villages. All these works 
believed that the Third Republic was not an expression of indigenous Filipino agency. 
The main limitation of all these works appeared to be that class was primarily a Marxist 
Western construct and was only one among many determinant factors in the Filipino 
setting. There was little effort to look at the complexity and diversity of the issues and 
players involved in a constantly evolving environment. Nevertheless, these works 
appeared to have consulted reliable sources of information on the history of the Third 
Republic.      
There were also scholars who believed that nation-state-building could only be 
accomplished through state actions based in Manila. Patricio Abinales and Donna 
Amoroso’s State and Society in the Philippines anchored their study of the evolution of 
Filipino nationalisms based on the relationship between state and society. As their 
argument went, the state constantly interacted with forces in society to deliver goods and 
services to people. The presumption was that only the state was capable of expressing 
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nationalism. Their work also argued that a weak state inevitably led to a weak nation.5 
Their study echoed Amando Doronila’s argument in State, Economic Transformation 
and Political Change in the Philippines, 1946 to 1972, which looked at the role of the 
State as an autonomous entity as compared to the multiple social forces in society. 
Another work, by political development scholar Amy Blitz’s The Contested State, 
looked at the Filipino state as a zone of “contestation” by competing forces in Filipino 
society. These largely Manila-centric scholars viewed the state as the leading actor in 
delivering goods and services to society. The problem lay with the reality that the state 
can be subject to multiple social factors in its wider environment.   
Postmodern historians looked at transnationalism and empire as a phenomenon 
that would define nation-building, such as Jeremi Suri’s Liberty’s Surest Guardian‘s 
argument in his chapter entitled “Reconstruction After Empire,” where American nation 
(or perhaps empire)-building in the Philippines took place primarily through the building 
up of the public school system in the islands at the turn of the century.6 Paul Kramer, in 
Blood of Government, argued that race, power and transnational empire-building by the 
Spanish and the Americans in the Philippines competed with one another to create new 
                                                 
5 Abinales, Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 6, 7.  
6 For a more in-depth discussion of the background of American involvement in the building up of the 
Filipino public school system during the early 1900s, see Chapter 3, “Reconstruction After Empire.” Suri 
argued that the transnational relationships between Americans and Filipinos who worked to educate the 
young in the islands was also a form of nation-building. This was an American legacy which Suri said 
endured in the Philippines up to the present. Jeremi Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-
Building From the Founders to Obama (New York: Free Press, 2011), 82-123.   
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“connections and transformations,” generated new “hierarchies of difference,” and 
influenced relationships among the different groups in the archipelago, such as between 
darker-skinned hill tribal up-landers and more “civilized” sedentary lowlanders. The idea 
of divided communities took root as a legacy of empire and colonialism. Furthermore, 
the work explained that the dynamics continued even after Filipino independence, as the 
Filipino Third Republic consolidated itself in Manila and in the rural countryside.7 Al 
McCoy’s Policing America’s Empire looked at how postcolonial continuities took place 
as the Third Republic used the institutional security apparatus inherited from the 
American colonizers to consolidate its hold across the Philippine archipelago. McCoy 
argued that the Third Republic ended up serving as a security proxy for American 
empire during the Cold War. But McCoy conceded that Filipino agency existed by 
exhibiting how Filipinos during the Third Republic appropriated American practices into 
the indigenous context to pursue Filipino ends. This was seen during the Third 
Republic’s war against the Huks. Julian Go’s Patterns of Empire critiqued the idea of 
American Exceptionalism in interactions with non-Western peoples, such as in Southeast 
Asia. His work’s main premise was that the United States has often been motivated by 
the idea of transnational empire and that American people, values, ideas, institutions, 
money and military supposedly shaped other societies in the world. The same was the 
case with Masuda Hajimu’s Cold War Crucible, which explained how the Cold War 
supposedly played a central role in influencing societies. These transnational works on 
                                                 
7 Kramer, The Blood of Government, 2.  
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empire collectively explained how external factors such as the interplay of race, empire 
and power played a role in Filipino nation- state building.   
Other scholars looked the evolution of Filipino identity within the context of 
politics, society and culture. Luis Francia’s survey work A History of the Philippines 
argued that there has been an ongoing evolution of Filipino identity since precolonial 
times. The natives in the archipelago began to see themselves as a people who were 
different from their colonizers, exhibiting forms of resistance, mediation and 
collaboration to preserve indigenous local identity.8 What Francia’s work did not explore 
at greater length was the continuity of the evolution of Filipino identity. This did not 
stop upon the attainment of independence in 1946. Nick Cullather’s Illusions of 
Influence was a classic secondary source material on the Third Republic Philippines that 
revealed the extent with which Filipino culture was steeped in patronage politics from 
the most obscure clans in communities far from Manila to the presidential palace and the 
legislative halls. Cullather explained that this was the context with which Filipino 
leaders including Magsaysay operated, and which American officials and policy-makers 
such as John Melby did not appear to understand very well. US policymakers were 
blinded by their assumptions that the United States continued to directly influence events 
in the archipelago and that Filipinos were simply their Cold War clients.9 Cullather’s 
work appeared to have focused too much on the role of politics, diplomacy and of 
                                                 
8 Luis Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: The Overlook 
Press, 2010), 14.  
9 Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 
1942-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).   
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interest groups in looking at US-Philippines relations. This study of nation-state making 
would instead incorporate transnationalism, development, relationship between the 
urban and the rural, the Cold War (and its impact on notions of ideology and ethnicity), 
disputes over bases and the trade treaties, as well as a changing Filipino culture.  
Development scholars such as Daniel Immerwahr (who also belonged to the neo-
colonial school), David Ekbladh, and Michael Latham looked at how Americans and 
Filipinos shared similar objectives. Immerwahr, in a chapter in his work Thinking Small 
entitled “Grassroots Empire,” argued that “rural inequality” and patron-client 
relationships that resulted in exploitation and neglect over time eventually contributed to 
the Huk rebellion. Immerwahr argued that to prevent a repeat of the Huk rebellion, the 
government in the mid-1950s launched a “nationwide community development 
program” in the communities and achieved small –scale successes that headed off rural 
unrest.10 A similar but more general work, Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission, 
argued that in the new liberal order being constructed by the United States, development 
was wielded as an “ideological weapon” that would produce “large scale 
transformations” that could be wielded to combat threats such as communism. This was 
true for predominantly agricultural societies like the Philippines in the wake of the 
expansion of communism across Asia during the 1960’s.11 Latham’s The Right Kind of 
Revolution argued that modernization was a new form of ideology that could be made 
                                                 
10 Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
11 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization & the Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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into a powerful weapon due to its transformative potential. The objective was to benefit 
everyone and improve the welfare of peoples, particularly those in developing societies 
like the Philippines. Latham argued that these visions of development was used by the 
United States to justify civilizing “racial inferiors,” such as the Filipinos at the turn of 
the century. The emphasis on development took an alarmist turn, when, during the 
1950s, a Huk rebellion was brewing in the independent country’s agriculturally-rich 
regions.12 These convergences suggested that Filipinos appropriated external rhetoric 
and stressed similarities with American objectives to pursue their nation-building aims.  
This study integrates the above various perspectives and locates itself in the 
postmodern school. It looks at the efforts by Filipinos to engage in nation-making by 
transcending questions on race and ethnicity, among all other local conditions. These 
ensured not only that communism would not find a fertile soil in the islands but that anti-
communism would be a major source of unity and the basis for nation-making in the 
archipelago. The study pushes the argument that the state would be the leading 
expression in Filipino nation-state making after independence. Filipinos, regardless of 
their ethnic identity, collectively undertook efforts to realize their visions of a united 
Filipino nation-state. The study also negates the idea of class as a basis for classification 
and categorization as propounded by the neo-colonial school since the idea of social 
differences are perceived and practiced differently by people over time. Many subaltern 
                                                 
12 Michael Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution, Modernization, Development and US Foreign Policy 
From the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 3, 4, 14, 112.  
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voices were simply overlooked and hence needed to be narrated and brought out into the 
open.  
This study employs a chronological and thematic approach. It chronologically 
begins with 1946, when Filipinos gained their independence, and ends with 1957, with 
the untimely death of Magsaysay. Thematically, this study looks at the roles of various 
actors and the issues involved. It would use indigenous Filipino perspectives on Filipino 
state and nation-building in decolonizing Cold War Southeast Asia. The narrative would 
also incorporate views of American policymakers on their interactions with Filipinos, 
their observations and their participation in these efforts.   
The Harry S. Truman Library and Institute holdings have been immensely 
helpful to my work. The Myron Cowen and the John Melby collections shed light into 
the extent by which American officials in the US embassy in Manila and at the State 
Department in Washington DC perceived the nuances and complexities of Filipino 
society. Other large collections consulted included the White House Confidential File, 
White House Central Files and the Official Files.  Other American sources were drawn 
from the National Archives and Records Administration, which contained declassified 
telegrams, reports by the State Department and from the US Embassy in Manila on 
Filipino activities in the capital and in the provinces, American observers’ appraisals of 
Filipino leaders, as well as US government files on the Philippines. Large files consulted 
included documents drawn from the Philippine Rehabilitation Program Subject/ Agency 
Files, The Department of State Decimal File 1945-49, and the General Records of the 
Department of State.  The Library of Congress contained National Security Progress and 
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Central Intelligence Agency reports on the Filipino security situation in the islands, 
especially concerning the Huks and the Chinese-Filipinos, from the end of World War II 
in 1945 up to the later 1950s, when the Huk threat receded. Documents from the Library 
of Congress also included expressions and pronouncements related to the formation of 
Filipino nationalist ideologies made by prominent figures such as Carlos P. Romulo. The 
US National Security Council Documents on the Philippines, from 1953 to 1960, edited 
by Nick Cullather, contained a valuable compilation of progress reports made by the US 
National Security Council on the Filipino administrations and their policies during the 
Eisenhower years. Lastly, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Office of the 
Historian contained State Department correspondences and transcripts of conversations 
between Filipino and American leaders, during the Quirino and the Magsaysay years.  
This study also draws from numerous indigenous Filipino sources. These 
included personal (e.g. Manuel Roxas, Carlos Romulo) and presidential papers (such as 
the Quirino papers during the Huk uprising), agency reports, speeches, telegrams, 
newspaper articles (particularly, but not limited to the Manila Times and the Daily 
Mirror) that dated back from 1946 to 1957. Other sources included magazine clipping 
files, opinion editorials, surveys, accounts and letters by ordinary Filipino citizens 
regarding affairs in the barrio, the community, the province and the state from World 
War II to the 1950s. These works represent the views of both elite and non-elite 
Filipinos.  This study also looks at the emergence of concrete manifestations of common 
Filipino solidarities from 1946 to 1957. The chapters explore the main themes and issues 
involved for each time period. The period spans three Filipino administrations (Roxas, 
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Quirino and Magsaysay). The process takes place from the level of the individual and 
the family in the local communities to the national.  Filipino culture and identity changed 
to reflect indigenous Filipino ends.    
Chapter 2, “The Promise and the Perils of Independence, Filipino State and 
Nation-building from the Ground-Up, 1946 to 1948,” looks at state consolidation during 
the Roxas years during the first two years of independence. The chapter argues that 
Filipinos finally had their sovereign state and that this gave them the ability to shape 
their collective destiny as a people, despite the multiple challenges that lay ahead. This 
was contrary to the belief by outsiders that the Philippines was well on its way to 
becoming America’s successful colonial experiment in Asia. Apparently, Filipinos as 
early as the Roxas administration had other ideas. The main issues and themes included 
reconstruction, US forces in the archipelago, dealing with the Huk uprising, use of 
Tagalog as a national language, and the need to gather together Filipinos of all 
backgrounds despite the state being weak at the outset of independence.  
Chapter 3, “Rescuing the Nation-State: The crisis years and the makings of a 
Filipino nation-building ideology, 1948 to 1951,” looks at the Philippines in the midst of 
the Huk uprising, which posed a threat to the Third Republic model. The chapter argues 
that contrary to what many believed, the Quirino administration possessed a well-
defined ideology which it used to express Filipino agency and to make the Third 
Republic the only legitimate expression of that indigenous agency.  To accomplish this, 
the Quirino administration even demonized the Huks as the “alien” other who had to be 
suppressed. The main issues and themes included integrating the Huks and the Filipino 
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Chinese, Quirino’s “neutralism” in Filipino foreign relations, corruption, dirty elections, 
and the disconnect between Manila and the barrios.  
Chapter 4, “From Manila to the barrios and from the barrios to Manila: ‘To unify 
the nation, 1950 to 1954,” looks at the various Filipino expressions of agency 
domestically and internationally. The chapter argues that the Third Republic not only 
asserted its claim to be the legitimate expression of Filipino indigenous agency but 
sought to build bridges to include all Filipinos in the nation-state building project. The 
main issues and themes included patronage and political power, the role of the Filipino 
military, rural community development and rural participation, security (internal and 
external) and expressions of Filipino anti-communism. The period also saw the 
beginnings of debates over the role of the Filipino-Chinese and of US bases in the 
islands.  
Chapter 5, “One nation, one people, undivided: The Age of Magsaysay, 1953-
1957,” looks at the vibrant debates and multiple voices taking place across all sectors of 
Filipino society under Ramon Magsaysay, the strongman of the people. The period was 
an intensely nationalistic time, with the US bases in the archipelago and negotiations 
over the Laurel-Langley Act of 1954 becoming major issues of contention uniting all 
Filipinos. The chapter argues that American anti-communism led many to overlook 
Filipino agency. The main issues and themes included the rapidly expanding phase of 
rural community-building, Filipino expression of indigenous agency internationally 
through SEATO and by participating at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, continued 
challenges in integrating the Chinese-Filipinos, the indigenous tribes and the non-elite 
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Filipinos, revisions in school curricula, separation of Church and State, and Tagalog as 
the national language across the archipelago.  
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                                                  
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF INDEPENDENCE: FILIPINO STATE- AND 
NATION-BUILDING FROM THE GROUND UP, 1946-1948 
 
“. . . this nation is above all a nation of people. Its Government exists by the consent of 
the governed. The welfare of the people must be our primary concern . . .”1  
- Manuel A. Roxas, Filipino President   
 
On July 4, 1946, the Stars and Stripes was lowered at Luneta Park while the 
Filipino flag with its golden sunrays was raised. Filipinos had finally attained their 
independence.2 Filipinos at last possessed a sovereign state and the ability to shape and 
determine their collective destiny as a nation. But no sooner than independence had been 
declared that Filipinos realized the magnitude of the colossal changes that lay ahead. The 
Filipino nation that emerged would not turn out to be what George Taylor and other 
scholars who belonged to the American Exceptionalist school described as “America’s 
experiment” and America’s “showcase in Asia.”3 Nor was indigenous agency an affair 
exclusively of Elite Filipinos and the state, as argued by scholars in works such as 
                                                 
1 His Excellency Manuel A. Roxas, “Address, Inauguration of the Philippine Republic,” July 4, 1946, 360, 
Folder-OF 1055, Seventh Report of the United States High Commissioner To the Philippines, 1945-46, 
Harry S. Truman Library and Institute, Independence, Missouri.  
2Luis Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: The Overlook 
Press, 2010), 192.  
3 Garel Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1951), 276.  
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Renato Constantino’s The Philippines: The Continuing Past and Amando Doronila’s 
The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in the Philippines. The idea 
of Filipino elites supposedly building the nation in collusion with the former colonial 
power, the United States, was a very common approach of those who belong to the neo-
colonialist school.   
The main themes and issues during the first two years after independence 
inevitably began with the Filipino state’s consolidation of what was described as a 
“weak state.” This entailed the utilization of the state and local networks to pursue state 
and nation-building. There were many debates amongst Filipinos over whether to 
welcome American forces in the archipelago.  The Huk uprising, which had its 
beginnings during the late American colonial period, also provided in the later years a 
threatening alternative to the Third Republic in winning the hearts and minds of 
Filipinos, especially in the rural areas. At the same time, this also spurred early efforts 
after independence to make the Huks part of the Filipino state and nation-building 
project. Meanwhile, Tagalog has been the national language since 1937. However, 
Tagalog was not yet widely used and adopted by a large number of Filipinos. Tagalog 
needed the support of the state, through its organs such as the educational system, to 
plant the seeds of linguistic unity and forms of collective identity. With power in the 
hands of the local leaders and of leading provincial clans, the Roxas administration saw 
the need to gather many grassroots groups. To deal with the Huk problem, the Roxas 
administration not only fought the peasant fighters in the field but used state policies and 
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local autonomy that appealed to rural Filipinos to counteract the communist-oriented 
message of the Huks. 
 
Reconstruction   
The road to Filipino independence was never easy, in no small part due to World 
War II. Filipinos during the occupation experienced food, fuel and clothing shortages as 
resources in the islands were all conscripted to the Japanese war effort.4  Wartime 
conditions such as food, currency, and housing shortages forced ordinary Filipinos to 
focus on survival. The Japanese, acting to impose law and order amidst the occupation 
chaos, were blamed for taking over large urban blocks for military and administrative 
purposes.5  
The Japanese espoused Pan-Asianism as an ideology that would seek to unite its 
newly conquered peoples across Asia.  This was meant to appeal to Filipinos.  But the 
main purpose of the Japanese in the islands was to extract and requisition resources such 
as rice to support the war effort against the Allies in the Pacific. The Filipino 2nd 
Republic under Jose Laurel was established to give Filipinos the idea that Filipinos could 
rule themselves, with independence proclaimed on October 14, 1943. But the Japanese 
military could be seen nearly everywhere and controlled all facets of life in the 
                                                 
4 Ricardo T. Jose (ed.), Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People, “The Japanese Occupation,” 
Volume 7 (Manila: Asia Publishing Company Limited, 1998), 173, 190.  
5 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House Inc., 
1989), 309.  
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archipelago.6  Besides, Pan-Asianism was just another expression of Japanese 
nationalism, and which asserted that only Japan could lead Asia against the West.7  
The Japanese occupiers found it difficult to appeal to Filipinos. The United States 
had ruled the Philippines benevolently and allowed Filipinos a share in governing 
colonial affairs in the islands. Filipinos resisted Japanese attempts to convert Filipinos to 
the Japanese way of life and a Japanese-defined Asian Identity. It did not help that the 
Japanese wanted to grow cotton in the archipelago instead of sugar. This ruined the 
wartime Filipino economy (and no doubt angered the large sugar planters, whose 
prosperity depended on sugar as a prized cash crop). The Japanese requisitioned food 
and basic commodities (such as salt and soap) for the war effort. Many Filipinos also 
lamented the loss of morality as well as the corruption (not only in the financial but in 
the personal sense) that Filipinos had to resort to in order to survive the Occupation.8 
The Japanese used many Filipino women as “comfort women.” Torture and mass terror 
was used to cow the population in the urban and in the rural areas across the 
archipelago.9 As far as Filipinos were concerned, the Japanese were a different race and 
the Japanese were behaving as just another set of conquerors as far as the Filipinos were 
                                                 
6 Francia, A History of the Philippines, 182.     
7 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 98. 
8 Karnow, In Our Image, 308, 309.  
9 Sonia M. Zaide, “Japanese War Crimes: A Forgotten Story,” undated, Folder-World War II, Ortigas 
Foundation Library.  
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concerned.10  The United States had promised independence to the Filipinos in 1946 
when the United States established the Commonwealth government in the archipelago 
back in 1935. Filipinos were therefore ambivalent towards the Japanese presence, even 
as the Japanese sought to promote and use Filipino nationalism during the Second 
Republic.11 Many Filipinos also knew that the Japanese did not have a strong chance of 
prevailing over the US armed forces in the Pacific as word spread of American victories 
getting closer to the Philippine coastline from the east. 
Other Filipinos took advantage of the Japanese occupation to consolidate 
territories under their control, stockpiling weapons, with an eye towards the post-war 
world.  Multiple guerilla attacks against the Japanese and against rival pro-American 
resistance fighters by groups such as the communist HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan 
                                                 
10 Renato Constantino, Letizia Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past (Manila: The 
Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 55. 
11 Most Filipinos who worked with the Japanese did so because of the vacuum left behind by the United 
States and due to Quezon’s directive that Filipinos do so to prevent breakdown. Many of the Filipino 
officials who worked under the Japanese also served under the previous Commonwealth government. 
Interestingly, many Filipinos, such as the Japanese installed 2nd Republic President Jose Laurel, used the 
Japanese occupation to promote Filipino nationalism at the popular level through the promotion of 
teaching and writing Tagalog, revival of the memory of the Filipino Revolution (which established the 1st 
Republic under Aguinaldo at the turn of the century) in textbooks and the promotion that the Philippines 
was very much a part of Asia. Many of these nationalists were members of the Filipino elite who sought to 
express Filipino agency. Many Filipinos saw the Huks not as anti-Japanese resistance fighters but as 
communists who sought to redistribute land, regardless of who was in charge. Patricio Abinales and 
Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 
2005), 159, 160, 163.  
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Laban sa Hapon), who would later be called the Huks, took place across the islands.12 
By late 1944, American forces under General Douglas MacArthur were back in the 
islands, inching their way from the central islands towards Manila in Luzon Island.13 
Fighting turned the Philippines into a hellish Pacific inferno.14 The physical devastation 
was uneven, with Manila and the surrounding areas suffering heavy damage during the 
                                                 
12 This wasn’t helped when the Japanese assumed a patronizing attitude towards Filipinos. The Japanese 
stated that Japan knew what was best for the Philippines and that Filipinos needed to be weaned away 
from the United States and its colonial influences. Francia, A History of the Philippines, 181, 182.      
13 US Army manuals for troops about to land to fight the Japanese occupation in the Philippines described 
at length the Filipinos whom many US troops would be encountering for the first time. It described the 
Filipinos as heavily Christianized by the Spanish. The manual categorized Filipinos into five kinds- a.) the 
cultured college graduate, b.) the non-professional Filipino, c.) the countryman farmer or fisherman, d.) 
the primitive jungle-native or Negritos, and e.) the Mohammedan Moros. One interesting description of 
the Moros was that “. . . With all their fierceness, Moros have shown that they like Americans better than 
any “outside group” they have come into contact with. They (the Moros) will prove to be excellent friends 
of ours . . .” Furthermore, the manual about the Philippines for American troops stated that “. . . your 
language difficulties in the Philippines will be very few . . . English has been the language of instruction 
used in the school system since the earliest days of the American occupation . . .” It also said that there 
were 87 dialects drawn from 8 different languages across the archipelago, such that “Filipinos in one 
island cannot understand the dialect from another.” English was said to have been introduced to the school 
system so that Filipinos in all the islands would share one common language.   
The manual also contained a “Tagalog Language Guide,” for the American troops, which 
involved translations from English into Tagalog of Greetings and General Phrases, of Greetings, of 
Locations, of Directions, of Numbers, as well as asking for things, “American Perceptions of Filipinos,” 
White Folder- World War II, 1944-1945, Zaide Series 5, Folder 265, Ortigas Foundation Library.      
14 Daniel Immerwahr, “The Decolonization of the United States: The Ordeal of the Philippines,” July 28, 
2014, Unpublished manuscript. 
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final offensive in early 1945 to retake the city.15 And with liberation came new 
challenges for the restored Commonwealth.   
Filipinos and Americans began preparing for the transition to independence. The 
Philippines under Commonwealth President Sergio Osmena held presidential elections 
in May 1946 (just three months before independence), which Osmena’s political rival, 
Manuel Roxas, won. For the first time, Filipino women participated in voting, something 
not done during the Commonwealth presidential elections of 1935 and 1941 during the 
US colonial period.16 Roxas’ Nacionalista party had “almost unchallenged” political 
control of the House, the Senate and the local provincial administrations (although 
during this period, Manila had a weak hold over the provinces).17 The United States 
colonial authorities did not hold-off on granting the much desired independence to 
Filipinos. On July 4th, 1946. High Commissioner McNutt, in front of Senator Tydings, 
General McArthur and the Filipino leaders, read President Harry Truman’s proclamation 
                                                 
15The battle to retake Manila took a month and resulted in 1,000 American soldiers, 16,000 Japanese 
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aftermath of the fighting. Abinales, Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 163, 170. 
16 Benedict R. Anderson, “Elections and Participation,” in R.H. Taylor (ed.), The Politics of Elections in 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge and New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), 21, 23.    
17 From Mr. Ely to Mr. Butterworth, August 4, 1947, “The Collaboration Issue,” General Political 
Situation, 1, 2, Folder G-21, General Surveys of Conditions in the Philippines, Box 2, Record Group 59, 
General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific 
Affairs, Office of the Officer in Charge for Philippine Affairs, Office Files 1948 to 1957, National 
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that withdrew US sovereignty and extended recognition to Filipino independence.18 
During the same day, July 4th, 1946, the Treaty of General Relations was signed between 
the newly-independent Philippines and the United States.19 In his inaugural speech, 
President Manuel Roxas remarked that, “No longer are we protected by the mantle of 
American sovereignty,” since “we [Filipinos] are an adult in the council of nations.”20  
As soon as independence was declared, Filipino political culture began to express 
itself on the issues of postwar reconstruction and in the collaboration issue. The scholar 
H.W. Brands, in Bound to Empire, argued that Filipino political culture, with its shared 
experiences and mutual interests, played a role in reconstruction. Members of the 
wartime Jose Laurel administration, such as Claro Recto, were part of the pre-war 
political elite and proudly espoused anticolonial nationalism. But many of their families, 
friends, and colleagues belonged to multiple interdependent webs where one couldn’t 
move an agenda forward without getting involved in patronage networks. This 
                                                 
18 Ricardo Jose, “One Hundred Years of Philippine-United States Relations: An Outline History,” in 
Aileen San Pablo Baviera and Lydia-Yu Jose (ed.) Philippine External Relations: A Centennial Vista 
(Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, 1998), 406, 407.    
19 This treaty involved the US recognizing Filipino independence, while the United States “withdrew and 
surrendered all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory and the 
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33.  
20 Inaugural Address on the Independence of the Philippines, July 4, 1946, 146, Papers, Addresses and 
Writings of Manuel Roxas, Lopez Museum Library.  
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phenomenon was just as true with the ordinary Filipino individual. One example was in 
the issue of wartime collaboration. Rivals accused Roxas of working with the Japanese 
during the war.21 Roxas, as well as other wartime leaders such as Jose Laurel were 
eventually exonerated by the Filipino courts.22 The Filipino public did not possess 
“serious convictions” on the issue since Filipinos knew that the presence of Filipino 
officials in wartime administration made life more tolerable for ordinary people under 
oppressive conditions. The “family system” in the islands was too entrenched and made 
prosecution difficult because there was said to have often been a “relative involved.” 
Roxas ultimately decided not to pursue the collaboration issue for fear of public backlash 
especially with the case of Laurel.23 The Truman administration was confused by how 
the elite treated the issue, and was perplexed by how Roxas granted amnesty to the “anti-
American, pro-Japanese collaborators” such as Laurel, since Roxas himself faced the 
same accusations.24 
According to Philippines scholar Luis Francia, part of the explanation for why 
the United States did not become more involved with the collaboration issue lay with the 
emerging Cold War and the “perceived threat” arising from the potential spread of 
communism. The United States, which continued to exert influence in the archipelago 
during the first few years of independence, valued the Filipino President’s anti-
                                                 
21H.W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 230.  
22 “The Collaboration Issue,” General Political Situation, 1, 2. 
23 “The Collaboration Issue,” General Political Situation, 1, 2.  
24 Brands, Bound to Empire, 233. 
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communism and government efforts to maintain stability in the archipelago.25 The 
United States in many ways was using the Philippines to pursue its regional and security 
aims. Filipinos used their foreign relations with the United States to assert its indigenous 
agency and its agenda of consolidating all Filipinos together. The issue of collaboration 
was therefore treated much less seriously by all parties except by the Huks.    
Filipinos saw nation-building in Filipino terms. An American report looked at 
inter-ethnic relations in the islands, describing “anti-foreign agitation” in the Philippines 
directed toward the Chinese-Filipinos. The ordinary Filipino was said to have possessed 
a “decidedly friendly feeling” towards the United States. Roxas took advantage of the 
pro-American sentiments of Filipinos to “make cooperation with Americans the main 
theme of his administration.” Roxas knew that the United States was concerned that pro-
Japanese, anti-American leaders such as Jose Laurel might somehow come to power in 
the archipelago.26 Roxas was determined to show that “American –style democracy” was 
“superior” to alternatives such as communism, non-alignment and revolutionary 
nationalism.27 
Filipino policy was also summed up in an American report regarding Roxas’ 
pronouncements which stated that: 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Luis Francia, A History of the Philippines, 194, 195.  
26 “The Collaboration Issue,” General Political Situation, 2.   
27 Abinales, Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 167.  
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The ambition of Filipinos, said the President (Roxas) . . . is 
to show our neighbors that Democracy can thrive in the 
tropics and that the happiness of a people can best be 
insured by giving them the amplest freedom in the 
management of their affairs . . . the nations of Asia are 
counselled to entrust the solution of their internal problems 
to decisions of the people through the processes of free 
discussion and deliberation.28    
 
Challenges of state included lack of a properly working bureaucracy, the lack of a 
professional military and continued oligarchic control of police and private armies in the 
various provinces.29 Many of the landlords in the provinces, particularly in the grain-
producing lowlands of Central Luzon Island, used force to quell peasant unrest. These 
provincial warlords, such as Pampanga Governor Pablo Angeles David, took advantage 
of the vacuum created by the postwar disarray, particularly from the central 
government.30 The government faced formidable obstacles, such as wartime 
collaboration, bills for compensation, and the need to resolve peasant uprisings against 
local landlords. The Filipino political system was patterned after the American model, 
though as a centralized republic with its capital in Manila. The largely elite-dominated 
legislature proved to be a rival to the executive. Scions of elite families and individuals 
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who owed their advancement and affiliation to these patronage networks dominated the 
judiciary. The political and economic elites dominated Congress, the Executive and the 
Judiciary. In these factional conflicts, Roxas used his national and provincial networks to 
win during the 1946 presidential election and consolidate power from the Nacionalista-
dominated Congress. Roxas was helped in large part by the phenomenon of “block 
voting,” which when augmented with patronage would have been an effective 
mechanism for the elites to maintain power.31 Roxas sought to obtain reconstruction 
funds from the US.32 The Filipino President did not hesitate to ask for financial help 
from its former colonizer, due to the challenges of reconstruction, so long as it served 
Filipino ends.33 
Filipinos knew that they needed foreign help and expertise in building and 
developing the nation. The Roxas government used the presidency and the government 
to rally support for US capital and technology, while also building up local infrastructure 
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and production.34 This government program for development included areas as far as 
Basilan Island, such as with a plan to plant palm trees in a land that enjoyed “even 
rainfall” all year-round, and the high process due to the demand for that product in the 
global market.35 The government objective was to uplift the welfare of the lower and 
middle class Filipinos. This lent the mirage of a top-down, state-centric brush to the 
nation-building enterprise.36 The Roxas administration had always believed in the 
primacy of state power. Given postwar conditions and the government’s desire for 
consensus, consolidation entailed cooperation from leaders from various parts of the 
archipelago.   
Money was needed to finance Filipino reconstruction. The Philippine 
Rehabilitation Act of 1946 ensured the provision of US $620 million for public and for 
private war-damaged properties.37 The highly controversial Philippine Trade Act (or Bell 
Trade Act of 1946) provided for the “duty-free” importation of Filipino-made goods by 
the US for a period of eight-years, before raising the tariffs gradually until reaching full 
tariff by 1974. But there were onerous provisions for the Philippines that restricted 
Filipino manufacturing goods that might compete with US goods. A provision giving 
American and Filipino prospectors equal rights to invest in the country’s natural 
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resources and ownership of stakes in the public utilities proved controversial.38 The 
premise behind the Bell Trade Act of 1946 was that domestic production in the islands 
had to be made efficient, personal incomes had to increase, while the standard of living 
was “below pre-war level.39” The dilemma according to George Taylor, in his work The 
Philippines and the United States, was that Filipinos “had to decide which they wanted 
more, their traditional value system or adequate economic growth.” Taylor further 
argued that Filipinos cannot have both.40 The best way to approach Filipino indigenous 
agency when couched in terms of national “development” was that Filipinos ultimately 
expressed agency through the prism of Filipino visions and ambitions. That Filipinos 
sought external aid such as from its former colonizer, America, did not submerge the 
indigenous agendas that lay underneath.  Manuel Roxas warned Filipinos that: 
 
. . . you must not have the impression that our economic 
and social rehabilitation can be  achieved merely by 
approval of the Rehabilitation Acts or by the inauguration 
of my administration. The assistance derived from 
America will merely give us the means or part of the 
means which we need to effectuate our economic 
reconstruction.41    
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The Third Republic saw the treaties it signed with the United States as ultimately 
beneficial to Filipinos. Filipino Senator Ramon Diokno stated that even as he disagreed 
with the Roxas administration for having pushed for those trade deals to be passed, these 
treaties were still a product of Filipino consensus. But while there was public support 
amongst the majority non-elite Filipinos, there was also much disapproval.42 The 
challenge for the Roxas administration was to show that the state and the nation-building 
project could be a vision shared by all Filipinos with a common future. Therefore, the 
chief of state exhorted Filipinos to help build the nation, stating that: 
 
. . . the actual work must be done by ourselves. You can’t 
expect everything from the  government; the 
Government alone can’t create the wealth needed for the 
sustenance of the nation. This duty devolves upon all our 
people for their individual welfare and out national 
prosperity.43    
 
The Roxas administration sought to build industrialization and an export-based society.44 
The state encouraged practicality in advocating for trades and crafts to promote 
industrial efficiency. It saw the necessity of fighting on two fronts: crime and poverty.45 
The State placed emphasis on the health of ordinary Filipinos, such as during the 
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tuberculosis crisis in Manila and the provinces.46 The State looked after the “nutritional” 
well-being of ordinary Filipinos in urban and in rural areas.47 Meanwhile, the Executive 
worked harmoniously with the Filipino Congress, with a record 119 bills acted upon, and 
97 passed.48  
Filipino print media, meanwhile, ran editorials that urged the administration to 
focus more on developing self-sufficiency.49  Broadsheets such as the Manila Post 
suggested that the solution for ordinary Filipinos lay with working hard and relying on 
themselves rather than on external assistance, as this appeared to be the only way 
Filipinos could express their independence as a people.50 That Filipinos were supportive 
of the United States did not mean that the Philippines saw themselves as dependent on 
the former colonizer. 
 
Security and Nation-Building: Debates over US Bases    
Another source of nationalist controversy in Filipino society was security, 
namely the issue of whether there should be permanent US bases in the archipelago. A 
Military Assistance Act was passed on June 26, 1946, prior to the granting of 
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independence in July of that year. The Act entailed a group of US military officers 
coming over to the Philippines for help in the planning of the Philippine Army. The US 
Military Bases Agreement was signed on March 14, 1947, while the Military Assistance 
Agreement was signed March 21, 1947.51 The negotiations over the bases revealed the 
reluctance of the United States to base forces in the archipelago. Filipinos were willing 
to welcome American forces for Filipino security, with the qualification that Filipino 
sovereignty and jurisdiction be respected.   
In 1946, the State Department debated where to place the US military in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and along with Pentagon military planners, leaned toward basing in 
Guam, Korea and Okinawa.52 The reason given was that sites such as Guam and 
Okinawa were “much easier to defend,”  the US Congress was becoming reluctant to 
“fund a spending spree” for bases, and that the United States had to defend Europe 
against the Soviet Union due to rising Cold War tensions.53 High Commissioner Paul 
McNutt in December 1946 informed President Roxas of an impending drawdown of US 
forces in Manila, since the Philippines was not considered by the US government as a 
priority for basing.54  
President Roxas supported the presence of American military bases in the 
archipelago. The Filipino President, in a speech to the Filipino Congress in January 
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1947, stressed the continued need for a US military presence and for external economic 
aid. This expression of intent did not sit well with Filipino nationalist politicians who 
opposed the perceived dependence of the US on its former colonizer.55 The nationalist 
Senator Lorenzo Sumulong criticized Filipino independence as conditional due to the 
potential for permanent American military bases in the archipelago, despite Filipino 
attainment of independence.56 In an interview with the Philippine National Broadcasting 
System, Roxas sought to reassure and assuage fears that the potential presence of 
American air and naval bases in the Philippines would not infringe on Philippine 
sovereignty.57  Roxas argued, during a radio interview with Harkness, that:  
 
. . . There is no major group in the Philippines which 
seriously objects to American bases in the Islands. As far 
as the great majority of Philippine people is concerned, 
they welcome the use by the United States of base 
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facilities for the protection and defense of both the 
Philippines and the United States. 58   
 
American policymakers were not as eager to station permanent US forces in the 
Philippines, as was often assumed. There were debates taking place among American 
officials over the “potential withdrawal of United States forces from the archipelago.” 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to President Harry Truman, and restated the 
State Department’s recommendation that “the United States withdraw all its army forces 
from the Philippines, with the proviso that should the Philippine government request that 
some forces remain such forces should be small in number.” Acheson mentioned to 
Truman that Filipino President Roxas stated to Acheson the position of the Filipino 
government, “that the Philippine government does desire the maintenance of some US 
military bases in the Philippines [and that] the Philippine Government desires the 
retention of such United States troops as may be required for bases.” Acheson cited the 
approval of the Filipino Congress in 1946, stating their desire for US forces to remain in 
the archipelago, where bases were “deemed necessary for the mutual protection of the 
Philippines and of the United States.” Acheson reiterated his previous position that 
should the US President find it helpful, Truman might want to issue a directive that 
“token US forces be continued in the Philippines.” The Filipino government stated that 
Roxas’ “public statements” and the government position reflected the general Filipino 
consensus. Roxas apparently did want to make it appear that the Filipino government 
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was merely acceding to an American “request.” 59 The Filipino government also 
“objected” to the idea of permanent bases in the urban areas, such as Manila.60      
Even United States’ agencies were divided on the issue. The US military had 
other views apart from the bureaucrats in Washington DC. A subsequent note the same 
day on December 24, 1946, described the concerns of the military. The Acting Chief of 
Staff of the War Department in Washington DC sought to bring to Truman’s attention 
the unlikely event that “the small force and defense installations now projected will not 
be sufficient for the defense of the Philippines.” The United States, according to the 
American official, should be wary of “entering into any mutual defense arrangement by 
which the US guarantees the security (of the Philippines).” 61   
The major issues involved during the 1946 debates between Filipinos and 
Americans, included the stationing of permanent bases in the archipelago, transfer of 
bases from the United States to Filipinos, and military and financial assistance by the 
United States to Filipinos. The US War Department wanted to maintain “a large number 
of troops in the Philippines,” proposing the retention of installations such as the Nichols 
Base Field and Fort McKinley, both located just outside Manila.  Americans GIs based 
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in Manila, particularly in the Nichols Field Base, did not exercise discipline. There were 
reports that the Filipinos were unhappy with the prospect of a continuing American 
presence. The Roxas administration ended up issuing an “ultimatum” that the United 
States could not obtain “public acceptance of a military agreement that provided for the 
maintenance of bases, (referring to these bases which the United States wanted to retain 
near Manila), in a metropolitan area.” The War Department, realizing that it could not 
obtain the money needed to “maintain the forces” the United States had on the ground, 
instead gave the Roxas administration an offer to “withdraw entirely from the 
Philippines unless the Philippine government requested the American forces to stay, (in 
the event, the United States would then be willing to maintain token forces in the 
Philippines).” The War Department offered to station forces instead at Clark Air Field 
and thus withdrew from the other bases they previously sought to station troops in. The 
Navy Department reduced its offer to just stationing forces in the naval base at Subic 
Bay.62 
The United States sent a group of Army officers to the Philippines to begin talks 
with the Filipino government and help build a Philippine Army. It appeared that 
Filipinos had other plans. The Filipino government would only accede to the American 
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plan to organize the Filipino military, if the United States were to provide a certain 
amount of money (US $9 million) to Filipinos. Otherwise, Manila would instead 
organize the Filipino army as it saw fit, and not according to American advice. The 
United States, according to the report, was trying to figure out how committed America 
must be in stationing military forces, including advisers, in the archipelago given that the 
Filipinos had their own plans for their own security in any event.63   
The United States, in addition, acceded to the request by the Filipino government 
to transfer some of the bases America formerly held. This was particularly true for the 
bases which the United States acquired from Spain at the turn of the century. The official 
“position” of the Filipino government was that “all the bases not specifically retained 
under the Bases Agreement virtually automatically passed to the Philippine 
government.” The US War and Navy Department’s position was that the United States 
had “certain rights and titles” to land obtained “from private owners by expropriation.”64 
The American plan was to “persuade (Filipinos) in return for the surrender of these 
rights to expropriate and turn over to the United States additional areas [they] say they 
need in the vicinity of Clark Field and of Subic Bay.” The report concluded, stating that 
“it did not seem likely that the Philippine government will be moved from its position 
that all unreserved bases reverted to Filipino hands.”65      
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The United States eventually settled for staying, due to more potential real estate 
for permanently emplacing its armed forces in Asian locations. Another document dated 
November 23, 1946, bluntly described the position of the Joint Chiefs when it came to 
the presence of military bases. Their “strategic concept” foresaw “not only the adequate 
defense of the Philippines but the utility of a Philippine area for staging and mounting 
sizeable air and ground forces,” should any future conflict arise. American military 
chiefs had also gone over the “global implications” of a potential US military withdrawal 
from the Philippines. The chiefs were worried that the prospect of US withdrawal “might 
be interpreted as an indication of a decreased US interest in the Far East, including 
China.” The United States also believed that complete withdrawal might “prejudice” the 
American position in the eyes of the Chinese, the Japanese and the Koreans, which 
might lead to a military vacuum. The action might be construed as “desertion” by some 
of the pro-American Filipinos.66 The US government was willing to accommodate itself 
to the requests of the Filipino government.   
The American report also looked at whether the presence of US bases in the 
islands would affect the “good faith” that existed between Americans and Filipinos. 
Washington always believed that “the independence of the Philippine government has 
resulted from the common action of our two peoples.” American officials assumed that 
the US-Filipino relationship was critical for America’s standing in the world. The  
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military and strategic importance of US Army troops” in the Philippines, therefore 
should be “weighted” with this in mind.”67  
American military authorities expressed skepticism with regards to stationing 
permanent bases in the archipelago, arguing that “any base rights in the Philippine 
Islands would be of very limited value, if not a source of weakness, without the full and 
complete cooperation of the Filipino people.” Therefore, the US Joint Chiefs came up 
with the recommendation for withdrawal, although they foresaw the eventuality that 
Filipino authorities may seek some forces to remain, “for reasons of political and 
military security.”68 The defense authorities would also be working with the Department 
of State to arrive at a plan for the phased withdrawal of American military forces in the 
Islands. The Defense Department agreed with the previous State Department report that 
only limited forces be retained in the islands. These forces “consisted approximately of 
one composite air group with a very small ground detachment.”  The military report also 
considered complete withdrawal of US forces from the archipelago, with only a 
“request” to be made for “long term air transit rights.”69  The United States, as much as it 
hoped to maintain strong ties with Filipinos, did not wish to be seen as continuing 
empire in its former colony and in a Cold War decolonizing world.      
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On December 24, 1946, Harry Truman laid out the policy of his government with 
regards to the potential withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines. In it, the 
American President stated that the US War Department would adopt as:  
 
. . . settled policy a program of withdrawing as rapidly as 
possible the major part of our  forces in the Philippines in 
particular from the metropolitan area in and around the 
city of Manila, but that the limited forces . . . be retained in 
the Philippines on such bases as will be available to this 
Government under the military base agreement now being 
considered by the two Governments.70  
  
 
The 1947 Military Bases Agreement, originally supposed to expire in 2046, eventually 
opened 23 military facilities across the country to US forces, the most critical of which 
included the sprawling Clark Air Base, with its excellent training area in Crow Valley, 
and the deep-water Subic Bay Naval Base.71 The Agreement proved very controversial, 
especially amongst poor residents and 1,200 families in Mabalacat site who lived near 
Clark Air Base, and whose lands were declared “a US Army reservation.”72  Some 
argued that America exerted undue “pressure” on the Filipino government to approve the 
Military Bases Agreement of 1947 where US advisers would train the Filipino military.73 
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American stationing of troops in a foreign land was not a blank check in the eyes of 
Filipinos.  
The United States Military did not enjoy full freedom even as America obtained 
bases in the islands.  A State Department Memorandum as early as late 1946, showed 
that the Americans were trying to abide by the intentions of the Philippine government 
regarding the size—and the strict Filipino oversight-- of the military forces deployed to 
the islands.74 Some critical issues involved surrounding the presence of US bases, 
included jurisdiction over the trial of American soldiers, sailors or civilian employees 
who broke Philippine law. The issue was whether the accused US military personnel 
needed to be tried in US or in Filipino courts.75 There was also the continuing dispute 
over titles to the baselands and over compensation.  
By 1948, the US State Department sent out its decision regarding the “future 
disposition of bases not retained under the US Military Bases Agreement.” According to 
the American Secretary of State, “all thought of attempt to bargain on the question of 
exchange of lands should be abandoned,” while Filipinos were to be informed by the 
American representatives that, “while the United States was advised that it had legal title 
to the property, it proposed to transfer it as soon as possible to the Philippine 
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government.”76 Some American figures had other opinions, such as General Dwight 
Eisenhower, who believed that the value of the US-Filipino special relationship overrode 
whatever strategic or symbolic value the bases held for American Cold War strategy in 
the broader region.77     
US President Harry Truman responded to the State Department’s concerns on 
July 1948. Truman stated that he completely agreed with the Secretary of State “that the 
bases the United States did not need,” must be turned over to Filipinos “without 
compensation.” Truman furthermore said that “if title is not clear, we should make it 
clear by the proper transfer.” And on September 1948, the Secretary of the Navy stated 
in a letter “. . . that the Navy proposed to transfer to the Philippine government without 
compensation certain land to which it held title and in return ask for certain land to be 
transferred to it.” A request was to be made by the United States to the Philippine 
government to recognize that America had a legal title to the US bases in the 
archipelago, “as was listed in Annex A of the Military Bases Agreement,” signed 
between the two countries back in 1947.78   
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America was chiefly concerned that Filipino nationalism might turn “anti-
American.”79 American policymakers saw the danger, as a result of the economic crisis 
then gripping the Philippines, of appeals by the outsized, wealthy and powerful Filipino 
Chinese, the Huks, the Filipino Communist Party and American communists in the 
United States.80 There was fear that Filipinos, should they feel that the US had 
“abandoned” support for the Filipino cause, might abrogate the mutual security and 
defense treaties, or even worse, elect someone like the ultranationalist Claro Recto. 
American policymakers therefore believed that America needed to continue providing 
aid, advice and assistance to Filipinos if only to have some form of postcolonial 
leverage.   
Filipinos were also looking for leverage over the Americans. They found it 
through American Cold War security fears. The Roxas administration knew that the 
United States was searching for as many allies as it could find against the Soviet 
Union.81 This meant that America could not interfere as much as it hoped for, or wished 
to in the internal affairs of its former colony. The Filipino political leadership was aware 
of where it stood in its relationship with the US and knew how to take advantage of their 
relations with the former colonizer.82 This was highlighted in a speech to the Philippine 
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Bar Association, where Roxas stated that the Philippines was in charge of its internal and 
foreign affairs.83 The United States was allowed by Filipino authorities to set up bases in 
Filipino territory which also meant the potential for local jobs and prosperity in the base 
areas. Filipinos would enjoy security while the United States would have another host 
country for their forces. Roxas welcomed US forces in, although the American presence 
subsequently led to issues over sovereignty and bases jurisdiction during the coming 
years.84 Before his unexpected passing, Roxas delivered a speech at Clark Field, where 
he lauded the presence of US military bases, such as Clark Air Force Base. The 
American report dated April 1948, which drew its cited passages from the Filipino 
newspaper Manila Times, stated that the Filipino President made it clear that “. . . the 
existence of such an American base in the Philippines was brought about through 
voluntary and free choice in the Philippines . . . that its main purpose was to insure 
mutual security of the Philippines and of the United States . . . “85 Security was but one 
of many Filipino concerns in building the Filipino nation. 
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Bringing All Groups Together: Elite and Non-Elite Filipinos  
Defining Filipino identity was often a challenge in state and nation-building. A 
radio interview with Manuel Roxas over the National Broadcasting system back in 1946 
revealed that Filipinos had dilemmas not only over unity but over self-identifying as 
Asians.  Roxas was asked about the “racial relationship of Filipinos to the other peoples 
of the Orient, Filipino customs in the islands and the prevalent language. The Filipino 
President answered that Filipinos were related to its neighbors by virtue of a common 
Malayan heritage. But Filipinos also did not interact much with their Asian neighbors 
over the centuries, according to Roxas. Referring to the heritage of centuries of Spanish 
colonialism, Roxas said that 90 percent of Filipinos are Catholics. Also, despite the 
proliferation of so many local dialects, the common language used and understood by 
Filipinos was still both English [and Tagalog] in 1946.86 At the time, Spanish, the other 
colonizers’ language in the archipelago, was only spoken by less than 3% of the 
population by the late 1930s, according to a survey done under the then-Philippine 
Commonwealth.87  
A common national language also played a critical role in the expression of 
indigenous identity and in nation-state building in the islands. This was true given the 
multiplicity of the dialects which existed across the archipelago. A national language 
appeared to be needed. Debates over the national language dated back to the 
                                                 
86 Radio Interviews over the National Broadcasting System, May 16, 1946, 37, Papers, Writings and 
Addresses of Manuel Roxas, Lopez Museum Library.   
87 Brands, Bound to Empire, 147. 
 51 
Commonwealth period. Some, such as politician and educator Rafael Palma, as early as 
1930, argued that, “to adopt Tagalog as a national language would be to isolate the 
Philippines from the rest of the world.” Apparently, Palma’s views evolved over time. 
By 1935, Palma became a leader of a faction in the Philippine Constitutional 
Convention, (which helped draft the 1935 Philippine Constitution) that supported 
Tagalog as the Filipino national language.88  
The opposition to Tagalog as the national language extended to the non-Tagalog 
ethnicities. Manuel Quezon’s representatives were tasked with propagating the teaching 
of Tagalog in schools across the archipelago. These representatives encountered 
challenges from regional groups in the central Philippine islands such as the Cebuanos, 
another major ethnicity speaking a different dialect. The Cebuanos were opposed to the 
work of the Institute of the National Language, which they perceived as favoring 
Tagalog too much. They therefore sought to present alternatives. The Cebuanos even 
mobilized groups such as the Kaumahang Binisaya (Bisayan Culture), where one of the 
members, a Vicente Sotto, “prepared a grammar and a dictionary.” The Cebuanos also 
argued that the Bisayans were “numerically superior to the Tagalogs.” In 1938, the 
Institute of National Language sent Professor Cecilio Lopez to Cebu to pacify groups 
that arose over the issue. Only Quezon’s “moral suasion and authority” prevented an 
“open rift” on the National Language question. Even Quezon’s authority, according to 
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Gonzalez, did not result in acceptance by many non-Tagalogs until much later.89 
Receptive adaptation of Tagalog only took place, once the Third Republic was able to 
plant Tagalog’s roots throughout the rest of the archipelago. The language question also 
exhibited the value of state power in consolidating people, especially when negotiating 
contested spaces and encountering various forms of local resistance.     
Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon supported the idea of a national 
language. In 1937, Quezon “proclaimed the Tagalog dialect as the basis for the national 
language of the Philippines.” According to the Commonwealth President back in 1938:  
 
. . . we will not be conscious of oneness as a nation until 
we speak a common language. . . ridiculous and 
humiliating that often Filipinos have to use a foreign 
language to understand each other. . . Do not attempt the 
impossible, do not attempt to make it (referring to English) 
the national language of the Philippines because it will 
never be.90   
 
A passage in a Philippine Magazine article stated back in 1938 that “. . . it must be 
admitted that English . . . stands very little chance to become the language of the masses 
or the people.” According to a Jose Hernandez, “. . . with independence, English will 
recede more and more to the background.”91 In 1939, Quezon, speaking in Tagalog 
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(which was then only used by a quarter of all English-speaking Filipinos), proclaimed 
Tagalog as the “national language of the Philippines.”92    
In 1940, Quezon “authorized” the Institute of National Language (established 
under Commonwealth Act No. 184 back in 1936) to print a dictionary and grammar. 
Also, in 1940, Tagalog came to be taught in all Filipino schools.93 The problem, as 
Andrew Gonzalez stated, was that the Commonwealth government, working with 
Filipino schools, found that there was a “shortage of teachers” that could teach Tagalog 
to Filipino schoolchildren.94 Scholarly works on the Tagalog language also began to 
appear. In 1940, a book entitled “Sinupan ng Wikang Tagalog,” by Professor J. Sevilla 
and A. Alvero studied Tagalog as an “ancient system of writing.” Other works involved 
looking at “the principal orthographic symbols of the ancient Tagalog syllabary,” 
“Tagalog syllables,” and “the value of accents in the Tagalog language.”95    
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Filipino independence on July 4, 1946, marked the time when Tagalog became 
an official language for Filipinos, within the context of a sovereign state.96 The lively 
debates over the national language continued after independence. A Saturday Magazine 
issue with an article entitled “Our Language Problem Remains Unresolved,” in 
December 1946, tackled the multiple voices and debates surrounding Tagalog not only 
amongst Filipinos, but even some Americans. The issue offered a sampling of opinions 
on Tagalog as the Filipino national language. A Mr. McNutt, appearing to favor the 
English language, critiqued the “misdirected pressure for a national language in the 
Philippines.” McNutt warned others [referring to the non-Tagalog speaking Filipinos] of 
the danger that in using Tagalog, “we might be reviving an ancient dialect as a vehicle 
for your thoughts.” A local Jesuit, Fr. James Reuter, criticized McNutt’s statements, 
arguing that McNutt “virtually advocated the use of English as the Philippine National 
Language,” when Filipinos looked like they needed the national language.  The Manila 
Times in December 1946 also opined that the issue over the national language could lead 
to “super-nationalism.” Filipinos were divided regarding the national language situation 
during the early years of independence.97  
This ambivalence amongst Filipinos was evident in a survey of the opinions of 
some well-known Filipinos. A congressman criticized the “Tagalog business” and 
doubted the concept of a “national language.” Another congressman from Pangasinan 
province in Luzon Island stated that “. . . The American language is good, but I don’t 
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agree that a Filipino should rise to protest against the use of his own tongue . . .” In 
addition, a “majority” of the representatives in Congress from the southern Philippines 
criticized Tagalog as the national language. On the other hand, renowned linguists such 
as Jose Villa Panganiban advocated for a common national language.98  
The teaching of Tagalog as a required subject for all high school students in 
public and in private schools across the country from the first grade to the fourth year of 
high school, began in 1946. Tagalog education was divided between the school system 
and formal education. But there was no principle of bilingualism to teach Filipino 
schoolchildren. According to educational researcher Andrew Gonzalez, “Filipino 
children from Grade One on were taught the national language as a subject of study, a 
content subject, and were taught about the language rather than how to communicate in 
the language.” Furthermore, Filipino school textbooks at the time showed stress on the 
grammar of Tagalog, as seen in the Balarila textbook. Reading activities were limited to 
Tagalog literary masterpieces said to “have been incomprehensible even to the adult 
native speaker of Tagalog living in Manila and accustomed only to the colloquial variety 
of Tagalog.”99 Despite this initial limit, the number of Tagalog speakers in the islands 
grew from 4,060,859, or 25.5% out of a total of 15,900,436 Filipinos in the 1939 census 
to 7,101,196 or 39.4% out of 18,024,365 Filipinos in the 1948 census.100 Tagalog as a 
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source of unity was pushed not only by the state through education but spread through 
Tagalog’s increasing use in wider society across the archipelago.      
Meanwhile, state power was weak and Filipinos needed to be gathered together 
to develop the nation, with the Third Republic as the legitimate expression of indigenous 
Filipino nation-building. In the aftermath of World War II, challenges of state included 
“. . . the destruction of Manila, the displacement of landlord power in the adjoining 
provinces, and the disruption of plantation agriculture . . .”101 Minority groups and 
individuals across the islands and far from the national capital were enjoined to 
participate in the Third Republic’s national state-building project.102 The Roxas 
administration used colonial methods and local, provincial ties to consolidate its power. 
In the southern islands, numerous “Moro tribesmen and chieftains” were enjoined to 
resolve their differences, to unite, and to work with one another. In exchange, the state 
government will work for the “agricultural rehabilitation” of the province.103  
The state also granted “universal suffrage” and took steps to make the status of 
many provinces “regular,” similar to the rights enjoyed by other provinces. According to 
Roxas, the objective was “to bring more democracy to the people concerned.” This 
entailed appointment of governors and of provincial board members “from natives and 
longtime residents in the provinces,” and to encourage these municipal districts to 
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“organize themselves into regular municipalities.”104  Nation-state building had a 
territorial aspect to it.    
The Roxas administration sought to alleviate postwar conditions for ordinary 
Filipinos. Roxas knew in 1947 that he needed the State to deal with the Chinese, who 
controlled key sectors of the economy such as lumber, and hence, the prices for building 
materials. To avoid further potential domestic discord between Filipinos and the 
Chinese, the Filipino President asked the Chinese to find ways to deal with the situation 
by “bringing down the prices.” The Chinese lumberman agreed to “cooperate” with the 
Roxas administration on lumber pricing, according to a Manila Times article dated 
February 1947.105  
The state knew that many Filipinos needed available low-cost housing, in the 
aftermath of the ravages of World War II, particularly in, but not limited to the Manila 
area. The government, through the National Housing Corporation, embarked on a 
“building program” to resolve the “acute housing shortage in Manila and in the 
provinces.” The government purchased a factory from the United States for use in the 
“manufacture of hollow blocks for home-building.” The Filipino government acquired 
the factory in 1947 at a cost of 70,000 Philippine pesos. Government also sought to work 
with private enterprise in the country to help quicken the reconstruction of homes, 
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particularly bungalows, in rural areas all over the country.106 Government-sponsored 
housing was provided for poor Filipinos. Homes were constructed for low-income 
government employees. This process entailed the cooperation of various government 
corporations.107  
Roxas used his executive power to boost Filipino confidence and engaged in 
presidential tours, (often with heavy turnout numbering up to 150,000 people in 
provinces like Cebu) where he delivered speeches across the archipelago. Boy Scouts, 
students, youth groups, municipal officials flocked to provincial capitals to listen to the 
President speak. The ordinary Filipino may not have the money or the political power 
but expressed his/her individual agency through voting and the use of family and 
informal community linkages to influence others.108 Mobilizing people in the age of 
Roxas entailed an effort by the weak state to reach out to the non-elite Filipinos, who 
often mobilized collectively to bring themselves close to the center of power.   
The non-elite Filipinos in the rural areas were not passive, dependent and merely 
being reactive to the edicts coming from Imperial Manila. In one of his provincial sorties 
in 1947, Roxas observed that there was a growing “Town Hall movement.” Roxas let it 
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be known that he viewed this movement’s growth positively, as it would stimulate 
“discussions of live issues and important subjects confronting the New Republic.” The 
Chief Executive also let it be known that the “Town Hall” could ideally include 
“matured people,” and “respected members of the community” such as “professional 
men, businessmen, publishers and welfare workers.” Furthermore, according to the 
Filipino President, “. . . if the Town Hall could create sufficient interest in the 
community, businesses would back it up financially and see that it grows in stature . . . ” 
Interestingly, Roxas also hoped that the Town Hall “be kept out of politics and avoid 
controversial subjects that will tend to divide people into groups . . .” Roxas hoped that 
the formation of the Town Halls “. . . manage it in such a way that it will gain the 
support of responsible people,” and that the best people to lead these kinds of 
movements would be “civic-minded people with academic backgrounds,” who would 
gain the respect of the community. Government would play a role in encouraging the 
Town Hall movement by making available public buildings for discussions.109    
Roxas also kept the local leaders, who also served as “middlemen” between the 
non-elite Filipinos and the central government in Manila, at arm’s length. For instance, 
Roxas met in 1948 with many political leaders and government officials in Iloilo 
province during one of his various conferences. Roxas used the opportunity to 
demonstrate the administration’s intent not to “tolerate election irregularities,” and 
instructed the local officials and the campaign volunteers to do everything to insure 
“clean and peaceful balloting” in the concerned provinces.  According to the people 
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whom the President met in Visayan provinces such as Leyte and Iloilo, Roxas had 
“made clear to all political parties concerned and to all local government agencies that 
the government will do its best to guarantee a clean and absolutely popular suffrage.“110 
These initiatives from the central government to bring Filipinos together 
extended to the Moros. In an address to an assembly of Moro tribesmen in Lanao, Roxas 
mentioned to the Moros that they had exhibited loyalty to the Philippines during World 
War II and had fought alongside Christian Filipinos. Therefore, the government 
promised to help develop the region. The government also sought Moro cooperation to 
resolve challenges such as the proliferation of firearms in the countryside and Moro 
slavery of Christian captives. The central government intervened in the latter, with 
Roxas giving the Moro slavers a month to set free the Christian slaves whom the Moros 
were holding.111  
Filipinos also possessed a continued tendency to be regionalistic and 
nationalistic. This was true in the use of word nation-building. Vice President Quirino, 
who came from Ilocos province, said that his home province needed an “industrialization 
program” involving factories, harnessing hydroelectric power in big rivers, provision of 
weaving machineries from Japan, the creation of a port of entry in the provincial capitol, 
the construction of roads, bridges, and of public buildings.112 Quirino also exhorted 
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Filipinos already based in the United States to return to the Philippines and help “rebuild 
the nation.” In Quirino’s eyes, the United States is “rich,” and America did not need 
Filipino industrial skills “in the same way that the Philippines does.”113  
The Roxas administration promoted autonomy outside Manila by allowing local 
leaders in the provinces to decide on local appointments, taxation and licensing goods in 
the local markets.114 The government also discouraged the practice of reliance on 
subsidies, given the state of government finances and increased taxes at the time.115 This 
level of intervention sought to prevent too much regionalism that only benefited local 
“bosses” amassing power and control over scattered, rogue provinces that threatened to 
spin out of Manila’s orbit.116 Roxas did not feel constrained by the limits of the weak 
Filipino state during his administration. He used the opportunity for the state to 
encourage local Filipinos in the provinces to work independently by finding ways to 
build and develop the communities and regions. 
 
The Huk Challenge  
The communist Huks had their early origins, according to American reports, as a 
“farmer tenant organization in Central Luzon.” The Huk movement in the central plains 
arose during the interwar 1930s as a result of grievances against the “large landlords of 
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Central Luzon.” The reality was that there were simply too many people for so little land 
available. The Huks ran the landlords “out of the provinces, harvested the rice, kept out 
the crops,” and fought the Japanese. The Huks were consolidating its strongholds to 
control the Central Luzon provinces. At the end of World War II, the Huks enjoyed huge 
stockpiles of arms, which they were reluctant to surrender to the returning Americans or 
to the Filipinos.117 The Huks apparently wanted to retain control over the tracts of land 
they controlled, while continuing to stockpile arms for what they saw as the looming 
conflict with the government in Manila in the coming years. The returning US and 
Filipino forces disarmed the Huks, arrested the leaders, and dislodged them from the 
territories Huks once ruled over since Washington [and the restored Commonwealth 
government] was afraid of the specter of a Manila that would lean towards the 
communists.118 Similarly, the elite Filipinos in Manila and their landlord allies in the 
rural areas have always viewed the Huks in the late 1940s as a dangerous force since 
they allowed the peasants “a taste of local power” in the areas it ruled over, to garner 
local support.119  
The Huks had always opposed Manuel Roxas, as they felt that he was an ally of 
the landlords. Throughout 1946, government and allied local forces employed a 
“pacification campaign” in suppressing the Huks in Central Luzon.120 This did not mean 
that Roxas would not or could not negotiate with the Huks. Roxas preferred that the 
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Huks surrender their arms.  But many of the Huks did not trust the Roxas government 
and both sides were exact opposites in terms of ideology.121  The central government’s 
approach towards the Huk challenge in 1947 involved using the Third Republic as a 
bulwark against general lawlessness and to promote the state as the only force capable of 
protecting the ordinary Filipino in the rural areas from elements beyond the individual’s 
control.122   
Huks presented the foremost challenge to the Third Republic’s quest for security. 
According to American estimates, the Huks numbered 15,000 heavily armed guerillas 
and enjoyed “wide support” among 2.5 million impoverished peasants in the central 
plains of Luzon.123 Filipino intelligence estimates were more accurate, as Filipinos in the 
field enjoyed the advantages of local familiarity. Filipino Constabulary Colonel 
Napoleon Valeriano believed the American figure of 10,000 to 15,000 fighters to be 
somewhat exaggerated, though that number might be true as loose arms abounded, with 
an estimated 250,000 Huk sympathizers in early 1946.124   
The Filipino Third Republic knew that the Huks presented a dangerous 
alternative to Manila’s state and nation-building project. The objective of the 
government was to “isolate the Huks.” With sustained offensives throughout 1946, the 
Huks were forced on the defensive and decided that they needed to establish a presence 
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in the neighboring regions to serve as fallback in case Huk positions in Central Luzon 
were overrun by the government’s forces. Their fighters were subsequently reduced to 
conducting hit and run ambushes against the central government in Manila. The Huks 
sought to appeal to the Constabulary soldier, arguing that the Filipinos should not fight 
other Filipinos, but to fight their “common oppressors,” referring to the Manila-based 
Third Republic. As part of its propaganda campaign, government portrayed the Huks as 
“bandits” and proclaimed that the “peace and order” problem has been settled.125  
Why did the government perceive the Huks as particularly dangerous? The 
scholar George Taylor argues that the Huks during and after World War II created an 
organization that defied traditional landlord-tenant relations. Huks offered non-elite 
Filipinos the promise of a break from what many Filipinos perceived as the 
“paternalism” and domination of landlord families. The Huks possessed cross-regional 
appeal, “demanded institutional loyalties, had a military machine and the potential to 
create national and international networks (due to their communist ideology).126 Huk 
demands also did not sound unreasonable to some of the ordinary non-elite Filipinos.  
These demands, expressed in negotiations between 1946 and 1948, were limited to 
agricultural reforms, the dismantling of vigilante groups, blanket amnesty for their 
fighters and legislative seats in government.127  In short, Huks cultivated an image of 
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being sensible to some Filipinos, which made them especially dangerous in the eyes of 
the Third Republic.  
Aside from the military-oriented “Iron Fist” approach, the Third Republic used 
other means to suppress and co-opt the Huks. Government worked with the local 
landlords to negotiate over agrarian reform. The Roxas administration knew that 
grievances over centuries-old landlord-tenant relations set the stage for the Huk 
rebellion. Therefore, the government bought some landed estates to be resold to tenants. 
The State also labelled the Huks as “outlaws, criminals and subversives.” The State also 
refused to provide amnesty for communist rebels in 1948.128 In the eyes of the Filipino 
government, Huks were seditious and wanted to overthrow the Filipino government. 
Huks were outlawed on March 1948, while affiliated associations were banned.129  
Government stressed people’s rights as it continued its counterinsurgency 
campaign in 1948 to counteract Huk appeal.130 The Filipino President, in an address to 
the members of the armed forces and the other agencies tasked with internal security, 
encouraged the soldiers to become familiar with and respect the civil liberties of 
ordinary Filipinos.131 Roxas stressed the obligations of Filipino citizenship, of those 21 
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years old and up, in mass assemblies held in barrios, towns and cities.132 The state in 
return would focus on making social security more effective and far-reaching, enact and 
implement more liberal banking laws, as well as private and public disability insurance 
benefits.133 These measures were meant to counteract the idea that the Huks were more 
concerned about people’s welfare than the Third Republic was. Under Roxas, 
government efforts to integrate the Huks would not be effective since the government 
refused to include the Huks in the political process and instead relied more heavily on 
military measures to bring the fighters to heel.134  
As the scholar Luis Francia had argued, Cold War realities led America to view 
the communists as a threat. Similarly, the Third Republic saw in the Huks not only a 
military danger, but an ideological rival that sought to gain the appeal of the peasantry 
that would eventually “seize state power” and take the Third Republic’s place.135 The 
Third Republic found Huks threatening because the rebellion posed a threat to national 
unity. Huks also employed what they called “popular democracy” to gain the support of 
peasants. In the eyes of the United States, of elite Filipinos, and of many non-elite 
Filipinos, there was reason to believe that the Huks sought power and control over the 
countryside.136 Renato Constantino argued that the United States had also been playing a 
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role behind the curtains by encouraging the anti-communist Third Republic not to allow 
the Huks any participation in public life.137 The Huks caused sleepless night in Manila 
and across the islands.       
Provisional local governments, with the tacit support of Manila, organized 
“armed and special agents” to deal with the Huks. Filipino army MPs carried out 
campaigns against the communist insurgents that resulted in the “improvement of the 
situation to some extent,” but Huk terror continued to stalk the countryside.138 The 
Roxas administration used the indigenous Military Police Command (MPC) of 23,000 
soldiers to crush the peasant revolt.139 Early efforts only produced limited success as the 
Huk rebellion rapidly turned into a brushfire. Roxas outlawed the Huks and their 
political arm, the Filipino Communist Party. A “full scale civil war” thereafter broke out 
in Central Luzon.140 Regional landlords exerted their local hold outside Manila while 
corruption pervaded the inner sanctum of Manila’s political elite.  The Filipino 
Constabulary, like its predecessor, the Filipino Military Police Command (which was 
“poorly trained,”) was said to have “standards of leadership and conduct (that) were 
considerably below . . . prewar performance.”141 The communists organized and 
established elaborate supply lines connecting regions, mountains, barrios and camps to 
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ensure good communications and logistics.142 The scholar Masuda Hajimu argued that 
the Filipino government therefore felt increasing pressure by the later 1940s to portray 
itself as more Filipino and as the “protector of the Filipino nation,” as opposed to the 
communist Huk rebels who were growing in popularity among some peasants in the 
Central Luzon plains.143 Huks were portrayed as separatists undermining Filipino 
internal security and seeking to impose communism in the islands.   
Not all Filipinos wanted to tie the Huk insurgency to Filipino external security. 
There were voices, even at the highest levels of the Filipino political world, arguing that 
the Philippines must not be involved in superpower rivalries just because of domestic 
events. Elpidio Quirino argued that the Philippines “will not be directly involved” in a 
potential war since the country was “too far away.” According to the Vice President, 
“the atomic bombs will fall not on Manila, Cebu, Iloilo or Vigan but on Honolulu and 
New York or Washington or Chicago, on Moscow and the other teeming cities of 
Russia.“144 Quirino’s ideas suggested that Filipinos must chart their own collective 
destiny.  Quirino’s own presidency was not too far away.   
Roxas died of natural causes on April 16, 1948, after delivering a speech in Clark 
Air Field, leaving much unfinished business.145 The diplomatic historian Milton Walter 
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Meyer, in A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, argued that one of Roxas’ 
concrete legacies was in having formulated the “nature of the economic and military 
ties” between the Philippines and the United States. These were said to have served as 
the foundations for Filipino state policies towards the United States for the years to 
come.146 Roxas was succeeded by his Vice President, Elpidio Quirino. Upon taking 
office, Quirino immediately sought a resolution to the Huk problem. The new President 
sent military detachments to rural areas to warn villagers not to leave, and prevent local 
governmental officials from deserting their local posts.147  
 
Conclusion    
At the outset, the Third Republic and the Roxas administration did not see any 
role for the Huks in Filipino nation-state building. The Third Republic under Roxas used 
a largely military-oriented approach and refused to compromise with the Huks. The 
government painted the Huks in the eyes of the other Filipinos as threats to state stability 
and a dangerous rival to the quest for legitimacy by the Third Republic. The failure to 
integrate the Huks in Third Republic state and nation-building, Renato Constantino 
argued in The Continuing Past, resulted in the expansion of the Huk rebellion to other 
parts of the archipelago. The spread of the Cold War to Asia, beginning with the fall of 
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China in 1949, was said to have increased Huk appeal in terms of “armed strength and 
mass support” in the central lowlands of Luzon.148 Local conditions, particularly the 
government’s dependence on landlord support, and a natural aversion to communism in 
the islands, played a role in the unwillingness to include the Huks in the national project.  
Taylor’s The Philippines and the United States argues that the Third Republic 
found the Huks threatening because they were the only other organization aside from the 
Third Republic that mustered enough support and had the potential to gain legitimacy 
across the archipelago. Rural Filipinos were getting exasperated by the government’s 
initially clumsy campaign of mass terror in the countryside, as well as the reformist 
impulses which many mistakenly believed that the Third Republic and the Huks shared. 
The resolution of the Huk challenge was to reach its climax during the Elpidio Quirino 
years. This meant that Filipino nation-state building during the Roxas years would still 
largely be a work in progress.    
 Reconstruction and rehabilitation revealed the extent with which Roxas used 
local and international networks to pursue the Third Republic’s vision for national unity.  
The Filipino state used its position to encourage practices such as autonomy and of self-
sufficiency. The state alleviated the plight of many non-elite Filipinos, using state 
resources to promote development such as building infrastructure.  Filipino authorities 
invited the United States in and signed treaties with it. Filipinos believed that a strong 
postcolonial relationship would be in the best security, economic, and trade interests of 
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the country. The Philippines could have easily not invited the Americans in to 
permanently station forces in bases across the islands, given that there was little danger 
then coming from Nationalist-ruled mainland China. Cold War fears could also not be 
used by Filipinos to invite the Americans in, at least until the fall of China in 1949. But 
Filipinos continued the post-colonial relationship with America, aware that the United 
States was eager to preserve its credibility in the region. The Quirino years was to be a 
litmus test for Filipino indigenous agency.  
 Filipino society was changing, with the national language a source of unity. More 
Filipinos used Tagalog, since it was being taught in the state educational system. More 
Filipinos were slowly learning the language and using it more widely outside Manila. 
According to the scholar George Taylor, in The Philippines and the United States, even 
as Filipinos spoke both English and Tagalog in the aftermath of the American colonial 
period, Tagalog in the next decade increasingly became more widely used in society.149  
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                
RESCUING THE NATION-STATE? THE CRISIS YEARS AND THE MAKINGS OF 
A FILIPINO NATION BUILDING IDEOLOGY, 1948-1951 
 
Every right-thinking Filipino should realize its importance, 
not only in the light of our present needs, but in the light of 
our future destiny as a sovereign people. I know we could 
make progress only if we dedicate our time . . . in greater 
economic pursuits independent of outside help. We should 
remember that the present achievements and economic 
standing . . . were particularly the result of . . . internal 
collective efforts. Let that be a lesson to us.1 
 
- An anonymous faculty member from the College of Education of a 
local university in Manila, on the need for Filipino self-help and self-
sufficiency   
 
 The years 1948 to 1951 saw the survival of the Filipino nation-state building 
enterprise called into question. The state appeared to be losing its moorings as the 
leading expression and vessel of Filipino nationalism. This period saw the spread of the 
Huk insurgency, money shortages, security issues, accusations of corruption, dirty 
elections, and growing public discontent over how the Filipino government was run. 
Filipinos on the street became more critical of the government’s perceived dependence 
on the United States for Filipino security and foreign aid. The Third Republic used Cold 
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War security rhetoric at home and abroad to paint the Huks and the Chinese-Filipinos as 
threats to the state. Domestically, the state promoted the idea of a strong center that 
would unify the nation. Internationally, Filipinos under Quirino promoted “neutralism” 
as an alternative to communism and to establish Filipino leadership in Asian affairs. 
Contrary to the one-dimensional view of corruption and mismanagement which many 
often associated with the Quirino administration, the Third Republic in fact possessed a 
well-defined and coherent, though not well-known, ideology for nation-state building in 
the islands.    
This state ideology as described in a State Department report on Quirino, 
involved the creation of a distinctive “Filipino” nation which combined “democracy” 
and “communism” with indigenous elements. The state vision was of a government 
being cleansed of graft and of corruption. The government would then help establish 
peace and order. Government would guide the masses so that they would not be 
“exploited.”  Government would encourage “openness to new ideas,” foster “peace and 
national unity,” in order that “foreign capital” and investments from the United States 
would flow to the islands.  This supposedly would bring about prosperity. The State 
would therefore play a leading role in the “development” of the country’s natural 
resources and consolidate all government-owned corporations.  The Quirino 
administration desired help from the technical expertise of development consultants 
from other countries.2 All these together constituted a well-articulated ideology, which, 
                                                 
2 “From Thomas Lockett to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, “Subject: The Tour of President 
Quirino through the Southern Philippines, November 22 to December 4, 1948 ,“ December 8, 1948, 2, no. 
 74 
if Filipinos applied it to their country’s modernization needs, would promote inclusive 
nation-state building.  
The Third Republic’s nation-state ideology possessed similarities and 
parallelisms with American approaches to nation-building. Works by scholars such as 
Daniel Immerwahr’s Thinking Small, David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission and 
Jeremi Suri’s Liberty’s Surest Guardian, discussed at length how American ideas and 
practices affected post-colonial development. All these works stressed, in many ways, 
that the American model could be replicated elsewhere. The idea of replicating and 
transplanting America elsewhere could be found in Suri’s chapter on the Philippines, 
which discussed efforts to build colonial public education in the islands at the turn of the 
century. Immerwahr reveals the role of grassroots organizations in rural Filipino 
communities during the Magsaysay years; Ekbladh offers a kind of meta-argument that 
colonial peoples such as Filipinos could only be brought up from colonial backwardness 
into modernization under American stewardship. All these works generally argue that 
the empire-state or the nation-state during the 1900s made use of teachers, travelers, 
government workers, community workers, and organizations to build up the state and the 
nation. However, these development scholars tend to overlook that peoples such as the 
Filipinos possessed their own ideas on development and knew how to bring indigenous 
dreams, ambitions and visions into reality in their own soil.   
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 Vice President Elpidio Quirino succeeded to the Presidency after Roxas passed 
away unexpectedly, after delivering a policy speech at Clark Air Force Base. At the 
beginning, Quirino was regarded as an accidental President, since Quirino was neither 
Roxas’ nor the Liberal Party’s anointed successor. But Quirino acted swiftly, working 
with Filipino congressional leaders. The Filipino president promised to “put the interests 
of the country” over that of the party. Upon taking office, Quirino paid attention to 
pressing issues such as the “law and order problem” in Central Luzon. He also promised 
to deal with “graft and corruption,” to maintain friendly ties with the United States, and 
“direct visits to troubled areas and points of interest in the Philippines,” especially in 
lands controlled by the Huks.3 The general consensus according to US State Department 
observers was that Quirino in 1948 had a good start. A local newspaper article stated the 
opinion that, “Politics in the Philippines, at best, is an uncertain profession and the office 
holder who today is winning public acclaim may tomorrow be suffering public 
ignominy.”4 
The new Filipino President sought to be a unifying figure. Quirino invited 
opposition figures to serve in the government. For instance, a Manila Times article 
written during the first few months of his presidency narrated Quirino’s belief that Jose 
Laurel’s “experience and background in administration [was] invaluable to the 
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Republic.”5 The President crossed party lines and included those “outside the 
government now or who belong to minority groups that may be invited to serve the 
government in these critical times.” According to Quirino, “It is of great importance to 
utilize the services of the best available men . . . In a spirit of national unity, we must 
count on all elements available to cooperate and lend their services to the 
administration.” Unity would not only include the cabinet but “all levels of government . 
. . such as diplomatic positions abroad, key positions in the government corporations, 
and perhaps the Council of State,” in the utilization of talents previously untapped. The 
purpose of “drawing in of outside talents to the fold,” according to Quirino, was to put 
“an end to petty personal strife engendered by some elements,” and for the nation to 
work together for a common national interest.6 
Effective nation-state-building also meant transcending regional differences. The 
new President came from the northern Ilocos province but told “a group of officials and 
political leaders,” that “his administration will not tolerate any act of favoritism in favor 
of Ilocanos and asked the Ilocanos in general never to expect special consideration from 
him as chief executive.” Quirino believed that “individual qualifications alone will 
determine the appointment of persons . . .  to avoid any group of people from having a 
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monopoly of the government service during his term.”  Quirino most likely was referring 
to any ethnicity or tribe that might exert any undue influence on government matters 
arising from who was currently living in the presidential palace at the time. The 
newspaper Manila Times stated that the new President wanted to avoid the impression 
that he was favoring people from his own region and that he was “determined to give 
people from all regions of the country equal opportunities in the government service.”7  
Quirino echoed common national goals such as “improving living standards 
[and] cooperation between capital and labor,” and the creation of a “Labor-Capital 
Advisory Board.”  This undertaking was not a top-down affair since labor and peasant 
groups (e.g. Congress of Labor Organizations, the National Labor Union, the Philippine 
United Peasant and Labor Organization), as well as nationalist politicians (e.g. Jose 
Laurel, Lorenzo Tanada), participated in this collective project.8 The President 
undertook a “new development program.”9 One of Quirino’s innovations included “a 
nationwide ocular survey covering key points of the archipelago.” The purpose was to 
obtain data that would “revise the financial system” to help strengthen the monetary 
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situation of the republic. The national project also involved the “revamping of the 
educational system,” and “pushing through an economic rehabilitation and social 
amelioration program.”10    
Quirino believed in strengthening Filipino youth. In an address at a public 
university in Manila, Quirino stated that the student “no longer confines himself to the 
four walls but the world has become his classroom.” Quirino believed that “a university 
does not stop at simply making knowledge and wisdom available to all; it should train 
the students to make use of knowledge and wisdom to attain the biggest possible 
measure of usefulness in the everyday life of their community and country.” Quirino 
also knew that Filipinos belonged to the “eastern world,” with “no less than a billion 
people whose potentialities are scarcely developed, and are at least not as exhausted as 
those of the old world or of the new world.”11 These reflected Quirino’s belief that the 
classroom and the outside world cannot be treated separately. It was Quirino as the old 
barrio teacher at work again, this time on a national scale.      
 The Quirino administration paid attention to local community concerns. The 
objective was to consolidate the nation and to counter-act the appeal of the Huks by 
increasing government involvement in the rural communities. For instance, Interior 
Secretary Sotero Baluyot in 1948 publicly broached the necessity of bringing Manila 
home to the barrios when he related how a sick man in Siquijor province in the Central 
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Visayas region mentioned to Baluyot “that there were not enough government 
physicians.” The Secretary used this example to stress why the Quirino government 
should “bring government closer to the people.”12 Quirino had appointed Baluyut as 
Interior Secretary to prosecute more strongly the war against the Huks. Baluyut was a 
former governor of Pampanga province in Central Luzon.  Many labor leaders saw him 
as a foe.13 Quirino possessed ardent anti-communist leanings and this was one example 
of how Quirino intended to fight the Huks. The Third Republic also opened up 
international spaces in their war against the Huks through an anti-communist foreign 
policy. 
    
Towards An Independent Filipino Foreign Policy  
The US-Filipino relationship deteriorated rapidly as Americans and Filipinos 
realized the wide gulf separating them. Quirino believed that Filipinos needed to pursue 
their own course. Quirino promoted “neutralism” in Filipino foreign relations. The 
Filipino President argued that Filipinos were neither communist nor anti-communist. 
Quirino believed that Filipinos would “respect” what kinds of governments their “Far 
Eastern neighbors” would choose to have, as the main priorities of Filipinos involved 
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“economic prosperity,” and “our own happiness.” The Quirino administration gathered 
together the non-Communist Asian countries to promote “regional cooperation” in 
“social, economic and cultural” matters.14 This was not surprising. During the later 
years, Carlos Romulo would write in his memoirs that Americans possessed a tendency 
to assume that “American-style democracy” would be “native to Asia.”15  
 Quirino and Romulo, appointed as Foreign Secretary, worked together closely in 
foreign policy. In a letter, Quirino stated that a new national objective was “forging a 
closer union among the peoples of Southeast Asia dedicated to the maintenance of peace 
and freedom in the region through appropriate methods of political, economic and 
cultural cooperation with one another.” Quirino believed that Filipinos needed to be 
proud of their history and culture, despite centuries of colonial domination. During its 
years of colonialism, Quirino mentioned that the Philippines “had the oldest and most 
aggressive nationalist movement in Asia,” that Filipinos were the first to achieve 
independence in the post-war period and “have consistently defended the right to 
freedom of subject peoples around the world.” Quirino further argued that Filipino 
freedom was “part of the first wave of Asian freedom,” and that Filipinos also looked 
forward to the eventual freedom of other Asian countries (such as of Indonesia, which 
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would gain independence in 1949).16 As early as 1950, Filipinos were increasingly 
seeing themselves as part of a growing regional Asian and Third World nationalist 
consciousness.  
In 1949, Quirino sent Romulo as representative to the New Delhi conference in 
India, since Quirino was “convinced that the Philippines had a special responsibility to 
support the struggles for freedom of the Asian peoples.” Quirino instructed Romulo to 
“sponsor the idea of establishing a permanent organ of consultation on problems of 
common interest among the countries of Southeast Asia within the framework of the 
United Nations.” Filipino participation at the conference was seen by Filipinos as an 
“outstanding success.” Quirino credited Romulo for the “establishment of a suitable 
machinery for consultation.” Romulo also helped ensure that “participating countries 
exhibit[ed] keen interest in establishing a permanent organization to safeguard their 
common interest.” Quirino and Romulo worked to create “a parallel safeguard for 
Southeast Asia” that would be similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
Europe.17 The Filipino role in regional cooperation initiated by Quirino and Carlos 
Romulo continued to express itself during the Baguio Conference, where Quirino 
highlighted the:  
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necessity of accelerating the process of establishing a 
union, predicated upon the independence and sovereignty 
of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the countries of the 
Pacific so that, masters of their own destiny, they can 
concentrate their attention to their coordinated full 
development in order to ensure their stability and security 
and thus contribute to world peace and advancement.18
  
 
Quirino envisioned that this “Union” would not be involved in military commitments but 
would be based on an act of “common faith” among the countries. The union would 
entail cooperation at the economic, political, and cultural levels.19 The underlying 
Filipino ideology for this proposal was based on the idea that “our strongest defense 
against totalitarian subversion would lie in providing a life of substance and contentment 
and promoting higher living standards among the Asian peoples.”20 Quirino and Romulo 
knew that the Philippines could use its advantage as an independent state and as an 
Asian country to become a leading voice in Asian regional affairs.  
The elites were not the only players involved in talks surrounding the Pacific 
Pact. The Manila Times conducted a survey of the “domestic reaction” in 1949 to the 
Pacific Union proposal worked out by Quirino and Nationalist China leader Chiang Kai-
Shek. The results, according to the newspaper’s provincial correspondents in “strategic 
provinces,” showed that there was “popular approval” across the archipelago. This was 
despite the presence of opposition. The strongest support appeared to be in northern 
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Luzon, particularly in Ilocos Sur province. This was where Quirino came from, and 
where the Manila Times correspondent editorialized that “the President cannot be wrong 
and that whatever commitments he has made are for the best interests of the 
Philippines.” An opinion from Legaspi town in Bicol region in south-east Luzon Island 
expressed that the union was an “effective means of counteracting the onslaught of 
communism in the Far East.” Government and businessmen in the Huk-occupied areas 
supported Quirino’s initiative. The newspaper survey extended to foreign merchants and 
to ethnic minorities from elsewhere doing business in the Philippines. Local Indian and 
Chinese businessmen in the town of Tuguegarao, Cagayan province in northeast Luzon 
declared that “this united front of Orientals will bolster the resistance to communism in 
the Far East.” Other newspapers such as the North Star in the President’s hometown of 
Vigan in Ilocos Sur criticized Quirino for dealing with Chiang Kai-Shek but praised the 
talks. For these local newspapers, “the talks have established for the Philippines 
leadership in Asian affairs.”21 Filipino expression of indigenous agency in the 
international scene under Quirino generally enjoyed public support, although there were 
voices in the opposition.  
Opposition to the Pacific Pact came from a few, local militant newspapers in the 
islands. One of these newspapers, the Pioneer Herald, criticized Quirino’s efforts at 
forming a union as an “under-estimation of the communist threat and ignorance of 
communist tactics.” US foreign nationals were also opposed to the Pacific Pact. An 
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American veteran who served as reserve officer in the United States Navy was 
concerned that “the Pacific Union will eventually lead to war because America will have 
to arm all Pacific countries to encircle Russia.”22  
Quirino’s proposed Pacific Pact of 1950 possessed overtones of neutralism. It 
brought together countries such as Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, Australia 
and New Zealand, to safeguard against external aggression. The United States and India 
were treated as vital external actors although Jawaharlal Nehru was skeptical that an 
Asian version of NATO would materialize “until present internal conflicts in Asia were 
resolved.” The United States saw the notion of a defense pact in Asia as “redundant,” 
and ran the risk of drawing the US into conflicts with countries such as Communist 
China in the mainland. Quirino, working with Romulo, had to shelve the plan for a 
Pacific Pact and instead proposed a collective Southeast Asian “close political, economic 
and cultural cooperation.” This new plan stressed “defense against totalitarian 
subversion by promoting higher living standards among Asian peoples,” instead of 
“military commitments.”23  
The historian Milton Walter Meyer, in A Diplomatic History of the Philippine 
Republic, described Quirino during these years as a visionary who “stressed non-military 
ties in regional unity.” The diplomatic offensive, spearheaded by Carlos Romulo, 
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stressed that the purpose was to contain communism by any means, even if this involved 
countries such as India under Jawaharlal Nehru, and the United States under Harry S. 
Truman. Quirino also supported the prospect of Indian leadership under this proposed 
Southeast Asian Union (SEAU), with the caveat that the meeting to establish this union 
was to be held in the Philippines. Quirino’s geographical dream expanded to Middle-
Eastern countries. Quirino hoped that a “Democratic League of the East” would 
materialize.24 The Philippines, at the height of the Huk rebellion, possessed ambitions to 
lead Asian countries.   
In any event, a conference took place in Baguio on May 1950, where participants 
from many countries in Asia were invited. The attendees included Australia, Pakistan, 
India, Ceylon, Thailand and Indonesia. The Philippines served as host while Nationalist 
China was not invited since that country was seeking military aid to fight the 
communists. Quirino took the lead in setting the tone and the agenda for the meeting. 
The agenda included “discovering mutual interests,” “meeting common internal 
problems through collective action,” and initiating machinery for a concrete base for 
regional collaboration.” Romulo added a “security dimension,” where security was 
defined as internally oriented, rather an outwardly aggressive. The conference did not 
deal with military cooperation and open anti-communism. It focused instead on 
economic, social, and cultural issues. The resolution, collectively adopted on May 30, 
1950, resulted in a recommendation that “participating governments take common 
measures to promote commercial and financial interests and unite their efforts to 
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facilitate cultural progress and social well-being.” There was no political organization 
built, nor was there a machinery for an established organization. Instead, Asian 
governments were to “consult through normal diplomatic channels, seek joint action in 
United States organs, and insure that Asian viewpoints be consulted in world 
consideration of Asian problems.”25   
Meyer’s book argued that while Baguio did not result in the formation of an 
organization, the conference brought together many Asian countries. The gathering 
together of these nations established “neutralism” as a force in regional Asian affairs. On 
the eve of the Korean War on June 22, 1950, Romulo argued that the United States must 
“recognize the validity of neutralism in world politics, understand that democracy did 
not necessarily work in Asia and not to brand all national movements as communist.”26 
These events provided a preface for what the Philippines and Romulo would express 
during the subsequent Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955.     
Meanwhile, the Quirino administration signed the 1951 US-Filipino Mutual 
Defense Treaty for Filipino security. This treaty bound the United States and the 
Philippines militarily, where the United States would consider an armed attack on the 
Philippines as an armed attack on American soil. Many domestic critics such as Recto 
were skeptical. The critics believed that the United States was more likely to adhere 
strictly to its alliances with the “North Atlantic” countries and cited the American 
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inability to defend the Philippines back in 1941 from the Japanese.27 Quirino believed 
that the treaty was a concession that Filipinos would find more safety in the American 
alliance, but for the time being it met mutual needs.28  Filipinos also tended to assume 
that US-Filipino ties possessed a sentimental aspect, due to the long decades of 
American benevolent colonial rule, and the close working relationships between 
American officials and many Filipinos. The Filipino critics believed that in the Cold War 
world, and in the “American fight against communism . . . It is not probable that Uncle 
Sam will be more considerate to the Philippines than China or Formosa because of 
sentimental reasons.”29 Within the state, there were therefore multiple contending voices 
on Filipino security.    
 The state also consolidated people, using the specter of the alien “other” that 
would threaten the national project.  Filipino leaders created the “Committee on Un-
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Filipino Activities” on the premise that communist Chinese foreign agents were working 
with the local Huk guerillas to “promote domestic subversion” against the Filipino Third 
Republic. The chairman of the committee in the Filipino Congress, Tito Tizon, 
mentioned to the local press that the Chinese- Filipino and Huk alliance appeared to be 
“far more dangerous to the Philippines” than the Chinese communists from the 
mainland.30 Equally interesting was Quirino’s belief that the Philippines must not be a 
puppet of anyone. According to Quirino, Filipinos must be wary of “elements” that 
sought to “justify foreign intervention and ultimately deliver this free country into the 
grip of either the old colonial powers or the latter day imperialists, the Communists.” 
Quirino argued in his monthly radio chat on June 1950 that there must be more emphasis 
on uniting people, and a “cooperative effort for development.” In Quirino’s eyes, the 
greatest danger was “destroy [ing] public confidence in the constituted government,” as 
this would risk benefiting communists and colonialists. Quirino viewed imperialism and 
communism as equally bad.31 The President’s foreign policy views were also 
complemented by his desire for a strong Filipino state domestically.  
 
A Strong State  
Quirino’s patronage networks provided a stumbling block to efforts at effective 
nation state-building. The consolidation of these networks resulted in a greater emphasis 
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on Manila as compared to the Roxas administration.32 This view of a strong state based 
on patronage networks was in contrast to Quirino’s predecessor Roxas, who believed in 
a looser and more consensual approach to cooperation between Manila and the 
provinces. Roxas believed that the state alone must not take the initiative. Roxas 
believed that for “economic and industrial development” to take root in places such as 
the southern regions, the “rival Moro tribes” must come up with ways to unify and 
resolve disputes on their own.33  
Quirino believed in bringing Filipinos together. Quirino expressed this in an 
interview, where the President argued that people in Visayas and Mindanao needed to 
share the burden of what he defined as “nation-building.” Interestingly, Quirino also 
reflected the view of the Filipino elites based in Manila towards the provinces. The 
President stated that “the once backward people of Mindanao have matured with a sense 
of responsibility.” In his radio interview, the President stressed that the provinces and the 
villages all form part of a “national backyard,” which Manila must help transform.34 The 
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Third Republic based in Manila saw it as necessary to assert Manila’s capacity to unite 
all Filipinos together, in light of the Huk rebellion in the rural areas.  
Upon taking office on April 1948, Quirino initially adopted Roxas’ methods and 
“brutally” cracked down on the Huk uprising.35 But Quirino’s hardline efforts towards 
Huks were neutralized by the widespread corruption under his administration, which 
partly fueled the continued strength of the Huk rebellion. The Third Republic was 
encountering a crisis of legitimacy in the midst of a growing Filipino civil war.  Quirino 
believed that granting amnesty to the Huks would lead many of the guerillas to officially 
register with the government and surrender their arms, but the turnout by surrendering 
Huks was low in 1948. Huks such as Luis Taruc stated that they would not lay down 
their arms so long as the bases and US imperialism continued to be present in the islands 
which Taruc believed the Third Republic and Filipinos must not be fighting for.36 
Officials in the Third Republic strove to find a middle ground though to no avail. 
Meanwhile, Carlos Romulo rejected an American proposal to send its own troops to 
suppress the Huk uprising and to forestall a potential Huk takeover, however remote. In 
Romulo’s eyes, “the Filipino people can and will do their own house cleaning.”37 The 
resolution of the core dilemmas of Filipino nation-state-building lay with the Filipinos.    
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Meanwhile, Quirino was not deeply popular with the Filipino public by the end 
of his second year in office late in 1949, an election year.38 The 1949 presidential 
election was the first to be held under the Third Republic.  The United States was 
surprisingly well-informed. But their observations and assessments were often limited to 
events taking place in Manila, through the US Embassy. An American “personal and 
confidential” report on the 1949 Filipino presidential election looked at the main 
candidates, their political ideologies and the major issues involved. The 1949 
presidential election was described in the report as a three-way race between the 
“Quirino wing” of the Liberal Party, the breakaway “Avelino” wing, and the former 
Second Republic President Jose Laurel of the Nacionalista Party. Incumbent President 
Quirino enjoyed the advantage of political machinery. The National Elections 
Commission gave Quirino’s Liberal party “two elections inspections for each polling 
place as against one each for the other parties,” while Jose Laurel enjoyed the support of 
former President Osmena, who continued to hold sway in his old power base in Cebu 
Island. Filipino party politics during the presidential election that year was highly 
factional and prone to defections back and forth between the Liberal and the 
Nacionalista Party. The American report also described the Filipino electoral system as 
working through “block voting,” as “one X of the pen in the proper block includes the 
whole ticket.” Former Chairman of the Liberal Party and candidate Jose Avelino, a 
presidential candidate, was in charge of “appointments throughout the provinces, 
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municipalities and Chartered cities.”39 What this American document showed was that 
the system of patronage politics connecting state and society remained the same, an 
observation not lost on Americans and Filipinos alike.    
The 1949 Filipino presidential election was the first election where rural 
Filipinos began to play a more pronounced role. The American report described the 
candidates for the 1949 Filipino presidential elections as travelling physically to the 
most distant barrios to obtain votes. Issues raised also involved Laurel’s “collaboration” 
with the Japanese. This was a concern shared by American observers, who described 
Laurel as “collaborationist,” and “definitely anti-American.” Quirino was slightly 
favored to win the election, although the report stated that Laurel had a decent chance to 
win. Laurel’s argument capitalized on lingering anti-Japanese resentments amongst the 
Filipio public. According to Laurel, he managed to prevent the Japanese from 
conscripting Filipino youth from serving in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy 
during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II.40 Both 
candidates presented stark alternatives and subscribed to the same patronage networks.  
Local newspaper accounts on the presidential elections, such as the Manila Times 
in September 1949, tended to favor Quirino. One account described Quirino on the 
campaign trail. In a transcript of a fireside talk in Zamboanga, Mindanao that was 
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rebroadcast nationwide, Quirino stated in the talk that the issue “is the plow and the 
pen.” Quirino also argued that he espoused “creative economics,” describing Laurel as a 
“self-styled intellectual.”  Quirino argued that he had a “definite” economic plan and 
program for development, and could inspire people to help realize these plans while 
Laurel simply had an “idle” dream to be “personally vindicated” by winning a 
presidential election.41   
The 1949 election campaign was described as messy and violent. A month before 
the election, on October 1949, Quirino’s rivals in Congress unsuccessfully sought to 
have the President impeached. Quirino blamed the attempt on his opponents Laurel and 
Avelino. The November 1949 election was said to have involved taking “fraud and 
intimidation to a new level.” Private armies battled at polling stations where 1/5 of the 
ballots were deemed as “fraudulent.” Government troops under orders of President 
Quirino suppressed “an election day uprising in Laurel’s home province of Tarlac.” The 
Huks sought to take advantage of the chaos by arguing that the ordinary Filipino could 
“hope for nothing” from the politicians. Nick Cullather, in Illusions of Influence, argued 
that the 1949 Filipino presidential election “accelerated the decline of the Quirino 
government,” and contributed to the increased appeal of Huks for some Filipinos.42     
The 1949 presidential election was seen universally in a highly negative light. 
While the presidential electoral results showed a sizable Quirino victory, a considerable 
                                                 
41 “Fireside Chat Warns Anew of Communism, Asks People to Take Initiative or Forfeit Chance to Red 
Menace,” The Manila Times, September 16, 1949. 
42 Cullather, Illusions of Influence, 81.  
 94 
part was due to fraud. The high turnout in this presidential election and the intensity it 
generated did not obscure the extent to which many local caciques benefited from the 
Quirino regime. The caciques and their allies used their local power, resources, and 
connections to retain, consolidate, and expand their hold on their fiefdom-provinces 
during election period. Filipinos during the time believed that had the 1949 presidential 
elections been held without any violence, voter fraud, and intimidation, the more 
pragmatic Laurel would likely have emerged as victor over the American-supported 
Quirino.43 In the aftermath of this election, many disaffected Laurel supporters came to 
sympathize with or support outright the Huks, not out of sympathy for communism but 
largely due to the Quirino administration’s perceived weaknesses.44  
The weak state under Quirino continued to be on shaky ground after the 1949 
presidential election. The islands were facing a rapidly expanding insurgency that 
threatened to spin out of control, an economic crisis, and numerous corruption 
allegations that shook the political classes.45  This began to extend to US-Filipino 
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relations. Filipino government officials such as Pio Pedrosa argued with US State 
Department officials such as Dean Acheson in 1950 that the Filipino government had 
“misused” 2 billion US dollars of American aid. In a statement commenting on 
Acheson’s charge of misuse, Finance Secretary Pedrosa stated that the government used 
the money for “salaries, wages and operating expenses of military, air, naval and civilian 
installations of the United States in the Philippines.” Others went to war damage 
payments, veterans payments, and the transfer of surplus property.46 All these might 
have given outsiders the impression that Filipinos were still dependent on their former 
colonizer and the American pursuit of Cold War objectives. Money flowed from the 
outside to the islands, which supposedly bred corruption in the eyes of many. American 
policymakers saw an archipelago at risk of falling to communism due to what it 
perceived as corruption, mismanagement and a failing economy.47  
In 1950, Manila was a hotbed of intrigues. The grapevine in Manila’s social 
circles was that the Huks were “months away from capturing the presidential palace.”48 
Quirino suspended the writ of habeas corpus, which curtailed some rights of Filipino 
citizens in the name of national security, to forestall a plot from the communist Huks and 
disgruntled right-wing factions aimed at overthrowing his government.  Quirino’s 
financial adviser, Miguel Cuaderno, warned the President that failure to pay the salaries 
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of Filipino servicemen might prove risky if the Third Republic wished to retain the 
loyalties of its soldiers in the midst of a war against the peasant Huk armies. And at the 
height of the Huk rebellion in 1950, Quirino was rumored to be preparing to flee the 
Presidential Palace should the Huks march into Manila. These were all demoralizing to 
the public. Manila was also barricaded by the government’s armed forces, with sandbags 
lining the highways leading towards the national capital as Huk attacks drew closer.49  
 The situation by mid-1950 in the Philippines was depicted as dire. The scholar 
George Taylor described the government “as practically bankrupt and the government 
was fighting for its life against Communist efforts to seize power.”50 A Manila Times 
article, dated April 1950, illustrated the political hysteria then gripping the archipelago. 
Provincial, city and municipal officials were ordered to undergo a “loyalty check,” and 
were to be removed if they were found to be “in connivance,” or “in sympathy” with 
Huk elements. These stringent measures were to be carried out by the (personally 
unpopular, according to one American report) Interior Secretary Baluyut. Baluyut started 
work in his home province, Huk-infested Pampanga, where he fired several local 
officials “found fraternizing with the Huks.” The accounts also revealed that many 
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officials were hesitant to remain at their posts in these war torn areas. Secretary Baluyut 
simply replaced these officials by others. Quirino also sought the head of the Huk 
Supreme Leader Luis Taruc. Quirino also knew that the problems in the Philippines 
possessed similarities with other countries, and that Filipino problems cannot be isolated 
from the problems of the rest of the world.51 But American officials saw Filipino 
problems differently. 
 
The View From The Street: Non-Elite Filipino Public Opinion   
American preconceptions on race and empire played a role in shaping American 
views of Filipinos. Officials such as US Ambassador to Manila John Melby believed that 
even with independence, Filipinos remained unable to govern themselves. Filipinos 
supposedly held on to primitive beliefs, ideas, values and practices. Similar views were 
held by Dean Acheson and W. Walton Butterworth regarding the capacity of Filipinos to 
defeat communism in the islands due to their supposed inability to govern themselves 
and understand the nature of their own country’s problems.52 American officials, with 
these preconceptions, therefore felt free to give out their own ideas on how Filipinos 
should build their nation. US Ambassador to Manila Myron Cowen in 1949 gave a 
speech regarding the need for Filipinos to embark on self-help measures to avail of 
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greater American aid.53 There were many Filipino responses to the speech. A Filipino 
veteran of the US Army living in Rizal province in Luzon Island expressed his opinion 
that: 
 
Ambassador Cowen’s remarks about the granting of 
further aid to the Philippines if we put our house in order 
first are justified. China’s present situation is a lesson to 
Uncle Sam who is now becoming dollar-wise. She no 
longer believes in mere handouts but in giving financial 
aid which will be beneficial to the country in general.54
   
 
The Filipino military officer believed that the Philippines must learn “to put its own 
house in order first.” This was meant as an admonishment to the Quirino administration 
that the Filipino government needed to focus its efforts on combatting ills such as waste 
and corruption, before going on to other less-pressing priorities and concerns.55   
 A brief survey of other opinions on the street by ordinary Filipino citizens 
showed that many non-elite Filipinos preferred resolving local problems and issues first, 
before asking for outside aid from powers such as the United States. For instance, an 
engineering student at a Manila University agreed with the US Ambassador’s comments 
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regarding “self-help.”  According to the student, there were “so many internal ills like 
peace and order, economic problems and others just as important. All these should be 
fixed first of all so that the American aid will be given to us will be fruitfully used. “A 
bookstore employee opined that “we must solve our home problems first in order to 
deserve more American aid. It is useless to receive aid if the allotment and distribution 
will be hampered by too much internal troubles and problems. It will only result in more 
troubles piling up on our government.”  A self-described blue collar worker reflected 
what the public thought, expressing that:  
 
I have not given the Ambassador’s speech much thought 
because I am only one of the working class. However, the 
policy he advocated really needs close following 
especially from our leaders who are in the habit of making 
promises. They make reports about this and that and give 
assurances that all this and that are okay. You know, it is 
like the saying that a fellow man who talks too much 
should never be trusted because in most cases his points 
are not correct. To deserve more American aid, we should 
really help ourselves first of all.56    
 
 
All these statements suggested that Filipinos knew that they needed to find their own 
path to make the country self-sustaining. The state, mindful of the Filipinos’ well-being, 
also promoted indigenous control of the country’s economy. The Quirino government 
imposed import controls, so Filipinos could get a bigger share of allocations through 
imports as compared to US commercial companies. Quirino also did not heed the advice 
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of the Bell Trade Mission regarding the liberalization of controls, and supported the 
adoption on July 1, 1951 of an Import Control Law wherein the main provision was that 
importers must reserve at least 50 percent of imports for enterprising Filipinos.57 
Filipinos did not listen to American advice all the time and had their own ideas on 
nation-state-building.   
 Filipinos also did not hesitate to express their reservations regarding trade treaties 
such as the Bell Trade Act. A report in 1950 from the Filipino executive office lamented 
the lack of cooperation and trust between the two governments.58 Filipino recalcitrance 
was due in part to the perceived “strings attached” to any such American money. 
America could speak of partnership and mutual cooperation. In reality, Washington 
represented American interests when dealing with Filipinos. It went without saying that 
if the Filipino government accepted American money, the US government would have a 
level of influence in how Filipinos would run their own government. This was true in the 
areas where Washington believed the Filipino government needed improvement, such as 
rehabilitation and reinforcement, such as in taxation, revenue collection, social 
legislation and economic development.59  
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While Filipinos generally saw foreign aid as desirable then, these conditions 
came across as condescending. Foreign aid positioned Americans as postcolonial patrons 
to an independent nation with its own sovereignty. Americans tended to think in terms of 
developmental goals that provided for the material well-being of Filipinos-- but they 
often failed to take into account political culture, history, identity and the native 
psychologies in the course of their involvement. American policymakers tended to 
continue to view the Filipinos as their colonial wards, and the Philippines as a “client 
state” that would toe the line of American Cold War anti-communist objectives. 
Assuming as Constantino et al do that the American role in Filipino economic and 
financial matters was decisive is not supported by the evidence, which is ambiguous at 
best. 
 
American Anti-Communism vs. Filipino Anti-Communism   
American assessments were not only colored by reports on the islands written by 
American policymakers from the State Department. US assessments and analyses were 
also influenced by the elite Filipinos with whom many of these American officials 
interacted with. Quirino, for many of these American observers and practitioners, 
appeared to have been the worst possible Filipino executive at the worst possible time.  
Stanley Karnow, in In Our Image, described the Filipino president as unable to cope 
with the Huk uprising. Karnow argued that Quirino did not appear to understand the root 
causes of the uprising and that the government’s only strategy appeared to consist of 
ordering the Filipino soldiers to hold their ground and destroy Huk-infested villages. The 
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end result therefore was to further increase the number of Huk fighters and 
sympathizers.60  In the perception of ordinary Filipinos, of the landholding cacique class, 
and their allies, the potential victory of the Huks became synonymous with the 
predominance and influence of the Filipinos of Chinese descent, who were said to have 
possessed sympathy for mainland China out of ethnic kinship and a desire to dominate 
economic life in the islands.  
American surveys showed that the Filipino communist guerillas were being aided 
by the Chinese and by the Soviets. The economic crisis also appeared to give the Huks a 
reasonable chance of success.61  A National Security Council document (84/2) dated 
November 1950, entitled “US Policy in the Philippines,” argued that while the Huks 
would be unable to take over the Philippines through military means, the dire social, 
economic and political situation continuously fed the growth of the Huk movement.  The 
report’s assessments of the capabilities of the 26,000-strong Filipino military and police 
in the Huk-infested areas were optimistic, affirming that the Filipino armed forces were 
capable of handling the insurgency.  The report also expressed concerns regarding the 
“potential for subversion” by the large Chinese-Filipino minority, which might produce 
an armed, militant component.62   
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A US top secret report, dated December 27, 1948, looked at the dilemmas faced 
by the Third Republic in integrating the Chinese-Filipinos in the nation- state building 
project. The report revealed the extent with which American officials Ambassador John 
Melby, Major Charles Glazer, and their counterpart Filipino Army Chief of Staff 
Mariano Castaneda viewed the presence of the Chinese in the islands. The Filipino 
Army Chief of Staff expressed his alarm over the dire straits of the Nationalist 
government in mainland China. According to General Castaneda, there were an 
estimated 60,000 Chinese in Manila and with around 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese across 
the islands. The numbers of the Chinese-Filipinos, coupled with the impending fall of 
mainland China to communists would eventually create “difficulties” for the Philippines 
in matters of security, in the eyes of the Filipino General. The Filipino military officer’s 
fear was that the Chinese community in the archipelago had already made 
“arrangements” with Chinese communists in the mainland. The General assumed that 
the Chinese-Filipinos in the Philippines might be “empowered” to become communist as 
a matter of “self-protection” from the Filipino state and people. The Filipino General 
indicated that plans were therefore afoot to “suppress any Chinese activities,” and to 
“completely break any organized Chinese activities,” to forestall any communist 
uprising in the islands.63  
In the eyes of Filipino military officials such as General Castaneda, the inability 
of the Third Republic’s forces to resolve the Chinese/Communist problem posed an 
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existential security threat to the islands. Castaneda stated to the American officials 
during his meeting, that “there would be no communists or Chinese problem today,” had 
military officials like him not been compelled by the Filipino government to release the 
communists, who were arrested wholesale years ago, due to Filipino “public pressure.” 
Castaneda also believed that the biggest problem that Filipinos faced was the “possibility 
of a large-scale Chinese illegal infiltration into the Philippines,” given the extensive 
coastline of the islands, emanating from areas in mainland Asia that recently fell to 
communism. He met American officials to seek American support for an “expanded 
naval patrol,” and a “greatly increased air force” for the Philippines to forestall the 
dangers coming from the Chinese who might seek to enter the islands. The General also 
mentioned the Huk situation during the meeting, arguing that the use of “military force 
alone could not solve the problem permanently.” Instead, there needed to be “a 
concerted government plan to solve the social problem which gave rise to the Huks.”64 
Even the most hardline Filipino officials such as Castaneda, and his Commander in 
Chief, President Quirino, did not believe that the use of force would be the answer to 
Filipino security challenges. But they sought to appeal to American anti-communism to 
pursue indigenous Filipino objectives.  
In the eyes of the Filipino establishment, the Third Republic could use the United 
States by appealing to Filipino and American suspicion of communist Chinese. This 
                                                 
64 General Castaneda also let it be known to the American officials in the meeting that he had gone over 
the contents of what he mentioned to these foreign officials with President Quirino before he met with the 
US officials. This was assumed to be a sign that he was also speaking on behalf of the Third Republic. 
Memorandum of Conversation, “Effect of China Situation on the Philippines,” 1, 2.  
 105 
mutually-shared hostility also extended to the Chinese-Filipinos and the Huks, whose 
loyalties at the height of the communist hysteria were deemed suspect. According to 
Ang Cheng Guan’s article, the Filipino central government’s relations with ethnic 
minorities were often a concern for the Third Republic.  The Quirino administration, 
largely representing the “indigenous Spanish mestizo elite,” and the majority of 
Filipinos, warily eyed the “highly educated urban intelligentsia,” and the 
“unassimilated” Chinese-Filipinos, who were often assumed to be sympathetic towards 
communism.65   
American assessments mirrored Filipino concerns. A secret CIA report on 
August 1950 feared that the Quirino administration’s lack of interest in reform could 
lead to its replacement and the rise of an authoritarian government that could reach an 
accommodation with the communist Huks, A nightmare Cold War scenario for the 
United States had always been the prospect of America getting “cut out” from its 
interests in the archipelago. US policymakers feared a Huk-led central government 
aligning the Philippines away from the United States, and towards the Soviet Union. The 
report saw possible Huk alliances with the Chinese-Filipinos, radical labor groups, 
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armed groups throughout the archipelago, and disaffected war veterans causing serious 
problems for the Third Republic’s nation-state building project in the islands.66  
Other American reports dovetailed with the Quirino administration’s assessments 
on the situation regarding the ethnicities in the islands.  A 1949 pamphlet described the 
300,000 Chinese-Filipinos in the islands as a frequent “target” of anti-communist 
Filipino nationalism. Those of pure Chinese blood were generally considered “alien,” 
“unassimilable,” and as having a tendency to dominate the local economies.  The 
Chinese-Filipinos were seen by nationalists as potential vehicles for the spread of 
communism, due to the suspected relationship of the Chinese-Filipinos with mainland 
Chinese communists.  The ethnic Chinese based in the Philippines were seen as more 
likely to be co-opted by communists. This prospect of collusion was seen as doubly 
dangerous by the concentration of their numbers in Manila.67 American analysts further 
believed that the specter of a dual urban-Chinese and rural-peasant communist threat 
could force the Filipino government to fight a battle on two fronts. The analysts, perhaps 
exaggerating the nature of the threat at the time, feared that the Third Republic may not 
ultimately prevail. The perceived communist threat to the islands undermined confidence 
in the economy, and public support for economic development. The ability of the 
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Quirino government to provide security for Filipinos was also in doubt.68 During the war 
against the Huks, Filipino nation-state building involved viewing and treating the 
Chinese-Filipinos as a potential security threat to the islands.     
Third Republic pronouncements also depicted the peasant Huks and the 
communist threat from mainland China and the Soviet Union as “one and the same.” The 
government accused the Huks of seeking after “Russian aid and ammunition, by 
submarine.”69 The Third Republic believed that Filipinos had no reason to trust the 
communist Huks.  Huk motives were particularly viewed as sinister when former 
Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon’s wife, Aurora Aragon, her daughter Baby, 
and many others in their convoy were assassinated by bandits suspected of being Huk 
fighters on April 28, 1949. Luis Taruc denied the charge that Huks were involved in the 
atrocity and accused the government of whipping up hysteria to galvanize the public 
against the Huks.  But Taruc also responded with class warfare rhetoric, with the stated 
objective of overthrowing the government.70  
Filipino anti-communism also had an international dimension. Filipinos sent a 
contingent under the banner of the United Nations to fight the communists during the 
Korean War in 1950. At a radio chat in September 1950, the Filipino President stressed 
that Filipino participation in the Korean War was an extension of the country’s battle 
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against communism. Quirino said during the chat that Filipinos were loyal to their 
heritage and that they were determined to survive the challenges. The President stated in 
the chat that Filipinos were fighting for what they “. . . believe to be just and right and 
true.” But more critically, Quirino believed that through these actions, Filipinos “. . .   
follow the hard but inescapable way of salvation not as individuals, but as people.”71   
Communism was not the only security issue facing all Filipinos. The government 
also sought to address the other aspects of Filipino security. This entailed dealing with 
crime and disorder. Quirino believed that the Third Republic needed to be a strong state 
but knew that this must be complemented by mobilization at the community level. For 
instance, at a radio talk at the end of August 1950, Quirino described a “dread Red Hand 
of Murder,” which “menaced” communities, and that involved “murder, rapine and 
burning.” There were also “horrible massacres” in some Filipino provinces. The solution 
to this, in Quirino’s eyes, was in “forming neighborhood organizations in every 
community, similar to the Japanese-time vigilance associations.” The undertaking 
involved the formation of “battalions of peace,” and “barangays for peace.”  In Quirino’s 
eyes, people must contribute to their communities and to support the formation of local 
citizens’ armies.72  
The government formed “barangay associations not only as basic civic units to 
promote community welfare.” They were also formed for civilian defense against what 
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Quirino termed as “the treacherous hand that strikes in the dark.” Government was to run 
the country, the armed forces were to undertake “armed action” that guaranteed national 
security, while citizens all over the islands would work on the national project. 
According to Quirino, these undertakings were to be a sign of “people’s readiness to 
invest their resources on courage and faith,” in the objectives of the Third Republic.73  
Huk armed offensives, beginning in March 1950, posed a danger to the Third 
Republic.  By August, Huk guerillas were undertaking multiple hit-and-run attacks and 
raiding ammunition depots.  Al McCoy, in Policing America’s Empire, stated that the 
US National Security Council saw that it needed to promote military assistance so that 
the Philippines can defend itself.74  The Filipino government also believed that it needed 
external aid and assistance from the United States. The American government, 
concerned about events in the archipelago, thereupon suggested to President Quirino that 
he appoint Ramon Magsaysay as Defense Secretary.75 It was a time of a devastating Huk 
rebellion, with the threat of communism internationally and with scarce state resources. 
The Filipino government therefore valued foreign aid and advice to shore up the state. 
But the government knew that it also needed to appeal to the people first and foremost to 
safeguard and consolidate the nation-state building project. 
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Enter Magsaysay: A New Age of Filipino Populism  
Ramon Magsaysay was a populist, down-to-earth, non-elite Filipino. His first 
occupation was as a mechanic. Members of the ruling circles in Manila saw him as an 
honest, relatable, everyday Filipino. Magsaysay became acquainted with American 
officials in Washington early in 1950, when Magsaysay traveled as a then little-known 
legislator who asked for benefits for Filipino veterans of World War II. Magsaysay, by 
chance, was invited to spend the evening with Lt. Col. Edward Lansdale, who was then 
“on loan” to the US Office of Policy Coordination. This office was responsible for 
“covert action” overseas.  Lansdale and Magsaysay had a conversation about the Huk 
threat in the Philippines. Magsaysay’s knowledge of the rebellion, its root causes, and 
what was needed to be done greatly impressed Lansdale and his immediate superior, 
Frank Wisner, who then offered American political support to Magsaysay. America 
subsequently sent Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant to propose to 
President Quirino that the Chief Executive appoint Magsaysay as Defense Minister in 
exchange for vastly increased US military aid to the Philippines. The Quirino 
administration, short of money, quickly acceded to this American proposition.76  
Magsaysay, as a newly appointed Defense Secretary in 1950, worked on building 
up the Filipino military. The Defense Secretary reorganized and enlarged the Filipino 
military to 26 divisions. The victories of Filipino soldiers on the battlefield, beginning in 
late 1950, lifted morale and rolled back Huk advances.77 Filipino officers, with US field 
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advisers, used cash incentives and monetary rewards to pay villagers who would inform 
on the Huks. A government program sought to encourage families of Huks to persuade 
members of their families who became guerillas to lay down their arms and to surrender 
to the government.78   
Defense Secretary Magsaysay knew that he needed to try innovative approaches 
beyond those done under Roxas and Quirino. Magsaysay valued the inputs and the 
involvement of his American advisers, who had advised employing psychological 
warfare techniques locally. This was to counter the Huk insurgents, who were known for 
being superstitious. Lansdale, one of those covert US intelligence officers, believed that 
the Filipino war for hearts, minds and souls could not simply be won on the battlefield 
by crushing the Huks. Lansdale’s familiarity with the local culture, his willingness to 
engage and put in positions of responsibility ordinary Filipinos, his understanding of 
Mao Tse-Tung’s guerilla warfare tactics, such as encouraging the Filipino government to 
become a “brother of the people;” and his marriage to a Filipina reporter all enabled him 
to understand more deeply the root causes of Huk resentment, as compared to many of 
his American contemporaries.79  The Third Republic, to suppress the Huks, made use of 
American Cold War fears, the expertise (and ingenuity) of their US military advisers, 
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and local superstition. On the field, Filipino military advisers worked with their 
American counterparts such as Charles Bohannan, an ethnographer who studied Navajo 
folklore, to look at local traditions, myths, and folklore by studying the worst 
psychological fears of the Huks, who were ultimately products of their local 
environments. 80 The superstitious fear of many peasant Huks of vampires in native 
folklore was used to make the Huks assume that these blood-sucking creatures were 
living in their vicinities. These psychological warfare tactics ended up causing disarray 
and constant fear amongst the Huk fighters during the night.  Other tactics involved the 
sabotage of Huk ordnance, infiltration, demoralization, the use of commandos, trained 
canines, counterintelligence gleaned from former Huks, and the use of napalm by the 
Filipino air force to degrade Huk ground cover and burn rebel food sources.81  
McCoy, in Policing America’s Empire, also described the role played by 
“talented Filipino officers,” such as the ideologue Jose Crisol who supervised the 
propaganda campaign against the Huks by emphasizing politics over outright repression 
of the Huk guerillas.82 Lansdale and Bohannan also relied on the infamous Filipino 
Constabulary Col. Napoleon Valeriano, whose “skull squadrons” were famous for 
chopping off the heads of suspected Huks, to sow terror amongst the Huks and their 
sympathizers. The relationship between Lansdale and Magsaysay became such that it 
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reached the extent of a mentor-protégé relationship where Magsaysay served an avid 
listener to Lansdale’s ideas. Lansdale’s ideas, it was said, flowed into Magsaysay’s 
speeches as Defense Secretary and as President. The relationship was such that the 
journalist Stanley Karnow, in In Our Image, argued that Lansdale had helped “invent” 
Magsaysay.83 Karnow’s views had a tendency to view Filipino agency as an extension of 
Washington’s Cold War objectives in the region.  But the Filipinos were not simply 
henchmen or hirelings of the US military forces or of the State Department in the 
islands. It could be safely said that Filipinos were using American aid and advice to 
pursue native solutions to Filipino problems.   
Magsaysay had many interesting pilot projects to wean the rural Filipinos away 
from the Huks. Renato Constantino’s The Philippines: The Continuing Past, described 
how the Third Republic appealed to the Huk supporters and turned them into ex-Huks. 
Magsaysay’s most prominent program, the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), 
involved the resettlement of ex-Huk families to new farm communities. The program 
was designed to answer the Huk “land for the landless” message to agrarian families. 
The program was meant to entice Huk families with the promise of titles to their own 
land in government-run EDCOR farms.84 Another program, which Renato Constantino’s 
work briefly touched on, was the Magsaysay administration’s “Ten Centavo Plan.” This 
allowed “anyone with grievance or with information about the Huks” to send in a “one 
page telegram,” only worth ten centavos, directly to Secretary Magsaysay. “Free legal 
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services by Army lawyers” were also offered to poor farmers,” courtesy of the 
government. 85 According to Constantino, all these programs ended up bolstering 
Magsaysay’s image as a messianic figure who would “personally and instantly” attend to 
the barrio people’s needs.86 
The Third Republic also embarked on electoral reform. Elections, particularly the 
previous 1949 presidential elections, were widely perceived as dirty and dishonest. 
These dampened public confidence on the government. Magsaysay therefore prepared 
for the 1951 congressional elections, with the help of the National Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL). This volunteer watchdog composed of pro-American Filipinos, 
initially under American leadership, monitored the 1951 parliamentary and the 1953 
presidential election. Their objectives included ensuring clean and honest elections, 
strengthening the electoral prospects and standing of Magsaysay’s supporters, bolster the 
Defense Secretary’s reputation for managing midterm elections, and ultimately to 
facilitate Magsaysay’s ascension to the Presidency in 1953. Benedict Kerkvliet, in his 
article, argued that if one were to subscribe to the “neo-colonial” interpretation, then one 
would believe that the United States continued to “meddle” in the affairs of its former 
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colony, at the guise of clean and honest elections.”87 That there was US involvement 
cannot be disputed. But whether NAMFREL was a form of “meddling” remained an 
open question. Even if the founder and the top leadership initially consisted of 
Americans, the vast majority of its members and subsequent leaders were comprised of 
volunteer Filipinos, both non-elite and elite.   
Constantino, in a brief history of the organization, narrated that NAMFREL’s 
brain trust was the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose main organizer was 
Gabriel Kaplan. Kaplan had relocated from New York City to Manila in 1951, and was 
given the task of overseeing this new electoral watchdog group to help Lansdale 
establish the foundations of Magsaysay’s subsequent election as President. Many 
Filipino organizations were involved in field organizing, ranging from the Lions, Rotary, 
Jaycees, various women’s Clubs, Masons, Parent-Teachers Associations, the YMCA, the 
Philippine Government Employees Association, the War Widows Association, Catholic 
Action, and the Federation of Free Workers. Jaime Ferrer served as the NAMFREL 
director, while NAMFREL chapters sprouted throughout the islands.88   
The outcome of the 1951 congressional elections was seen as a success. Filipino 
political scientists Clarita Carlos and Rommel Banlaoi found that electoral turnout was 
sharply up, at 92.3%, during the 1951 congressional election.89 The stage was set for a 
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new phase in Filipino governance beginning with Magsaysay. Constantino’s work 
narrated how Magsaysay, working with NAMFREL, took advantage of his own 
charisma and his ability to communicate to all Filipinos, to also helped make electoral 
process a success. The Defense Secretary, using his magnetic personality, toured 
troubled spots, distant polling sites, talked to Filipino soldiers, provided military escorts 
for candidates regardless of party affiliation, and actively helped to dismantle private 
security teams. Magsaysay’s actions were said to have provided a new form of military 
activism, where polls were policed well, ballot boxes were guarded, intimidation was 
absent, and electoral returns were sent quickly to national headquarters. Magsaysay’s 
image was further bolstered when he exhibited political will in having ordered the arrest 
of Negros Provincial Governor Rafael Lacson, who was a member of the ruling party of 
Quirino and Magsaysay and who padded Quirino’s votes in his fiefdom during the 
earlier 1949 presidential election, for the murder of a political rival. With the favorable 
outcome of the 1951 parliamentary election, the armed forces and Magsaysay thus began 
to prepare for the 1953 presidential elections.90 Luis Francia’s work, A History of the 
Philippines, argued that Magsaysay was effective because he became a “common man’s 
hero,” who defeated the Huks at their own turf. 91 Magsaysay knew that he had to 
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integrate all aspects of governing effectively, with a deeper understanding of the issues 
involved if he were to encourage mass participation in and public support for the Third 
Republic.  
 
Conclusion     
 The Quirino period was notable due to the Huk challenge to the Third Republic’s 
vision of nation- state building. The Huks lost their greatest battles in Filipino homes 
since Filipinos did not believe in an agrarian communist-inspired revolutionary project 
that had suspect psychological, ideological, and racial links to Mao’s China and whose 
armies were chasing the United Nations coalition (including the Filipino Expeditionary 
Forces battalions) down the Korean peninsula.  The similarities between the Huk 
rebellion and the Maoist hordes in the mainland were not lost on Filipinos—nor on U.S. 
officials, who quadrupled military aid the following year after Ramon Magsaysay was 
appointed as Defense Secretary by President Quirino.92 The Third Republic prevailed 
not so much due to Huk weaknesses, but due to the Third Republic’s strengths and the 
superior appeal it held for many Filipinos, who had an aversion to collectivism and to 
communism.  
The survival of Filipino nation-state building under Quirino therefore entailed a 
sense of unity and nationalism. Competent leaders ended up working skillfully with the 
limited tools at their disposal. Most critically, they enjoyed public support. Quirino was 
in many respects a flawed leader. But the President thought of Filipino interests while 
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negotiating with American representatives. But he lacked a national mandate and was 
not popular, due to corruption. Quirino’s administration was also unable to fully 
recognize and address the root causes of how to appeal to non-elite Filipinos.93  
For instance, a Manila Times report narrated how Quirino’s “barangay” plan, 
which his administration had advocated back in 1950 to deal with domestic crime and 
disorder, only produced mixed results on the ground. According to the newspaper, there 
were many reports trickling in from the provinces that many people were not as 
enthusiastic as they appeared to be in participating in the government project. Many 
people in the provinces, such as school-teachers, complained that they were being taken 
advantage of by local officials to “make some racket,” and to victimize rural inhabitants. 
Funds that were supposed to be allocated to the barangays to maintain peace and order 
were appropriated by municipal authorities, policemen and others, who then claimed 
local authority over the salaries of school teachers, or forced civilians to contribute. It 
also did not help that interest “fizzled out,” due to the lack of “follow-up,” by the 
government. Many residents, particularly those who lived in the distant barrios, feared 
the threats emanating from dissidents. There was also confusion regarding what the 
function of the “barangay” would be. Initially, the barangay was conceived to be a 
“national militia” against dissidents that would work with the national armed forces. The 
barangay’s role then subsequently evolved to becoming “a nucleus of cooperatives.” It 
was also said that “the barangay was just going to be used for cultural purposes and 
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means of disseminating information.94” The barangay plan became a project for 
propaganda purposes in the eyes of the people instead of being an effective plan to bring 
home the government to the barrios.   
A more cohesive nationalist Filipino state was still an accomplishment for 
Filipinos during the Quirino period, even if the grassroots were still to be fully reached. 
The Filipino public, after all, chose to support the Third Republic over the Huks. But the 
Third Republic also recognized that Manila was seen as too imperial and too distant 
from the ordinary barrio home. By 1951, government, with far more active involvement 
by individuals such as Magsaysay and the people around him, began to more effectively 
work with the grassroots in the communities to foster local economic development and 
to provide a bridge between the urban and the rural. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                
FROM MANILA TO THE BARRIOS AND FROM THE BARRIOS TO MANILA: TO 
UNIFY THE NATION, 1950-54 
 
Magsaysay made it clear that no racial or geographic 
principles decide Manila’s present and future policies and 
that any return to now-disappearing colonialism “shall not 
be tolerated in any form . . . world communism is today’s 
threat in Asia and a good defense against this threat is 
healthy Asian nationalism.1  
  
- New York’s Saturday Evening Post newspaper, on Ramon Magsaysay in 1954 
 
The living conditions you have heard, Mr. President, are 
not unusual. In fact, they are all too common. And these 
people I have visited are not strangers. They are fellow 
Filipinos, Mr. President . . . like you and I . . . They are 
entitled to their share of the social services that are 
supposed to go with the democracy of our Republic. Put 
away your political maps Mr. President. Look at a large 
map, large enough to show the barrios that are the 
backbone of the nation.2 
 
 
- Ramon Magsaysay’s message from the barrios, addressed to Elpidio Quirino and 
the other officials in Manila  
 
 
 
The Red wave appeared to be ebbing in the islands. 1951 saw the defeat of the 
Huks in the battlefields of the Central Luzon plains, in the rural communities and in 
urban Manila. Ramon Magsaysay was establishing a good reputation as Defense 
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Secretary, ultimately to become President after the 1953 presidential elections. The 
Filipino economy was also recovering domestically amidst the Korean War’s demand 
for Filipino goods. Filipinos expressed indigenous agency internationally, earlier by 
sending in a contingent to Korea in 1950 and also by helping establish organizations 
such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) by 1954. Filipino leaders such 
as Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos Romulo knew that to legitimately express indigenous 
agency and to define national identity, all Filipinos regardless of background and 
persuasion had to be enjoined to participate and to possess a stake in the nation-making 
project.      
The Third Republic under Magsaysay staked the claim of being the legitimate 
expression of collective Filipino will. Nation-state building proved that the islands had a 
natural aversion to communism, to colonialism, and to corruption. The major challenges 
for defining and consolidating Filipino nationalisms also involved bridging Manila and 
the barrios, which included the effective use of the Filipino military as an effective agent 
of nation-state-building. There were also issues related to crime and the prevention 
communist infiltrators from entering the islands. There were also growing dilemmas 
regarding how to integrate Chinese Filipinos, and Filipino sovereignty over US military 
bases in the islands. 
  
1950: Has the Colonizer Returned?    
 The Quirino administration at the start of the 1950s was in a state of crisis. An 
American report in 1950 described how “the Philippines (is) was facing serious 
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economic and financial problems which must be solved if the country is to become and 
remain stable and self- supporting.” A joint US-Filipino economic survey mission 
looked into various economic sectors such as “internal and external finances, agriculture, 
mining, industry, distribution and foreign trade, amongst others.” The objective of the 
joint mission was for Filipino agencies to operate with “reliability and stability.” Most 
critically, the Joint Mission argued that Filipino “finances and foreign exchange” needed 
to be attended to, if economic collapse was to be avoided by the Third Republic. The 
report emphasized the need for Filipino “self-help, which the Philippines must take [on] 
and make effective” to achieve stability. The report also broached the amount of foreign 
aid “necessary or appropriate to supplement maximum self-help” by Filipinos.3  
The government was also in dire need of money. Another report earlier in the 
year had warned of the rapidly depleting “foreign exchange reserves.” The report went 
on to state that the money shortage could only be counteracted by the “possibility of 
encouraging the flow of private capital,” the rehabilitation and the development of the 
Philippine economy, the “most effective and balanced” utilization of its resources, the 
“effective application of modern technology,” and the “pursuit of development projects” 
to encourage investment.4  
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A US Embassy report, dated May 1950, subsequently noted the growing 
“political and economic deterioration of the Philippines” under Quirino. The American 
report warned of a “rapid decline into chaos,” and the “emergency” posed by the Huk 
insurgency to American Cold War interests in the islands. The report also noted 
Quirino’s “political maneuverings,” such as the President “using “a disgracefully large 
pork-barrel appropriation bill” to “re-establish his position,” and even going as far as to 
ask the Filipino Congress to grant the President “emergency powers,” but which 
Congress refused to do. The report went on further to state that although Quirino, and by 
extension the Third Republic, was not in any immediate danger of losing his grip on 
power, the Huks might take advantage of any political vacuum.5  
Meanwhile, Filipinos sought American help in obtaining World War II 
reparations from Japan. The Filipinos were unhappy that these reparations were not yet 
forthcoming during the early 1950s. Some, such as businessman Francisco Sycip 
decided to act as middlemen. The businessman’s argument was that part of the problem 
with obtaining war reparations from Japan lay with the Filipino government’s “lack of a 
plan . . . on how to distribute any or all of the reparations and how such reparations can 
benefit the country and the people ultimately.” The Filipino consensus regarding 
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wartime reparations as of 1951 was that, “Japan should, as a matter of policy, 
acknowledge Philippine reparations.” That this was symbolic did not reduce its 
significance. Filipinos feared a revived, reconstructed Japan. Therefore, Sycip suggested 
that “the Philippine government should condone such reparations in lieu of a guarantee 
of a peaceful Japan in the Far East for a period of at least twenty years.”6  
Other Filipinos lamented the corruption of the Quirino government, not only in 
Manila but in faraway Mindanao. A concerned farmer from Davao, in Mindanao, named 
Demetrio Velez sent a letter to President Truman through the US Embassy in Manila. In 
the letter, Velez expressed his gratitude for the education he received from “American 
teachers” during the colonial period. Velez represented himself as “one of the humble 
voices” of the Filipinos. Velez mentioned in his letter that he was not in any way 
connected to the Filipino government, but that in his view, a vast proportion of U.S. aid 
to the Quirino government was lost due to government “mismanagement” and to 
“corruption.”7  
American assessments of the Filipino government dovetailed with private 
Filipino assessments. US State Department officials knew that Quirino’s own party 
members and the Filipino public were beginning to doubt the President’s ability to lead. 
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The revenue earned from import controls was lost to corruption and to the ineffective 
manner in which they were imposed and used. Quirino also refused to devalue the 
Philippine peso. The President’s brother, Judge Antonio Quirino, was said to be involved 
in all kinds of “dubious” transactions involving veterans’ benefits. Also, in the early 
1950, the “Filipino government’s finances [were] in very bad shape.” The government 
insisted on maintaining tax rates said to be “among the lowest in the world,” and which 
were often evaded by many.  American officials also believed that “any aid that they 
would extend must be placed under rigid control,” to prevent the money and the 
resources from being wasted and “dissipated.”8  
Surprisingly, Filipinos began to turn the situation around rather quickly. In 1951, 
Filipinos obtained money from foreign governments overseas and the government 
pursued sound economic policies. Government officials such as the Filipino Central 
Bank Head Miguel Cuaderno, widely viewed as competent, thanked the United States 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for their “invaluable assistance” at a “critical 
period” of intense economic crisis, when foreign exchange reserves reached an all-time 
low. Filipino cash reserves increased from PhP 12.6 million in mid-1950 to PhP 73.6 
million by mid-1951. The trade outlook was also beginning to look good. The outlook 
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was becoming bright for the fiscal year 1951 to 1952, due to efforts by competent 
members of Quirino’s government.9   
According to a US State Department report on the Philippine Aid Program, 
American ease with the Filipino situation was further reinforced, when, in 1951, the 
international reserves of the central bank and the private banks together reached $100 
million. This meant that the Filipino government “could afford to relax its exchange and 
import controls sufficiently,” and enable the government to “import the necessary 
commodities” that benefited the country. But American State Department officials also 
made it clear that they preferred a military aid program over an economic aid program, 
since the United States saw the Huks as their main adversary for US interests in the 
islands, and on providing existing support for the Philippine armed forces.10   
Filipinos knew that they needed to use foreign organizations, aid, and expertise 
to successfully pursue their nation-state building goals. An American document, dated 
November 24, 1950, described the “attitude of Philippine government officials,” who 
invited “American technicians in advisory positions in key government agencies.” The 
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Americans were to be on the US payroll, but would “report directly” to the Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), and would work under Filipino department heads 
albeit with “little supervision.” The Americans’ work included “survey,” “advising,” and 
“suggest improvements.” The American officials knew, while discussing the number of 
technicians to be offered to the Filipino government, that the Filipinos they were 
interacting with largely came from the elites. These included personalities such as 
Finance Secretary Pedrosa, Economic Coordinator Araneta and Agriculture Secretary 
Lopez. The final number offered to the Philippine Government was “50 to 75 
technicians, including those on short assignments.”11 The government welcomed the 
advisers and the technical expertise from the United States. That an independent state 
continued to rely on aid and advice from its former colonizer was not surprising. 
Filipinos had always viewed American colonialism as benevolent and remembered the 
peaceful manner in which the islands obtained independence from the American 
colonizer.  
The security situation remained on edge, with the Huk uprising reaching its 
zenith in 1950. American pressure had prompted a reluctant Quirino administration to 
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appoint Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense in 1950.12 Many Filipinos warned the 
American officials that the new Defense Secretary was a good and honest man, but that 
even Magsaysay would not overcome the entrenched interests in the officer corps of the 
Filipino military. Other Filipinos told American officials that the Filipino military was 
“hated and feared” by some Filipinos, who sometimes saw scant difference between the 
soldiers and the Huk guerillas in the field. According to H.W. Brands, in Bound to 
Empire, Huks were generally seen as having bright leaders whose struggle had a strong 
chance of winning if things got out of hand. Lansdale, the CIA officer, was very 
surprised when he toured the countryside and discovered that there was much sympathy 
for the Huks in ordinary Filipino peasant homes across central Luzon, due to discontent 
over land.13 Also, the Third Republic had yet to appeal effectively to ordinary Filipino 
homes in the rural communities across the islands.   
Cold War-minded American advisers in the field such as CIA officer and Lt. Col. 
Edward Lansdale, and reform-minded Filipinos such as Defense Secretary Ramon 
Magsaysay deduced correctly that waging war against the Huks solely on the battlefield 
did not provide a long term solution to Filipino social ills.14 To counteract the image of a 
disconnected and “imperial” state, Magsaysay promised to hire idealistic young people 
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from the middle and the lower classes to serve in his administration, while campaigning 
for the upcoming 1953 presidential elections. Magsaysay disagreed with Quirino’s 
philosophy of governance, which held that citizens were to be treated as if they were 
“members of the crew” of the ship of state. According to Magsaysay, citizens were 
supposed to be the “owners of the vessels,” where the captain was a “servant of the 
citizens.” Magsaysay inculcated in the minds of the youth that “public office should not 
merely be a means for personal gain.”15  
Magsaysay established a partnership with ordinary Filipinos based on mutual 
trust by bringing Manila to the distant barrios. The Manila Times narrated how, in one of 
Magsaysay’s sorties as a Nacionalista Party candidate, residents in Barrio San Mateo let 
it be known to the Defense Secretary that the citizens’ main problems involved a lack of 
nipa huts to provide habitation for families, meager harvests of the rice crop, and the 
lack of a pump to bring river water to the fields and potable water to households. The 
average Filipino family only made only 85 centavos a day, far below what was needed to 
sustain life.  This therefore led to large-scale borrowing and indebtedness for these rural 
Filipino families. A 70-year-old man named Jose Bautista who lived in one of these 
barrios told the Defense Secretary that he had been living in the locality for a long time, 
but that all he could do was wait. As far as he was concerned, government did not appear 
to exist and ordinary people’s needs were being neglected.16    
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This was not to say though that the average Filipino citizen lacked initiative. 
Barrio residents told Magsaysay in the same Manila Times article about how they helped 
build the local school “out of their earnings,” which benefited other members of the 
barrio. The people were willing to forgo a significant chunk of their savings for the good 
of the community. But there were also other problems. There were no clinics or even 
doctors in the vicinity to treat the sick in the barrios. Only the Filipino military brought 
the presence of the Third Republic into the lives of people in the barrios, and only in 
1953.17 The foundations of nation-state building could only be established if both the 
grassroots and the state worked together to address the myriad local problems.    
The Third Republic believed that the elite Filipinos also played an important role 
in nation-state building. But the landowners did not fully share the Filipino 
government’s goals of social reform. The Filipino oligarchy and the landlords may have 
possessed an interest in maintaining the law and order required for business-- but this did 
not extend to redistributing their estates for the sake of the peasants.18 This did not mean 
though that elite Filipinos they were not interested in the well-being of other Filipinos. In 
one of President Quirino’s local tours, Quirino could not help but be impressed at the 
“many young scions of rich families in Manila and Central Luzon who have settled there 
(in Occidental Mindoro province) to embark in mechanized farming.” These sons of elite 
parents left their secure “white collar jobs” in the cities for farm work. They found that 
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the biggest problem of these farms was “rat infestation.”19 For the elites to understand 
the everyday lives and experiences of their fellow Filipinos, they needed to become 
familiar with the living conditions of Filipinos in the rural communities. The elites 
realized that they could protect their own interests, but at the same time reach out to rural 
Filipinos.    
Filipino consolidation extended to the regions. The Quirino administration, aware 
that regional and ethnic differences existed across the islands, encouraged Ilocanos, from 
the northern Luzon province of Ilocos, to settle and take advantage of “vast 
opportunities” in Mindanao in the south. The government sought to encourage 
Mindanao’s “agricultural and economic advancement.” The Quirino administration 
promoted “economic development” there, including “farming, fishing, weaving, and 
livestock breeding.” The President also championed the idea that “technical men and 
brilliant minds” would help solve economic problems in resource-poor provinces such as 
Ilocos Sur.20 To “promote community life,” and to encourage the development of a 
“community spirit,” the government also encouraged and supported individual 
homeownership by the ordinary Filipino and his family. This nationwide housing project 
extended from Baguio City in the North to Mindanao in the South.21  
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The government focused on regional community development in Mindanao. 
Addressing the local inhabitants in June 1952, Quirino argued that people in Mindanao 
did not work together to unite by themselves due to local “politics” and “partisan 
strifes.” According to Quirino, this disunity resulted from “scheming peoples” and “clan-
based hatreds.” As a result, the local population “suffered,” while development was 
“hampered.” Direct intervention by the Filipino Executive and the Filipino military 
appeared necessary then. But even the government knew that intervention was a 
temporary solution. For the long term, Quirino placed emphasis on the need for 
“acquainting one’s self with local conditions and local problems” in Mindanao. 
Quirino’s advice for the local people was to “. . . Please forget political quarrels and 
work together.”22 The Third Republic believed that the nation- state building project 
would only be successful if familial, clan, tribal and geographical loyalties were 
transcended.  
By 1953, Quirino was facing strong headwinds in his efforts to win a new 
presidential term. The incumbent knew that Magsaysay, and possibly Carlos Romulo, 
would be his rival for the post during the presidential election later that year. Quirino 
therefore realized that he needed all the domestic allies he could obtain. Quirino also 
made sure that his Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the cacique Joaquin Elizalde, kept US 
Embassy officials in Manila apprised of the political plans of the incumbent President. In 
conversations with Embassy officials, the secretary mentioned to officials that Quirino 
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was looking forward to a smooth re-election campaign, where he expected to win easily 
over Magsaysay and Romulo. Quirino’s envoy denied to US officials that the President 
intended to use “coercion,” or “fraud”, or to deploy the armed forces to assure his re-
election that year.23  
A report by the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs stated that the 
biggest problem in the Philippines was the politics, due indirectly to the educational 
system that was a legacy of American colonial rule. Education was found to have bred 
interest in political affairs by Filipinos regardless of background, but it did little to raise 
the “poor” quality of Filipino political leadership, according to the Bureau report. The 
US Mutual Security Agency’s task therefore was to encourage the Quirino government 
to ensure “free elections” in 1953, amid reports from “many sources” that the Quirino 
government intended to use “intimidation” to assure the incumbent’s victory.24  
One major concern was “cleanliness in politics.” American observers thought 
that the Philippines needed to be encouraged to get into “good shape,” and eventually 
learn to “wean [themselves] away from American aid.” Filipinos have often been fond of 
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pointing to the strong relations Filipinos had enjoyed with Americans while fighting the 
Japanese during World War II. Filipinos often used this memory and legacy of 
cooperation as a reason to ask for more foreign military and economic aid from the 
United States. The 1952 US Mutual Security Agency report recommended further 
continuation of military aid to the Philippines, but was more hesitant to continue the 
previous scale of economic aid, due to the Quirino government’s legacy of corruption 
and misuse.25  
A Manila Times article dated January 1952 showed how Americans and Filipinos 
shared a common concern for the security situation in the islands.  A shared objective 
was the “plugging of all loopholes of illegal arms and strategic war materials smuggling 
between the Philippines and communist territories.” U.S. security aid to Filipinos was to 
be used for “new battalion combat teams to be organized to finish the dissident 
campaign in the country.” Manila was also receiving reports of “banditry in Leyte,” and 
the “illegal purchase of arms” across the countryside. Smuggling was rife between 
Borneo and the southern Philippines.26 These all implied that a strong Filipino military 
would result in public order, as well as more effective consolidation by the Third 
Republic.  
The government deployed military forces not only against Huks but against 
regional warlords. For instance, in 1952, the Manila Times reported on how the Manila-
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based government deployed 200 marines in the southern Sulu archipelago to stop the 
“outward” (of “firearms and of strategic war supplies”) and the “inward” (of cigarettes 
and opium) flow of smuggling goods in the islands. Reports claimed that the arms 
shipped out of the Philippines were being received by “communist agents” outside the 
country. But with the sharp decline of the Huk rebellion after 1951, the newest challenge 
faced by the Third Republic was “political violence in the countryside.” Before World 
War II, Filipino authorities working under the US Commonwealth strictly imposed “gun 
control,” which did not exempt politicians. But after World War II, “provincial bosses 
obtained arms from the black market and formed private armies.” Quirino knew that the 
local leaders “could deliver blocs of voters whose sum was often the margin of victory,” 
which potentially provided electoral windfall in a close race in the upcoming presidential 
contest. 27 Quirino also knew that he needed to appeal to communities in the provinces 
for his re-election prospects, even if it meant deploying troops to vital regions to secure 
peace and maintain order. The Filipino military was also able to maintain its forces due 
to a better financial situation for Manila.28 Electoral interests, the quest for security and 
order, and nation-state building did not necessarily contradict one another.   
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Election of Magsaysay as President: From Manila to the Barrios   
1953 was an election year. Defense Secretary Magsaysay knew that he enjoyed 
the advantage of having much stronger ties with the United States than incumbent 
President Quirino possessed.29 Magsaysay also was aware that he enjoyed the support of 
the Filipino public. But Quirino pulled all the stops, using government resources and his 
personal patronage networks on the ground to attempt to secure re-election in 1953. 
Magsaysay’s popularity was also boosted by the support of American media and military 
advisors--who promoted the populist slogan “Magsaysay is my guy,” replete with a 
theme song, “Magsaysay Mambo,” as the candidate toured the barrios-- overwhelmed 
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Quirino’s extensive electoral machine. Magsaysay eventually won over Quirino with 
almost 70 percent of the total popular vote during the 1953 Filipino presidential 
election.30 Much had been made regarding the American support for Magsaysay but the 
Defense Secretary also enjoyed mass support from sectors in Filipino society. Turnout 
was at an all-time high of 77.2% of registered voters across the islands.31  
Magsaysay could have run as an independent, instead of under the Nacionalista 
Party, one of the two major political parties, and therefore been much less beholden to 
oligarchic interests, but the prospects for success amidst the patronage web of Filipino 
political culture would have been doubtful. Moreover, Magsaysay had to avoid being 
perceived as being too pro-American, particularly by fiery ultranationalists such as Claro 
Recto.32 In Filipino politics, party labels did not matter much due to the social origins of 
the personalities involved. Members of the established parties also resisted the idea of 
ending corruption and of taking steps towards enacting land reform.33 Magsaysay needed 
to walk a tightrope despite his vast popularity and good reputation.  
Magsaysay would potentially have trouble moving his agenda forward unless he 
could navigate the intricacies of Filipino political culture--avoiding being labelled as 
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being seen either as an American puppet or as an incompetent leader. The oligarchy, if it 
sensed that the President did not reach out to its members, might provide a stumbling 
block to any new President’s ability to push through sought-after reforms since 
Magsaysay would need the support of Congress to move forward the Executive branch’s 
agenda. The President also knew that the battle to win the ordinary Filipino could only 
be won by tackling its root causes. This entailed addressing socio-economic ills such as 
“poverty, hunger, despair, economic and social stagnation.”34 Nation-state-building also 
could not be realized without the approval and the involvement vast majority of Filipinos 
who did not belong to the elite.  
Magsaysay recollected his experiences to ordinary townsfolk while touring 
poverty-stricken barrios across the country. Magsaysay knew that Central Luzon was a 
breeding ground for the Huk rebellion not only through confidential state reports but 
through simple conversations with ordinary farmers during his provincial tours. A 
farmer whose name was Alavado, and who came from a small barrio in Central Luzon, 
told the Defense Secretary that in some towns, “there is no running water, no electricity, 
no hospital, not even a public high school . . . doctors practice only in the daytime 
because they are afraid they might get sick calls from Huks at night.”35   
The Defense Secretary believed that Manila must not be disconnected from the 
realities of Filipino life. Magsaysay had a “weekly [broad]cast called “Magsaysay 
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calling Malacanan [the presidential palace],” where the Secretary reported from the field 
on the conditions he witnessed and the accounts he heard in the rural areas.36  The “chat” 
transcript narrated how Filipinos in the barrios gave a full picture of local conditions. 
Magsaysay heard that residents tended to leave their communities due to government 
neglect. Residents in these barrios told Magsaysay and his entourage that the nearby city 
was monopolizing the flow of water from a local reservoir. As a result, many residents 
either had to walk several kilometers to the city, or to use local transportation to 
purchase water at expensive prices set by the city officials.  A local resident, sari-sari 
store owner Constancio Bajas, had four dependents and a monthly income of 60 
Philippine pesos. Bajas lamented that he had to come to the city to purchase “good 
drinking water” at 10 centavos per bucket. Bajas suggested to Magsayay that the 
solution to the water crisis was for the government to build artesian wells across the 
country. The store owner told Magsaysay that “. . . one artesian well in Lapasan [a town] 
would make 300 families happier, much more happy than a thousand reams of paper like 
[Manila’s plans for] economic mobilization.” Another resident, Julian Olango, a father 
of six, lamented to Magsaysay that the government’s “educational assistance” was 
woefully inadequate. According to the carpenter, Olango, the local barrio folk had to 
“contribute from their own pockets to pay for the necessary repairs,” so that ramshackle 
schoolhouses would be repaired and schoolchildren didn’t have to “carry their own 
school benches to school.” Many of the barrio residents, according to Magsaysay, were 
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concerned that the taxes collected, “for the education of the schoolchildren,” were not 
being spent well. The Secretary added that: 
 
Most of the school buildings in the barrios are makeshift 
huts made of bamboo and grass. And it was not the 
government that built those traditional schoolhouses. It 
was the local PTAs which provided the material and the 
labor, and have been footing the yearly repair bills. Here 
the people do the job that the government should be 
doing.37      
 
The rural folk also told the Defense Secretary that the Third Republic needed to get 
involved in the provision of services and infrastructure that would withstand adverse 
weather conditions during rainy season.38 There may have been an element of 
Magsaysay playing as political candidate and campaigning to garner votes in the barrios 
in an election year. But these accounts of the local conditions were very revealing of the 
developmental gap between urban and rural settings.  
 Magsaysay also had tremendous faith in the Filipino military’s ability to bridge 
gaps in Filipino society. The Defense Secretary believed that aside from suppressing the 
Huks and the warlords, the military could be transformed into an agent for national 
consolidation. As Defense Secretary since 1950, Magsaysay had sought to 
professionalize and organize the military. He also endeavored to “discipline” officers 
seen as corrupt, and sought to improve the military’s performance and reputation.39 
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Magsaysay later said that officers and enlisted men needed to keep in mind that they 
were “Filipinos first and soldiers second” in their duty to “safeguard” democracy.40 
Magsaysay believed that the Filipino military had a critical role to play in nation-state 
building.   
Magsaysay in turn was well-regarded by the all-important officer class as the 
Defense Secretary made sure that the military’s needs were met. As Defense Secretary, 
Magsaysay’s trips around the country had made him familiar with the local rural, 
conditions across the islands.  This contrasted sharply with Roxas and especially with 
Quirino, who gave speeches in front of assembled crowds in barrios and poblaciones 
around the archipelago while preaching national unity. The previous leaders were 
genuinely committed towards improving the lives of people through their policies but far 
less often mingled with the crowd or listened to the concerns of individuals and clans as 
compared to the simple and ordinary looking Magsaysay. Magsaysay was unique from 
the other politicians, in that the Secretary naturally appealed to the common folk but 
could also play good politics with the elites based in Manila.41 In so many ways, 
Magsaysay was a bridge builder across Filipino society.   
Magsaysay, the government troops, and the local governments, following Lt. 
Col. Lansdale’s advice in the Central Luzon provinces, pursued a strategy to win local  
“hearts and minds” by providing for peasants’ welfare. They speeded up court cases, 
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deployed army units to dig artesian water-wells and provided medical care for the poor. 
That Magsaysay often accompanied the troops at the frontlines of the guerilla conflict 
further earned him the troops’ respect.42 According to Magsaysay, the objective was not 
to enhance his personal reputation but to improve relations between the military and the 
civilian population.43  
The government knew that development was a critical component of nation- state 
building. Drawing on Magsaysay’s nationwide barrio tours, those who worked under 
him established rural health units and boosted the role of provincial agriculture in the 
rural nation-building project.44  Magsaysay’s programs also included the construction of 
“new roads, bridges, irrigation systems, community development projects, highway 
development, the construction of feeder and barrio roads that would link communities 
and rural areas to towns and markets, health centers, schoolhouses for Filipino children, 
new policies and laws on land tenure and land settlement,” and a law to improve tenancy 
relations. Magsaysay also advocated food self-sufficiency.45  
Magsaysay knew that the Philippines had a farm productivity problem. He 
declared in 1953 that the Philippines was “underdeveloped and badly developed,” as its 
farms had failed to yield their full productive capacity, because “small farmers do not 
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have titles to their lands,” and that the current five-year program would take too long to 
address this.  The Second World War and the Huk rebellion had also led to displaced 
rural farmers leaving the countryside for relatively safer but crowded cities. In 
Magsaysay’s view, these farmers’ productive labor needed to be attracted back to the 
fields, which would also resolve the problem of urban “squatters.”46 Rural and urban 
social problems were both connected.  
The government also invested in the health sector. A Manila Times article of 
October 1953 lamented that the state of public health in the provinces was dismal. 
Diseases such as pulmonary tuberculosis, malaria, influenza, measles, beriberi, typhoid, 
diphtheria, and dysentery plagued the people. A lack of accessible hospitals compounded 
the problems, and contributed to a high child-mortality rate. For Magsaysay, a solution 
lay in attracting “medical graduates to the barrios, to establish medical centers in 
strategic and geographical places outside Manila, and building more postgraduate 
medical schools.”47 He knew that people in the barrios needed access to good medical 
care, even if the training centers and the most advanced medical facilities were to be 
found in the big cities.         
Magsaysay knew that bringing Manila to every barrio home endeared him to the 
people. But all was not well in Manila. Conflict was brewing within Magsaysay’s 
Nacionalista Party, especially between Magsaysay and the ultranationalists Claro M. 
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Recto and Jose Laurel. Magsaysay enjoyed the support of Carlos Romulo, particularly in 
his policy on effectively suppressing the Huks.48 And even after Magsaysay was sworn 
in to the presidency late in 1953, Magsaysay retained control over the Defense Ministry 
portfolio. Romulo, in a lecture tour across America, sought to shore up support for the 
new President. Romulo mentioned to the Americans he encountered that Magsaysay, 
unlike many others, was more immune to political pressures, because when Magsaysay 
held the Defense portfolio, Magsaysay knew how great the political pressures could 
potentially get.49 
After taking office late in 1953, Magsaysay looked at expanding beyond his 
predecessor’s vision of a “strong state,” to a “strong people.” The new President 
believed that “strong people are what a country needs today.” In a graduation speech in 
April 1954 where Magsaysay spoke in the local Ilocano dialect, Magsaysay urged young 
graduates to help improve “barrio conditions,” to prevent further “communist 
infiltration,” since the war was being waged in “both the battlefield and the rice field.” 
According to the new Filipino President, the war could not be conducted in an “orthodox 
way,” and that there was “no time” to train formally the “teachers, doctors and health 
workers for the country’s almost 20,000 barrios.”50  
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People in the barrios responded to the government’s call for “community 
organization,” and “self-help.” A Manila Times article dated January 1954 documented 
how Filipino schoolteachers developed a “community school program through public 
schools.” The account narrated that “hundreds of functioning, arguing, energetic 
community councils in the barrios,” with the help of “selfless” teachers, taught 
“democracy” to Filipinos. The program stressed “group decisions, group planning and 
group effort,” for “thousands” of projects. These projects involved reforestation 
programs, upgrading of livestock, the teaching of “interesting histories written in the 
vernacular,” in provinces such as Iloilo in the central Visayan Islands, cooperative 
business enterprises, and garden and sanitation projects. What made the overall 
community school program effective was the emphasis on “greater flexibility in the 
creation of school curriculum so as to relate subject matter to community problems 
required.51” Community schools were a pioneer project in the barrios during the 
Magsaysay years.  
The Filipino government had further ambitions to expand rural-based projects 
like community schools. The government promoted the “Philippine Community School 
movement” to neighboring countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan and Indonesia. 
The report applauded this regional vision, arguing that these experiments could “destroy 
any chance for mass support of Communism in Southeast Asia.” The experiments also 
encouraged community councils and government agencies to “integrate” their activities 
in the islands. Even private civic organizations were urged to support government 
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agencies in these projects.52 Apart from suppressing communism in the islands, these 
projects consolidated the big cities and the barrios. Government and ordinary 
townspeople worked locally and understood one another. Magsaysay evidently believed 
in starting small. 
   
Many Peoples, One Nation: A New Nation-State Building Ideology   
As President, Magsaysay articulated a straightforward philosophy of Filipino 
nationalism in early 1954. Magsaysay believed that a “strong nationalism” could only 
take root if it embodied the best of the Filipino people’s “traditions, customs, ideals and 
aspirations to greatness.” The new President attributed Filipino nationalism’s evolution 
to the “native ancestries” present in the archipelago, and the colonial influences of the 
Spanish and the Americans. Magsaysay also lamented that many Filipinos had 
developed the habit of relying on America for “paternal protection and generosity.” He 
implied that Filipinos could not make it on their own if they were unable to start small 
and from within. Magsaysay’s speech also exhorted Filipinos to “express and broaden” 
their cultural heritage, which included taking pride in the Filipino people’s “racial” 
talents, by which Magsaysay meant the multiracial Malayan, Spanish, Chinese, and 
                                                 
52 An interesting exchange took place between Magsaysay and a wealthy Manila-based civic leader. The 
civic leader let Magsaysay know that he (the civic leader) “did not believe in people (other Filipinos),” 
while Magsaysay did.  The man stated that Magsaysay was “willing to trust them to act as they should.” 
But the man let the Filipino President know “that they must always be forced to do the right thing.,” 
“Barrio folks band, find profit, security in it.”  
 147 
aboriginal heritage of the Filipinos.53 Magsaysay believed that a multiracial and a 
multicultural Filipino nation possessed unique strengths that could be used effectively 
for the betterment of Filipino society, and the expression of Filipino indigenous agency 
overseas.  
This new approach manifested itself in the issue of US bases in the islands. US-
Filipino relations during the Magsaysay period have often been assumed by outsiders to 
be that of a Cold War superpower-Third World “client” state arrangement. But 
Americans knew that the Filipinos were becoming sensitive to US military deployments 
in the islands. According to a letter written by US Ambassador Raymond Spruance, “the 
Philippines is now an independent, sovereign country and should be treated as such.” 
The ambassador disagreed with the other American policymakers regarding: 
 
United States officials (having) the authority to permit 
third-power aircraft unlimited right to overfly the 
Philippines [and] the United States Navy (having) the 
authority without reference to anyone else to bring into its 
bases here foreign public vessels-- a right which it does 
not possess with respect to naval stations in the United 
States.54 
 
 
 Spruance reminded American officials such as Philip Bonsal that “with respect to both 
third-power public vessels and aircraft, we are already, as you know, on record with the 
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Philippine government contrariwise.”55 The United States was trying to be careful not to 
offend Filipino sensibilities since the Philippines was no longer an American colony but 
a treaty ally.  
 American officials observed that passions amongst Filipinos were beginning to 
run high, especially over the status of US bases in the islands. Ultranationalists such as 
Leon Maria Guerrero and Claro Recto argued that America was not treating the 
Philippines, as it did its other allies such as West Germany and Spain. The United States 
believed that Magsaysay could not support the US Navy’s position without engendering 
“vicious attacks” from the Filipino ultranationalists. Spruance also advised the United 
States to prepare for a future time when a “less friendly government” would come to 
power in the islands.56 State Department officials also believed that the United States 
needed to extract concessions from a friendly Filipino government under Magsaysay in a 
way that would not weaken Magsaysay’s domestic position. But what Americans did not 
realize was that even Magsaysay was sympathetic to the Filipino nationalists’ public 
stances and the public’s outcry over the US bases. The debates over the bases was an 
issue which united all Filipinos.          
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A major point of contention and of Filipino resentment was the American desire 
to expand its base operations to service increasing US military operations in Indochina. 
The Magsaysay administration and the Filipino public did not raise any strong objections 
to American requests until February 1954, when Eisenhower’s Attorney General, 
Herbert Brownell, argued that the United States held legal title over the lands where the 
US bases were sitting on in the islands.57 The official Filipino stance was to affirm the 
status quo “on the lease of the military bases,” instead of the “outright sale to the United 
States government in order to safeguard the sovereignty of the Philippines” in the lands 
containing bases, training facilities and other installations.58 Filipino officials knew that 
the public would not allow the return of US legal sovereignty over any part of the islands 
after independence in 1946.  
The Philippines also participated in regional security and defense. A Manila 
Times article, dated August 1954, outlined the Filipino position regarding the emerging 
regional security arrangement that would be called the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO).  The Philippines specifically “affirmed the right of free Asia 
nations to self-determination and [went] on record as [being] opposed to any form of 
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imperialism in the region.”59 The Philippines was a founding member of SEATO, 
hosting the first conference in Manila on September 1954.  
Security was a major issue in Filipino nation-state building. The Magsaysay 
administration knew that it could not build weapons and military transportation on its 
own. The government therefore sought to work with the US government for training, 
operational enhancement, and arms purchases. A “Philippine-American Council” was 
created, which involved exchanges between the US and the Filipino Departments of 
Defense, “for strengthening the Filipino armed forces.” Manila also asked the United 
States for the sale of “destroyers, jet powered aircraft,” and for “help to increase the size 
of Philippine ground forces to four divisions.60”  These were felt to be especially urgent 
given the threat posed by the Chinese in the archipelago. 
  
The Chinese-Filipinos: A Security Dilemma?    
 Efforts to consolidate the state extended to the Chinese-Filipinos in the islands. 
Quirino, staunchly anti-communist, proved conciliatory to the Chinese-Filipinos in the 
islands, due to his sympathies with Nationalist China. In an address which the Filipino 
President made to the “National Convention of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 
Manila,” Quirino remarked to the delegates that that this: 
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community or individuals have identified themselves in 
the constructive work of building this nation . . . you have 
identified yourselves with us and these have borne fruit in 
the closer association and cooperation between the 
Chinese community and the government to such an extent 
that we now regard the Chinese community here almost 
not as a foreign element . . . You have identified that your 
life in this country has been made part and parcel of our 
own community lives. The Chinese permanent residents . . 
. have stayed long enough to be identified with us 
permanently and may be called Chinese-Filipinos.61   
 
Quirino viewed the Chinese-Filipinos as potentially assimilable. The Chinese-Filipinos, 
who were widely viewed as “lawbreakers” by many in the islands, organized “civic 
enterprises.” These included launching civic drives such as the “Peace Fund campaign,” 
and the “Community Chest Drive,” to cooperate with the Third Republic’s commercial 
and economic activities.62  The Third Republic recognized that the Chinese-Filipinos 
also possessed the financial resources to contribute to national economic development. 
But it was also true that the Chinese-Filipino communities needed to be monitored, due 
to their numbers and their potentially conflicted loyalties.     
According to the scholar George Taylor in The Philippines and the United States, 
Filipinos were “concerned about the same old problems of the overwhelming economic 
influence of the Chinese and their potential threat to the national security.” Taylor 
argued that security and economics were interrelated in the eyes of many Filipinos. 
Many of the Chinese-Filipinos in the islands were suspected by the Filipino authorities 
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of being “political agents” for Maoist China. The fear, as Taylor argued, was that 
communist Peking might “use the overseas Chinese for its own purposes,” by appealing 
to transnational ethnic, historical and ideological linkages between the mainland and the 
overseas Chinese.63 
Filipino nationalism had a strong anti-Chinese-- and anti-communist-- 
component. The Huk rebellion, coupled with the fall of mainland China to communism 
and the outbreak of a Korean War, fueled Filipino concerns. Many Filipinos remained 
suspicious of the Chinese-Filipino economic influence, which dated back to the Spanish 
and American colonial period. But many could not avoid dealing with the Chinese-
Filipinos, whether in borrowing money, taking goods to market, or in buying large and 
small articles.64 A Manila Times article mentioned how meat vendors such as Mrs. 
Florencia Sunga at the Divisoria general market in Manila complained about “Chinese 
middlemen . . . controlling the meat trade.”65        
Taylor argued that the dilemma with regards to the Chinese-Filipinos could also 
be traced back to the economic structure of the archipelago. The Filipino middle-class 
was small, relatively unsophisticated, and had to compete with Chinese-Filipinos and 
American businessmen operating in the islands.66 Chinese-Filipino economic power was 
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widely viewed as potentially dangerous. After independence in 1946, the Filipino 
Congress enacted legislation against Chinese-Filipino access to the “mineral and natural 
resources” of the islands, as well as against Chinese-Filipino entry into Filipino 
professions. It was only a combination of US and Nationalist Chinese pressure which 
prevented the Filipino government under Roxas and Quirino from acting against 
Chinese-Filipino control of retail trade.67 Government policies over control of retail 
trade was to change under Magsaysay.   
Magsaysay was far less optimistic than his predecessors about Chinese 
contributions, viewing many of them as “overstayers” prone to local extortion. 
Magsaysay urged the Chinese-Filipinos to have “more courage and civic spirit,” not to 
“take bribes,” nor “yield to demands,” promising the Chinese-Filipinos the full 
protection of the government.68 Magsaysay’s administration also stressed “morality.” 
The Filipino President believed that the Chinese-Filipino community must “not be 
instrumental in the corruption of government personnel.” Magsaysay also believed that 
there were “bad elements” in the Chinese-Filipino community that needed to be rooted 
out. 69    
But Magsaysay left the Chinese-Filipino community an opening to participate in 
Filipino life in the islands. Nick Cullather, in Illusions of Influence, documented how the 
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Chinese-Filipino community donated money to the Filipino military to install artesian 
wells in many peasant barrios.70 According to a Manila Times article, dated December 
1953, the soon to be inaugurated President let the Chinese-Filipinos know that they 
needed to “extend their fullest cooperation in the task of nation-building . . . help in 
combatting bribery, extortion, illegal smuggling of aliens and guns, and tax evaders.” 
Magsaysay also believed that “the Chinese . . . should consider it a duty to fulfill their 
financial obligations to the state in the matter of taxes.” Magsaysay also sought out the 
help of the Nationalist Chinese (ROC) ambassador in helping out with the “bad Chinese” 
in the Philippines.71  Many Filipinos remained suspicious of the Chinese-Filipinos, who 
for the most part had not assimilated into mainstream Filipino society, or had become 
full citizens. The rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as the third largest 
communist party in the world, after the USSR and China, also led the Magsaysay 
government to become suspicious of Sukarno’s leadership in Jakarta and the potential 
transnational influence of overseas Chinese communists across Southeast Asia.72  
Filipinos used Cold War language for their nation-state-building objectives. 
According to the scholar Masuda Hajimu, in Cold War Crucible, the Filipino 
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government portrayed the communist Huks as Soviet and Chinese puppets.73 This 
appropriation of Cold War language provided a fig leaf for the indigenous objective of 
promoting the Third Republic as the ultimate expression of and as the legitimate vehicle 
for Filipino nation-state building. The oligarchy, which owned land throughout the 
islands, feared that the Chinese-Filipinos would use their wealth to buy land and 
eventually to exercise political power across the country.74 Elite Filipinos, particularly 
the oligarchs and the caciques, generally associated Chinese-Filipino economic power in 
the islands with the potential expansion of communism. Anti-Chinese-Filipino agitation 
also had an immigration dimension. There were local fears that the entry of more 
overseas Chinese in the islands potentially led to greater Chinese-Filipinos control over 
key sectors in the Filipino economy. There were also those, such as the aforementioned 
Committee on Un-Filipino Activities, who tied national loyalty with being “opposed” to 
“communist propaganda,” believing in “God” and “morality,” and fervent opposition to 
those working towards the “attainment of a classless society.”75 The resolution of 
Chinese-Filipino involvement in the Filipino economy and fear of communism were a 
source of unity for both elites and non-elite Filipinos alike. 
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The nationalization by the government of retail trade in favor of Filipinos was 
widely interpreted in American reports as a move “aimed at the [local] Chinese.”76  The 
Retail Trade Naturalization law of 1954 stipulated that foreigners could not own land 
and excluded the Filipino-Chinese. Many Filipinos had feared that the Chinese-Filipinos 
would use their economic clout and the Filipino kinship system, since many Filipino 
Chinese had intermarried with other Filipinos, to acquire their own haciendas. Chinese-
Filipino landownership meant holding the keys towards political power, which many 
elite and non-elite Filipinos were not willing to tolerate. One little-known facet of the 
1953 presidential election was that Magsaysay and the Nacionalista Party had won their 
landslide victory in part by campaigning against potential Chinese-Filipino domination 
of economic and political life in the country, which the vast majority of Filipinos had 
conflated with communist infiltration of the islands. Magsaysay, like Quirino and the 
Liberals, was known for his dislike of Chinese-Filipino control of sectors in the 
economy such as retail trade, and campaigned for nationalization in favor of other 
Filipinos to prevent monopoly.77 But even Magsaysay knew that he also needed to 
incorporate the Chinese-Filipinos into his nation-state building project. The Chinese-
Filipinos had been very much a part of economic life in the islands for centuries.  
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Magsaysay, like many of his countrymen, was a staunch anti-communist, but still 
believed that it was possible to wean the Chinese-Filipinos away from collectivist 
influences and sympathies. Like Quirino, Magsaysay extended an olive branch to the 
sizable Chinese-Filipino community in Manila. He told the Chinese-Filipinos in Manila 
that they could show their loyalty to the Filipino state by “uniting in the struggle against 
communism,” through exposing communists amongst members of their own community. 
Magsaysay reassured the Chinese-Filipinos that the Third Republic would not harm 
Chinese-Filipino interests as the government’s objective was to “provide employment 
and a decent standard of living for all.” Magsaysay also believed that the Chinese-
Filipino community had the potential to contribute to the Filipino economy. But 
Magsaysay also did not view the Chinese as full-fledged “Filipino” citizens, at least until 
the Chinese-Filipinos could purge communist influence within their communities that 
might be harmful to the Filipino nation-state project. Magsaysay argued that differences 
between Chinese-Filipinos and the other Filipinos could only be resolved when the 
Chinese-Filipinos found ways to suppress the “misbehavior” of a “small faction” within 
their community.78 In the same way that Magsaysay suppressed the peasant-based Huk 
uprising, the President evidently hoped that any possible danger of communist 
influences and sympathies emanating from members of Filipino society, such as the 
Chinese-Filipinos, needed to be rooted out. It did not appear to matter to Magsaysay 
whether the state, the elite, the non-elite Filipinos, or even the Filipino-Chinese 
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themselves were to be the ones suppressing communism-- but Magsaysay believed that 
it needed to be done for the sake of the national unity. 
  
Conclusion  
By the mid-1950s, the Filipino economy was showing signs of good health. 
Quirino’s earlier “import and exchange controls” resulted in economic improvement. 
Local manufacturing flourished under Magsaysay. International events, such as Japan’s 
recovery and the Korean War, stimulated overseas Filipino exports of timber, sugar, and 
coconut. The government, to raise further money, imposed higher taxes on both foreign 
and private corporations operating in the country. This was seen as a sign of growing 
economic nationalism and protectionism. Magsaysay also inherited a budget surplus of 
655 million pesos, which had not been enjoyed by the Filipino economy since 1946. But 
many Filipinos remained discontented by their share in the country’s economy.79 The 
debates over Filipino nation-state building during the 1950s were evidently tied up with 
an evolving national identity, an ongoing process after independence in 1946.  
There were also two different strains of “nationalisms” that existed in the 
archipelago during the Third Republic. Elite-centric nationalism saw nation-state 
building in terms of using instruments of state power, the preservation of entrenched 
interests, and gathering Filipinos together, but with state structures as the locus of power. 
What characterized elite nationalism was its emphasis on institutions, as well as national 
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and local leaders as the main agents for unifying the nation-state. Non-elite Filipino 
nationalism, which tended to be more grassroots-oriented and inclusive, sought to 
integrate the urban and the rural. Non-elite nationalism also concerned itself with the 
self-improvement of, and the well-being of all Filipinos. Non-elite Filipinos, who 
comprised the vast majority, expressed themselves, participated in public life, worked 
with others, and voluntarily contributed their energies towards nation-state building. The 
non-elite Filipinos recognized that they and the elite Filipinos shared a common vision, a 
common identity and common interests, as seen with issues such as development, the 
threat of communism, economics, trade, and the presence of US bases in the archipelago. 
Both strains of nationalism also sought to unify all Filipinos even if the means they 
employed varied. But the end result they envisioned was the same. Assuming that it was 
only American power or a revolutionary class struggle would foster indigenous 
nationalism is to misread the expressions of indigenous agencies in the archipelago from 
multiple Filipino perspectives.    
Magsaysay’s Third Republic played a key, visible role in unifying and 
reconciling all these forms and expressions of indigenous Filipino agency. The Huks and 
the Chinese-Filipinos, despite suspicions directed towards them, began to see themselves 
as stakeholders in the Filipino nation-state building project, unlike under Spanish, 
American, Japanese, then briefly again American colonial rule. By the mid-1950s, 
Filipino nation-state building was at an advanced stage. The state was busily building 
bridges and consolidating linkages between the urban and the rural, across ethnic groups, 
and between the elites and the non-elites across the islands, with anti-communism as a 
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unifying glue.  New actors from the grassroots were also beginning to play roles. In all 
these, Magsaysay played an outsized role in promoting these forms of unity.   
Magsaysay embodied the more inclusive, non-elite strain of Filipino nationalism, 
even as he enjoyed huge support from elite Filipinos. The Filipino press gave Magsaysay 
glowing reviews as President, from the very beginning of his term.  But A Manila Times 
article of November 1953 painted him in a more realistic light. In the article, the Filipino 
President was depicted as wanting to make democracy work “in a Far Eastern setting,” 
but also conceded that there were “deep-seated problems” such as “land distribution, 
unemployment, trade and investment.”  Magsaysay knew that drastic reforms were 
needed but the President knew that he could not afford to alienate any sector of Filipino 
society. Magsaysay knew that he would need broad-based support to pursue his 
objectives in achieving a united Filipino nation and in pursuing the Republic’s goals.80  
Magsaysay valued his linkages with the United States, from which he knew he 
could obtain much needed support, money, aid, advices, expertise and technical 
assistance. But Magsaysay was a Filipino, first and foremost. Magsaysay knew that 
many ultranationalists were bitterly opposed to continued American involvement, even 
in security matters.  Time correspondent John Osborne reflected American policy-
makers concerns when he stated that should something like Claro Recto’s views prevail 
in the islands, Filipino foreign policy could turn “uneasily neutralist,” as opposed to a 
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“firm alliance,” should Magsaysay continue to prevail.81 But Recto’s views did not 
appear to have fertile soil in Filipino nation-making.    
Americans possessed the tendency to view any local anti-communist strongman, 
such as Magsaysay, as a suitable Cold War ally. US policymakers also often misread the 
difference between American objectives and Filipino objectives. Magsaysay initiated 
campaigns to ruthlessly crush the Huk rebellion, but he was very much in favor of 
reintegrating the ex-Huks as fellow Filipinos who would participate in nation-state 
building. Magsaysay also possessed a keen insight, unlike Roxas or Quirino, into the 
plight of non-elite Filipinos and saw the necessity of looking at the root causes of 
agrarian unrest that gave rise to the earlier Huk rebellion in central Luzon.82 Painting 
Magsaysay as an American puppet, as Constantino et al do, mischaracterizes the critical 
role which Magsaysay played in Filipino nation-state making.  
Magsaysay also knew that the adept use of government power, which encouraged 
volunteerism, the harnessing of the productive energies of members of the communities 
across the islands, and a message of multi-sectoral inclusiveness, was effective for all 
Filipinos in the long run. Magsaysay knew that these measures were a much stronger 
antidote to any unrest such as the Huk insurgency than any ruthless, military-oriented 
pacification campaigns, such as under Quirino, or any informal deals made with local 
leaders and warlords, such as under Roxas. Magsaysay’s methods were unconventional, 
as he sought to circumvent the urban-based elite Filipinos, and brought his candidacy 
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and personality directly to the rural barrios. Magsaysay also cultivated non-elite 
technocrats and military officers. While Magsaysay detested the Huks and the Filipino-
Chinese, he knew that these sectors also needed to be treated like the other Filipinos for 
the nation-state building project to become successful. Magsaysay’s campaign in the 
countryside also enabled the Third Republic to define itself as the collective popular 
expression of Filipino nationalisms. Magsaysay was willing to use state power and his 
popular appeal to encourage grassroots involvement in pursuing the goal of unity.  
The challenge of building a united Filipino nation entailed the transcendence of 
personal, familial, clan, tribal, ethnic partisan, organizational, and ideological interests. 
As the islands progressed into the mid-1950s, the sources of nationalism that served to 
unify (and divide) would increasingly become more heated and more pointed. These 
would be true over issues such as Afro-Asian unity, US bases, trade treaties, agitation 
directed at foreign control over sectors of the national economy, and the separation of 
Church and State in debates over the school curriculum. With Magsaysay at the helm, 
Filipino nation-making efforts would reach a culminating stage.      
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CHAPTER 5                                                                                                                   
ONE NATION, ONE PEOPLE, UNDIVIDED: THE AGE OF MAGSAYSAY, 1953-
1957 
 
“To know what we want to be as a nation, we need only ask ourselves what we want to 
be as individuals.”1 -Ramon Magsaysay  
 
 Magsaysay and the Filipinos have often been viewed as passive, dependent 
puppets of American power in the midst of a Cold War between two superpowers, which 
had just spread to Asia.  Scholars such as Stanley Karnow focused on nation- state 
building during the Magsaysay years as a successful joint US and Filipino project, with 
Filipinos subscribing to the American perspective. Others such as Renato Constantino 
treated the period as an exclusive product of collaboration between elite Filipinos and 
the United States, superficially focusing on the heavy involvement of the CIA and 
ignoring the participation of other members of Filipino society in nation-making. Often 
lost in the mists was the evidence that Filipinos by this period were a rapidly uniting 
nation of individuals and groups, with their own visions, missions, and agendas. 
Filipinos were anti-communist not because they were a Cold War satellite of the United 
States but because Filipino society in the islands had a natural aversion to collectivism.   
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 This chapter argues that US anticommunism led many outsiders to overlook 
Filipino anticommunism. The islands’ anti-communism, critical to the consolidation of 
government in the barrios and the integration of various ethnicities such as the Filipino-
Chinese and the aboriginal tribes, was left out of many outsiders’ narratives of life in the 
islands. Undetected by Cold War-obsessed decision-makers and policymakers in 
Washington DC and in the US embassy in Manila, Filipinos all over the islands were 
busily making a nation-state and expressing indigenous agency. This was true even if 
American and Filipino objectives dovetailed at times due to shared interests.     
The Magsaysay era saw a renaissance in indigenous Filipino nation-making, both 
internationally and domestically. Filipinos expressed indigenous agency overseas, 
through participation in regional security organizations such as SEATO and by 
espousing opposition to all kinds of colonialism (including communism) at the Bandung 
Afro-Asian Conference in 1955. Contentious debates over trade agreements such as the 
Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1954, and Filipino sovereignty over US bases also showed 
common issues that united all Filipinos across society. Filipino culture was also 
changing by the 1950s. New textbooks were required to promote patriotism amongst 
school children. These also sparked contentious disputes over the separation of church 
and state. Tagalog, the national language, became more widely used in society as 
another potential source of unity.  A plurality of Filipino voices and indigenous modes of 
expressing agency existed, where none was previously assumed to be.      
The intense “nation-making” period of the 1950s sparked an impulse for political 
reform.  Magsaysay, at the outset, enjoyed the support from a broad range of groups, 
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including the “professional military officers, the CIA, the Catholic Church, professional 
associations, anticommunist labor and peasant organizations.” Magsaysay knew that 
Filipinos were looking for a reform-minded figure who could get things done, that the 
so-called non-elite professional class was staunchly anti-communist, and that the public 
had hoped for “clean and honest government.” Magsaysay was personally popular and 
could draw upon American support. His Nacionalista party also controlled the majority 
of both houses in the Filipino Congress.2 That Magsaysay himself switched parties, from 
Liberal to Nacionalista to run against Quirino, did not presage any departure from the 
Filipino two-party political system since personalities and factions mattered more than 
formal structures like these parties.3  
Even a reformer like Magsaysay knew how to play the political game. Under 
Magsaysay, the Filipino military, and the National Movement for Free Elections 
                                                 
2 State reform extended from laws passed dealing with executive power, management of the state budget, 
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(NAMFREL) safeguarded the ballot and prevented voter fraud during the 1951 
parliamentary elections and the 1953 presidential elections. These institutions were well-
regarded by the Filipino public.4 According to Karnow, in In Our Image, Magsaysay 
governed as a “strongman of the people.” Magsaysay espoused a presidency that 
genuinely cared for the well-being of ordinary folk.5 What made the Filipino President 
useful to the nation-state making project was not just his charisma or his connections 
with the United States; it was his ability to build bridges and establish connections where 
there were none previously.    
Seeking competent people with sound policies, Magsaysay placed business 
executives in charge of economic projects. The President appointed non-elite technocrats 
and military officers to government posts in education, public health, and road 
construction in the countryside. Magsaysay-appointed military officials were put in 
charge of the Bureau of Customs and of Mindanao resettlement programs.6 Magsaysay 
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was also greatly helped by the participation of non-elite volunteers. For instance, to 
support Magsaysay’s quest to build more artesian wells in the barrios, a group of “public 
minded citizens” formed what they called the “Liberty Wells.” This project resulted in 
the construction of thousands of new artesian wells within two years. 7 Magsaysay knew 
that to complete the nation-making project, the state needed to make itself felt not only 
in the big cities, but also in the countryside.   
The government encouraged people in the rural areas, sending government 
workers and community leaders to the barrios. Magsaysay used state power to 
circumvent local leaders since he thought that the local bosses and the landed elite were 
not effective in nation-state building.8 State laws promulgated between 1955 and 1963 
devolved power to local barrio councils as “official organs of local government,” and 
promoted local autonomy and local self-reliance. These barrio councils taxed, collected 
license fees, and enacted local laws in their areas. The Magsaysay administration also 
established the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD), a “unified 
state agency,” under veteran community organizer Ramon Binamira, to promote local 
initiative. As far as the PACD was concerned, barrio councils promoted democracy and 
community living, since people were encouraged to pursue their own self-interest.9  
The PACD’s mission was to promote “self-help.” People in the barrios 
voluntarily contributed their energies towards the building of artesian wells and feeder 
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roads. Their labor complemented government-provided funds, technical services, and 
equipment. The PACD-- a lasting Magsaysay legacy-- sought to circumvent, and replace 
whenever possible, the traditional networks controlled by local leaders on one end, and 
by congressmen in the capital on the other.10  
 A Manila Times report of July 1955 showed that these rural programs were 
implemented extensively. There were 18,000 to 20,000 barrio workers who were trained 
to “guide and assist rural communities in self-development.” These workers were among 
“the first multi-service rural reconstruction workers” to receive training through the 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), which was among the first non-
governmental organizations to operate in the islands.11 An example was in the town of 
San Luis. According to the Executive Director of the project there, these workers were 
“little Magsaysays . . . getting people to work more, produce more, and save more, so 
that they would become better producers, better businessmen and better citizens, 
stomach full, mind clear and heart loyal to democracy.” These barrio workers were with 
the people all day and all night, working on what needed “fixing,” and did not mind the 
“risks involved.” This town held symbolic value; San Luis was former Huk chief Luis 
Taruc’s hometown, and was now the site of a “social laboratory, where mass education 
techniques, old and new, of this and other lands, were being tested and developed for 
later nationwide application.” The PRRM worked as a “subsidiary” to government 
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agencies such as the PACD to “mobilize” the rural constituents, and to “promote rural 
democracy.”12  
Community development did not just consolidate the state. It opened the eyes of 
many urbanites to the challenges of democracy amidst rural life.13 A Bataan Magazine 
article, dated August 1956, observed that “many Philippine towns are isolated, and a 
farmer may have to walk twenty miles or more with a 100-pound sack of coffee on his 
back to take his product to the black market.” The magazine believed that a national road 
network would help to relieve this isolation, and Manila sought the help of US aid 
missions to achieve this end.14  
Many rural folk saw the central government as a source of redress for local 
concerns involving patronage and corruption. In one of Magsaysay’s sorties, local 
councilors, who were representing a district with many fishponds, sought an audience 
with the Filipino leader.  According to the councilors, small fishermen were 
encountering difficulties in “earning their daily subsistence.” This was because small 
businessmen, who were well-connected, had secured government permits allowing them 
to control the operations of “almost all the fishing grounds.” The councilors representing 
the small fishermen told the President directly that the fishermen needed help from the 
Department of Agriculture, since these rural fisher-folk lacked the connections that elite 
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Filipinos possessed. Magsaysay sympathized, believing that if the thousands of small 
fishermen were denied their livelihood, the specter of another communist uprising was 
never too far-fetched.15 Government thus sought to alleviate the condition of the 
fishermen by “cancelling outright all permits to establish fishponds and salt beds in the 
shore areas,” and made these disputed areas open to “free enterprise of the sea-folk.”16 
Magsaysay knew that rural discontent, which led to the rise and the spread of the Huks, 
was linked to issues such as corruption and livelihood. Government listened to the 
voices of ordinary Filipinos.   
Magsaysay’s administration pushed for Filipino unity. In a flying trip to Naga 
City in early 1956, the President said that if Filipinos would “forget their political 
animosities and banded together” with the government, economic and agricultural 
projects could be realized. Magsaysay expressed this appeal in Tagalog, saying that with 
the elections over, “it was imperative that the leaders and the people irrespective of 
political persuasions should put their shoulders together in pushing the country towards 
progress.” Magsaysay further believed that the government “should indulge in less 
politics,” according to the Manila Times article.17 The state encouraged officials to settle 
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disputes and to focus on solving the city’s problems. The objective was “good and 
efficient government.”18 The Bataan Magazine article also described Magsaysay’s 
natural gift as a communicator. The President self-deprecatingly joked that while he was 
not reading technical and complicated “economic treatises,” he knew that the Filipino 
economy was similar to a “sari-sari store,” as he had run one himself when he was 
young.19 
Magsaysay used his charisma and his presidential powers to directly intervene in 
local affairs. For instance, a contract between the government-owned National 
Development Company (NDC) and with landowners in Mindanao for cotton planting 
was deemed “inadequate” by the latter. The landowning settlers argued that they were 
having trouble making a living, since tenants working their land had to pay debts to the 
government.  Magsaysay sought out these landowners to listen to their grievances. One 
of the settlers, an old hand named Brigido Geronimo, mentioned that he owned 10 
hectares for cotton cultivation, with a contract under the NDC. Geronimo said that his 
lease with the government only gave him 10 pesos per hectare. The landowners’ profit 
was not enough, in his eyes, to “improve his living.” For Magsaysay, as reported by the 
Manila Times, the solution to Geronimo’s dilemma was to change the contract “in such a 
                                                 
18 “RM pleads for unity among city officials,” The Manila Times, January 2, 1956.  
19 Apparently, Magsaysay valued competent people around him. The President sought to appoint in his 
administration “the best economic minds in the country,” and those who possessed “down to earth ideas” 
who apparently shared his inclinations in bridging the gap between the elite and the non-elite Filipinos. 
“Official Report: President Magsaysay’s Economic Development Program,” July 1956, 5, Bataan 
Magazine, Folder-Philippines, HSTLI.   
 172 
way that after the tenant had paid his debts” to the NDC, “what remained of the amount 
should be given to the landowner as his profit.”20 In many such cases, government 
arbitration had become necessary to get things done at the local level. Exposure to the 
field exposed the limits of nation- state building from the top, since locals saw and 
experienced problems far more vividly than the view from ventilated offices in Manila.21  
According to Immerwahr, the Filipino state found that building the nation 
through communities actually “worked,” and that the solution lay in “encouraging 
bonds” amongst the people. This finding was observed by the government in its training 
programs for the barrio workers who worked in these rural communities. These workers, 
alongside the PACD, shifted emphasis away from “technical skills” such as soil analysis, 
animal husbandry, or agricultural economics. Instead, they focused on more generalist 
approaches that stressed sustaining “social harmony” through “group dynamics, rural 
sociology, and community organizing.” These barrio workers used a novel tactic through 
the use of “T-groups,” discussion groups that were without any particular theme but the 
ultimate goal of which was to foster and illustrate various forms of cooperation, instill 
familiarity and comradeship-- critical facets of Filipino culture.  Immerwahr also cited 
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PACD chief Ramon Binamira, who said that their on-the-ground training ultimately 
helped leaders recognize the magnitude of local concerns, as these community workers 
interacted daily with ordinary Filipino families. These experiences made the workers 
determined to solve problems in their localities.22 Hence, the July 1955 Manila Times 
article was very revealing of the Third Republic’s visions and objectives when the article 
referred to the phenomenon of “little Magsaysays” across the islands.  
    
Indigenous Agency Expressed through Foreign Relations  
Diplomacy presented another opportunity to express Filipino indigenous agency, 
through international alliances and through participation in regional conferences. 
Scholars such as H.W. Brands, in Bound to Empire, noted that “Washington and Manila 
have never got along better than during the years of the Magsaysay administration.”23 
But an American National Security Policy Statement NSC 5413/1, dated April 1954, 
showed that Magsaysay also expressed interest in promoting closer diplomatic relations 
with other Asian countries. The Filipino President believed that there needed to be 
“Asian non-communist unity.”24 
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Magsaysay’s Philippines hosted the founding conference of SEATO partly in 
pursuit of that unity.25 The organization’s mission was to maintain “peace” in the region, 
albeit, by working with the United States.26 The Philippines under Magsaysay also 
participated in the April 1955 Bandung Conference, sending a delegation led by Carlos 
Romulo. But Third World leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru of India saw Romulo as a 
mouthpiece for American-led international Cold War security alliances, such as 
SEATO.27 Romulo, for his part, knew that Washington was apprehensive about the 
upcoming conference. According to the scholar Robert McMahon, in Limits of Empire, 
in the run-up to the Bandung Conference, the United States had feared that the rise of the 
Third World as a united force ultimately benefited Soviet interests by taking advantage 
of Asian (and African) resentments against the potential return of “colonial domination 
and economic dependence.”28  But Romulo persuaded American officials that if the 
United States were to “block the Afro-Asian Conference . . . it would cause huge 
embarrassment” for America and backfire to “the benefit of the Communists.” 
According to the US Department of State, Romulo therefore argued that it would be best 
for countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan to participate in the 
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Conference, so as to ”resist Communist attacks,” and to effectively counteract 
“allegations that Nehru and the other neutralist” leaders might make.29  
 At the same time, Romulo believed that Filipinos needed to join emerging 
articulations of African and of Asian voices. Romulo argued that the Philippines needed 
to participate in the upcoming Bandung conference. According to Romulo, “the mere 
decision to hold that meeting was a Communist victory,” and might attract new states to 
that side. If the “anti-Communist” countries did not attend, Romulo feared, this would 
“represent a further defeat for the anti-Communist nations.”30 Romulo knew that even if 
the US and the Philippines both had an aversion to communism, Filipinos, being Asians, 
possessed common ground with the other conference participants.    
Romulo let U.S. officials know that “Asian nationalism is going to continue its 
growth, and that the only way to prevent it from being perverted is to have friendly 
Asians present at such Asian meetings.” Otherwise, “extremists” could “obtain a wide 
audience for their views.” Romulo argued to the American officials before Bandung that 
the conference was ultimately a good thing, since it “is (was) a second step towards 
developing nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia which is completely hopeless to try 
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and eliminate.” The Filipino diplomat also suggested to the United States that the best 
course of action that would be beneficial to the anti-communist cause was to “make the 
voice of the more moderate Asians heard.”31 Filipinos also knew that the United States 
wanted to maintain its credibility as an anti-colonial power with the new nations of Asia 
and Africa. 
During his opening speech at Bandung, Romulo expressed his reflections that 
Filipinos shared “historical elements” with other Asian countries, such as the experience 
of “subjection” by a foreign power, and belonging “to a group of poor, less economically 
developed countries with relatively low standards of living.”  In Romulo’s eyes, 
moreover, these newly independent countries shared an “abhorrence” of any form of 
imperialism, whether by the West or by the Communists. In Romulo’s view, the colored 
peoples, of which the Philippines was a part, needed to articulate their collective voices 
together.32 Romulo further argued that “white supremacy” had always been central to 
“all the versions of Western colonialism,” and that racism served “as a driving force in 
the development of the nationalist movements in our many lands.”33 
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Augusto Espiritu’s article demonstrated that Romulo knew that Filipinos needed 
to express that they could speak for the “anticommunist alliance,” and also show that 
African and Asian unity could be a powerful global force. Filipinos, often mistakenly 
seen by outsiders as heavily Westernized Asians, wanted to dispel the notion that the 
Philippines was simply an American puppet and therefore actively pursued an agenda of 
preventing the spread of communism in the Third World.34 According to Romulo, the 
conference organizers believed in fighting colonialism, and obtaining political freedom, 
“racial equality,” and “peaceful economic growth.”35 Romulo admonished afterwards 
that the United States needed to avoid branding Asian and African nationalist 
movements as “communistic,” whenever these countries did not appear to conform to 
American interests.36 Romulo also tackled and responded to the criticism that the 
Philippines was a “stooge” of the United States: 
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To turn towards Asia for friends and allies is a natural 
impulse, in the view of Filipino nationalists, and the more 
success the Philippines has in building up its relations with 
Asian countries, the more valuable it will be, so it claims, 
both as a friend of the United States and as a potential 
bridge to Asia . . .37   
 
A Bataan Magazine article, written in 1956, narrated how Bandung also captured 
Magsaysay’s views on Filipino participation in the spread of Asian nationalisms during 
the President’s term. Magsaysay stated that the Filipino role was to play the “free world 
in Asia.” The three considerations guiding Filipino foreign policy included “national 
security,” “economic stability,” and “political and cultural relations with the free 
world.”38  
Magsaysay also revealed his desire for the Philippines to take an active role in 
Third World leadership. The Filipino leader said that many countries in the Third World 
tended to “view the present world tension as the result of competition between two 
power blocs-- one headed by the United States of America and the other the Soviet 
Union.” Magsaysay argued that Filipinos held a “different view of the situation”-- that: 
 
first, we do not view communism as just another world force to be  
satiated with territory and gold. We have learned from our communist 
Hukbalahap revolution that communism is not just some distorted 
nationalist ambition . . . to be satisfied with land or riches, but an 
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unremitting universal campaign to rule the earth, to eradicate individual 
liberty, to destroy God and the souls of men.39   
 
Magsaysay viewed Filipino participation at Bandung in a highly positive light. In the 
President’s Third State of the Nation address in January 23, 1956, Magsaysay said that 
“We have strengthened our friendship with other free countries. In the Bandung 
Conference, we forged closer ties with Asian and African nations and effectively 
collaborated with them [these countries] in achieving unity. “40  
Meanwhile, Washington’s fears about Bandung proved unfounded. Historian 
Jason Parker described how Bandung, instead of being used by the communists to their 
advantage against the United States, emerged as a “Western win” thanks to anti-
communist non-Western participants such as the Philippines. Filipinos criticized 
American support for the European colonial empires, but they also conflated European 
colonialism with Communist colonialism, arguing that they are one and the same.41 
Filipinos actively participated in Bandung not because they were acting as American 
agents, but as an international expression of their indigenous agency.     
Magsaysay was viewed very well overseas. A Manila Times article of March 
1955 showed that the charismatic President was viewed more favorably than any other 
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head of state in the American press. Clippings were compiled by the US-based 
“Philippine Association,” which “kept a running check on the state of editorial opinion 
on the Philippines in the United States.” This outfit was a “civic organization which 
conducts a campaign in the US to build confidence in the Philippines.”42  Americans 
viewed Magsaysay very favorably, although they expressed concern that other 
Nacionalista leaders around the Filipino leader were seeking to reduce cooperation with 
the United States to establish that the Philippines was “truly independent.”43 
 An American editor, Virgil Pinkley, sought out Magsaysay and toured the 
country with him.  The President mentioned to the American writer that “everything can 
be accomplished in a democracy through constitutional means that can be achieved 
under a dictatorship or through communism and without loss of human rights and 
dignities or a revolution. “44 Magsaysay also believed that to attain economic 
development, a leader must be “fanatically honest,” and his administration must “strike 
vigorously” against graft and corruption.45  Pinkley wrote that Magsaysay knew that 
Filipino “national economic strength must be built from the base up . . . Our (Filipino) 
present economy is agrarian and 75% of our people derive their livelihood from agrarian 
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activities.” This, in the eyes of the Filipino President, was “the broad base that must be 
modernized and strengthened to support a sound program of industrialization.”46 
American appraisals of Magsaysay, both in government and in the press, tended 
toward the positive.  A 1954 US National Security Council report took stock of 
Magsaysay’s achievements.  The report found that his administration had improved the 
“status of the peasant,” and had undertaken steps to raise “political morality.”  The 
report also described his appointments as a motley mixture of those with “political 
backing,” reformists, and “capable administrators.”47  
In a 1955 interview with Bataan Magazine, Magsaysay described the US-
Filipino relationship as a “partnership in the building of democracy-- democracy in the 
broadest sense and on a world scale.” Magsaysay believed that this produced a society 
where the “the interests and the welfare of the individual” would be the primary concern 
of the government. Magsaysay believed in the ideal of a “world community,” where 
each nation, regardless of its size and material strength, possessed “a voice and 
acknowledged rights.” For Magsaysay, the global struggle was over the challenge by 
“communist imperialism,” which sought “a world of Red colonies,” and posed a threat 
not only to the American but to the Filipino ways of life. Internally, the problem was 
communist agents embedded in society; externally, the problem was communist “threats 
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and aggressions.”  This, Magsaysay believed, was “the common problem facing all 
Asians.”48 
There were disagreements. Filipinos were becoming discontented with the 
current state of their trade agreement with the US.49 Many ultranationalist Filipino 
leaders had long resented the Parity Rights clause in the Bell Trade Act, which conferred 
equal advantages to Americans and Filipinos in the ownership, exploitation, and use of 
Filipino resources in the islands. Well into the mid-1950s, as high as two-thirds of 
Filipino exports from the islands flowed to the United States. Copra and sugar, which 
together comprised half of the islands’ dollar revenues, were sold at artificially high 
prices in the American market. American consumers were also said to have been 
subsidizing the “sugar barons” in the islands. Increasing tariffs imposed by the United 
States since 1946 on Filipino exports to the United States would have done away with 
this form of subsidy. What the barons wanted Laurel and the delegation to do was to find 
a way to obtain a “longer period of free trade for Philippine exports.” Filipino 
industrialists on the other hand, wanted Laurel to “eliminate free trade for US imports,” 
since 69% of the Filipino imports came from the United States.  Filipino manufacturers 
preferred “tariff walls, in addition to import controls already restricting the flow of 
American goods.”  Magsaysay was said to have supported the industrialists’ view.  The 
President believed that supporting Filipino industry would help speed up the transition 
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from a predominantly agricultural economy in the islands to an industrial one. 
Industrialization would helpfully lead to the “development of an indigenous market.” 50 
Magsaysay therefore sought to press for revisions to the Bell Trade Act of 1946, which 
was due to expire in 1954. The government sent a Philippine Economic Survey Mission 
team to Washington, D.C. to renegotiate.  Jose Laurel served as Magsaysay’s chief 
representative in the Filipino delegation to the American capital.51  The other members 
of the delegation included “Cuaderno, furniture manufacturer Gil Puyat, Lorenzo 
Sumulong and other sugar-bloc Liberals, as well as many “old guard” Nacionalistas.”52  
Laurel wrote Magsaysay from Washington, explaining his strategy in dealing 
with the Americans. According to the chief representative, Filipinos must cater to those 
sympathetic to Filipinos in the US Congress.  Laurel prescribed that the Filipino 
delegation must avoid getting entangled with lobby groups in Capitol Hill.53  In the 
course of the negotiations, Laurel pressed for more free trade and for American 
investment in the islands, mindful of the factions who lobbied him and his delegation 
before departing for Washington, D.C.  But it was important in Laurel’s view to connect 
the issue of free trade with Filipino independence. For Laurel, “parity rights” was a very 
contentious matter.  US Ambassador Spruance also asked Laurel whether the Philippines 
                                                 
50 Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 
1942-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 145, 146.  
51 Blitz, The Contested State, 96.  
52 Brands, Bound to Empire, 253. 
53 Blitz, The Contested State, 96. 
 184 
would rather have special trade relations with the United States or “be divorced and to 
receive most favored nation treatment.”54  
The American negotiators knew that these trade talks were a very sensitive topic 
for the already-inflamed Filipino nationalists. Washington wanted to strengthen 
Magsaysay’s government, when the Americans agreed to more “liberal trade 
concessions” for Filipino industrialists and commodity exporters, to help aid Filipino 
economic objectives. Tariff autonomy would ideally have helped Magsaysay raise more 
money, and would enable the islands not to rely too much on foreign aid. The 
Philippines also pursued industrialization in the mid-1950s to help generate jobs for a 
growing population.55 Filipino negotiators were looking for a better deal that would 
benefit elite and non-elite Filipinos alike. The negotiators knew that they had the high 
card, knowing that the islands’ strategic value to U.S. Cold War security arrangements. 
The Filipino delegation was well aware that “the Philippines was an important link in 
[the U.S.] security system.” The Filipino negotiators raised the specter of a Philippines 
that “weakens internally,” which would also weaken American security if the United 
States continued to act obstinately for the sake of a few trade advantages.56 A 
compromise was in the offing.  
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The Filipino negotiators won many concessions from the American officials in 
Washington. Laurel obtained decelerated rates for “Filipino exports subjected to 
American tariffs” and accelerated rates “at which American exports to the Philippines 
would be subject to Philippine imposts.” These arrangements ultimately benefited 
producers in the islands, making the mission a Filipino success. In the eyes of 
Magsaysay and his team, the mission’s outcome was big achievement for Filipino 
nationalism. Magsaysay described the aftermath as having accomplished a goal that was 
“most necessary and vital to the future of our country.”57 The resultant Laurel-Langley 
Agreement demonstrated that Filipinos used their connections with the United States to 
exact more favorable trade deals for their people. Laurel-Langley also helped defuse 
nationalist agitation against perceptions of foreign involvement and influence in the 
islands.   
 There were, however, other issues. The foremost related to US bases--  a source 
of continued friction. The 1947 Military Bases Agreement had guaranteed a permanent 
US military presence in the archipelago, upon Filipino invitation. But there were many 
questions surrounding control of the territory where the US bases were located.58 From 
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the standpoint of the Americans, the United States “retained sovereignty over the bases” 
from the moment legal ownership of the rest of the archipelago was transferred to the 
Philippine government on July 4, 1946.  For Americans, it did not matter whether they 
had the actual paper title of ownership or not. The Pentagon was especially enthusiastic 
in supporting this view since it allowed American authorities to have greater control over 
the bases in the islands.  Brands, in Bound to Empire, argued that for Filipino 
nationalists, which American estimates at this time included “the entire population,” 
Americans were acting like “imperialists” whenever Filipinos got “arrested, or wounded 
or killed” in the baselands located in the islands, regardless of pre-existing arrangements. 
Having recognized that these issues touched a nerve amongst the inhabitants in the 
islands across all sectors of Filipino society, Eisenhower thereafter conceded that 
Filipinos could keep the title of ownership of the land.59 American officials more 
acquainted with conditions on the ground in the islands and who had interactions with 
Filipinos knew that their Filipino hosts were not completely satisfied with the 
arrangements. According to a US National Security Council Progress Report dated April 
1955, the United States foresaw many political problems in dealing with Filipinos. These 
included the recommendation that Americans must attempt to allocate “additional land 
for military bases” with the Filipino authorities in ways that would not lead to 
“undesirable political repercussion” for US interests in the islands. The two sides came 
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to a settlement, wherein Filipinos agreed that Americans needed not obtain title for the 
expanded baselands to continue their operations in those areas.60  But many American 
officials, according to Brands, continued to view the Philippines as a “small nation” 
while the United States was one of the two superpowers astride the world.61  These 
would put strains on the relationship between the former colonizer and the now-
independent nation-state.   
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited the Philippines in 1956 to meet 
with President Magsaysay. In the meeting, Magsaysay explained to Dulles the scope of 
the challenges facing the country. A pressing concern by many Filipinos was the 
“unimpressive amount” of American foreign aid money, compared to what was being 
received by the other US allies. Magsaysay argued to Dulles that the Filipino President 
was “in a defensive position with my own people,” which suggested implications for 
American standing in the eyes of the other Asian allies.62  In a letter which Dulles 
addressed directly to Magsaysay after the meeting, Dulles expressed his appreciation for 
the friendship between the two countries, which Magsaysay was said to have 
“exemplified.” The letter acknowledged Magsaysay’s priority of using foreign aid 
money for rural economic development. The Dulles letter sought to answer Filipino 
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questions indirectly on how military and economic aid was dispensed, to dispel Filipino 
doubts about how U.S. aid money was going to other countries. Dulles stated in his letter 
that American money: 
 
is not dispensed on the basis of friendship . . . both because 
friendship does not lend itself to measurement in terms of 
dollars and cents, and also because our program does not 
represent a desire to be generous and give away presents. 
Rather it is a willingness to do what seems necessary to 
assist those countries which are endangered and which 
cannot do what you and I would want them to do unless 
we help them.63 
 
 
The Dulles letter to Magsaysay explained that Korea, Taiwan and Indochina received the 
bulk of US foreign aid as compared to the Philippines and many Latin American 
countries in the Western hemisphere, because these places were not in any imminent 
danger of falling to communists.64 The aftermath of the meeting did not go too well, with 
Dulles adopting a patronizing attitude towards Filipino concerns.  Magsaysay, his rivals 
whispered afterward, listened too much to the “cheap politicians” around him, and that 
“the Philippines could get a lot more out of the United States if only Magsaysay would 
play a different game.”65  
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The state of the US-Filipino relationship continued to deteriorate over the 
inability of both parties to resolve the issue of the status of the US bases in the islands. 
Magsaysay also had to intervene with American officials, to have the military 
checkpoints in the areas surrounding the bases removed.  Also, in 1956, when a United 
States Air Force plane made an emergency landing at the Manila International Airport. 
American soldiers surrounded the plane, stopped Filipinos from getting near it and 
smashed the cameras of Filipino journalists.66 What raised the ire of many Filipinos was 
not the landing so much as the perception that the American military police had treated 
the newsmen and photographers so rudely.67 Filipino discontent was therefore beginning 
to sour at the American military presence and operations in the islands.  
There were many other controversies involving the base areas during the mid-
1950s.  Many locals were never comfortable that American authorities administered 
nearby Olongapo town and its 20,000 inhabitants.  In 1956, an incident took place 
involving Filipino miners near Clark Air Force Base, where American authorities 
challenged the right of Filipino miners to “quarry and transport manganese ore,” in what 
many American authorities claimed was “part of a military reservation.”  The Filipinos 
argued that the American military had set up a checkpoint without the approval of local 
Filipino authorities, which Filipinos had to pass through to get to the mines. Moreover, 
the Filipino miners had to deal with what they argued were obsolete American legal 
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claims dating back to the early 1900s. According to the ultranationalist Claro Recto, who 
served as counsel for the miners, Filipino sovereignty must be upheld in favor of the 
miners.68 This issue came to a head in 1956 when Magsaysay sent Vice President Garcia 
to press the US government to allow Filipino miners to operate within the reservations. 69   
Other issues involved US military personnel in the base areas. In January 1956, a 
US seaman, George Roe, was accused of “driving recklessly,” which was said to have 
caused physical injuries to a local Filipino man. According to the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement, seaman Roe was supposed to be placed under Filipino jurisdiction. Instead, 
the American seaman was transferred to the United States mainland and subsequently 
discharged. The Filipino foreign office filed a note of protest to the US Embassy. There 
was outrage amongst Filipinos. The Filipino press also took up the issue of “pilfering,” 
where, over the course of 10 years, 20 local Filipinos were killed while scavenging for 
bombs that US planes dropped at the gunnery range in the base areas, during the course 
of training.70 The Filipinos demanded that the Americans “return unused base areas,” 
that a joint US-Filipino defense council be created, that Filipino laws were to be applied 
within US bases, and that a “definite assurance of automatic United States retaliation in 
the event of an attack on the Philippines,” mutually agreed upon by the 1951 US-Filipino 
Mutual Defense Treaty, but Filipinos wanted to ensure ironclad American commitment. 
Meanwhile, the negotiations between Filipinos and Americans over this issue appeared 
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fruitless, George Taylor argued in The Philippines and the United States, partly due to 
Filipino negotiators being professional politicians while the US negotiators, except for 
Ambassador Albert Nufer, were military representatives.  Filipino representatives 
therefore did not wish to be seen to their domestic constituents as compromising with the 
Americans.71 The mid-1950s was a time when passions ran high in the islands.     
Magsaysay’s team met with the American negotiating team led by the former US 
Undersecretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen to go over the issues surrounding the 
American bases in the islands. The meeting was unsuccessful, with Bendetsen (as well 
as State and Defense officials such as Dulles and acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral William Radford) unwilling to compromise on the contentious issue of 
“criminal jurisdiction” over Americans on the US bases. Negotiations were postponed 
until after the November 1957 presidential election. The US Air Force and the US Navy 
ended up making “informal arrangements” with the Filipino army and thereafter 
provided funds to make Philippine airfields longer for American military use.72 US Vice 
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President Richard Nixon finally brought the matter to a close on July 4, 1956, conceding 
that the United States was willing to recognize Filipino sovereignty “over all Philippine 
territory,” including the US bases.73  
In the eyes of Jose Laurel and many Filipinos, America needed to understand that 
the islands were no longer American soil, including the US bases. The American bases 
had become a focal point for Filipino unity during the mid-1950s. For instance, Jose 
Laurel stated: 
 
The establishment of foreign military bases in any country is a serious 
matter, indeed, and except for the English base in Ceylon, the elimination 
of which is now being sought, there is no foreign base in Southeast Asia 
except in the Philippines. To the extent that a portion of a nation’s 
territory is yielded, its territory is seriously impaired. It becomes a target 
of attack and its power to declare war is rendered illusory. Despite these 
inherent dangers however, we agreed to seal our fate with the United 
States.74 
  
 
Laurel also studied the external security treaties into which the Third Republic had 
entered. Laurel described the period when the 1947 Philippine- US Military Bases 
Agreement would be in force as “unusually long,” as it covered 99 years, though this 
was later reduced in 1966 under Ferdinand Marcos to 25 years and thus came to be set to 
expire in 1991. Laurel also said that many of the provisions were “fundamentally 
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unfair,” even in exchange for American “financial aid.”75 According to Laurel, many 
Filipinos had expressed their resentment with the US forces in the base areas during the 
past decade over issues such as local Filipinos being mistaken as intruders when 
venturing near the bases, people accidentally being run over by American vehicles, 
American base personnel committing property damage, and Filipino citizens expelled 
from the American bases for any reason. Laurel also recommended trying the errant 
American soldiers “as the result of a fair and judicial trial by their countrymen [who 
would be fellow Americans] but upon the administrative recommendation in which alien 
civilians, Chinese [Chinese-Filipinos], for example could sit as members.”76  
The Filipino Congress took up the “question of [Filipino] jurisdiction” over the 
US bases. The legislators expressed their collective stance that Filipino authorities must 
be allowed to enforce local laws in all US bases in the islands. The Filipino Congress 
declared that any violator, “irrespective of the citizenship,” must be “triable in Philippine 
courts.” The collective statement by the Filipino congressmen stressed that even if the 
American government was leasing the bases under a binding treaty, these lands were still 
part of Filipino territory. Filipinos also held “title to the lands on which these bases have 
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been situated.”  Therefore, according to the declaration, there was no “question of doubt 
as to who really owned them.”  The Filipino politicians knew that the US-Filipino 
defense relationship benefited Filipinos.  The collective statement recognized the 
American right to “exercise jurisdiction over violations of its own laws by members of 
its armed forces within the bases.”  But the Filipino Congress also contended that the 
Philippines must have jurisdiction over American military personnel who “violated both 
American and Philippine laws.”77  
According to the scholar George Taylor, the disputes over the US bases formed 
part of the core debates over Filipino identity, Filipino nationalism and the place of the 
country in the world. Many Filipinos, Taylor argued, were “thinking about their national 
pride and the way other Asians view them as Oriental Americans.”78  Part of the upsurge 
in Filipino nationalism was due to a general perception amongst Filipinos that the 
country was relying too much on the United States.  This view was summed up by 
Filipino Congressman Jose J. Roy, who, in 1956, declared that there were too many US 
technical advisers in the Philippines.  Roy believed that Filipinos would need to expand 
their relationships beyond the United States to countries such as West Germany to help 
train local Filipinos “in the right fields,” for domestic and national development. 79  
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Promoting the Filipino  
By the 1950s, state policies increasingly reflected concern over Chinese-Filipino 
dominance in the retail trade sector of the islands’ economy. During the early 1950s, the 
Chinese-Filipinos only consisted of 1% of the population but controlled the retail and the 
wholesale trades, due to Spanish and Chinese-Filipino mestizo control of commercial 
agriculture since the 1800s.80 With the passing of the Retail Trade Nationalization Act in 
1954 by the Nacionalista Party-controlled Filipino Congress, retail trade was restricted 
to Filipinos. Those seen as “aliens”—aimed at the Chinese-Filipinos, but which also 
covered Americans and other foreigners-- were given 10 years to disengage from their 
businesses.  This congressional measure was aimed at preventing the Chinese-Filipinos, 
among other foreigners, from amassing too much economic power in the islands. The 
Retail Trade Nationalization Bill was appealing to non-Chinese Filipinos, since local 
entrepreneurs resented domination of key sectors by the Chinese-Filipinos.81  Filipino 
share in industry therefore expanded. In 1949, Filipino capital only held 55% of 
investments in start-up enterprises, with the Chinese-Filipino share at 37 percent, and 
with the American share at 5 percent. But by 1961, the Filipino share rose to 88 percent, 
the Chinese-Filipino share was relegated to 10 percent, while the American share 
dropped to below 2 percent. The Chinese-Filipino presence in the Filipino economy was 
reduced everywhere within a decade, except in the manufacturing industry.82  
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Taylor argued that the Filipinos in 1958 also knew that for the nation-state-
building project to be successful, they also needed absorb the Chinese-Filipinos into 
mainstream Filipino society. But the government also saw that the majority Filipinos 
also needed to attain “economic leadership and control,” so that the majority would not 
resent and/or fear the Chinese-Filipinos. 83 Magsaysay believed that he had to reduce the 
an economic and social presence seen as “alien” by many. It was also just as true that the 
Chinese-Filipinos were “unwilling to give up their traditional culture,” with an estimate 
of over 200 Chinese schools in the islands, where Chinese-Filipino families sent their 
children, during the late 1950s. The non-resident “overstaying” Chinese also presented a 
legal and security headache in the islands. But the government was making it difficult 
for the Chinese in the islands to obtain Filipino citizenship. The specter of the Chinese-
Filipinos in the Philippines maintaining their power in sectors like retail trade, while 
refusing to assimilate and who were suspected of having communist sympathies, was a 
major challenge for nation-state building.84  Nacionalista politicians such as Magsaysay 
and Laurel therefore used the state as the bridge between the other Filipinos and the 
Filipino-Chinese, and to encourage the Chinese-Filipinos to conform with the state and 
with the other members of society. This therefore did not mean that the Chinese-
Filipinos in the islands were completely controlled or that they could not be useful. For 
instance, to halt rapidly rising consumer prices, Magsaysay appealed to the Chinese-
Filipino press in the islands to ask the readers to cooperate with the government’s price 
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controls.85  The Third Republic also established formal diplomatic relations with the 
Nationalist Republic of China to minimize the potential influence of communists within 
the Chinese-Filipino community.86  
The state’s promotion of Filipino economic nationalism encouraged Filipino 
production. The government appealed to all Filipinos to “buy products manufactured by 
Filipino brains and brawn” as a sign of “patriotic duty.”  For Magsaysay, such acts 
helped “foster the spirit of nationalism” amongst the people. Magsaysay wore Filipino-
made shoes, which he described as “good as foreign ones,” and believed that national 
industry needed to produce what was “essential” and “what the nation needs.”87 
Magsaysay led the sartorial way by popularizing the use of the Barong Tagalog, which 
used to be worn by non-elites in the islands.88  
Magsaysay’s government also took into account the welfare of “non-Christian 
tribes” in central Luzon. The Manila Times published an article in April 1956, which 
described how the government embarked on schoolhouse construction, artesian well-
digging, the setting up of health centers, the provision of work animals and farming 
implements for tribesmen, and agricultural instruction for “better farming techniques” in 
                                                 
85 Jose L. Guevara, “Packaging firms suffer dollar cut,” The Manila Times, February 1, 1956.   
86  Ang Cheng Guan, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Domino Theory,” in Christopher E. Goscha and 
Christopher E. Ostermann (ed.), Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia, 1945-1962 (Washington DC and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Press and Stanford University Press, 
2009), 313.    
87 “Buy PI-made goods, Mag’say urges nation,” The Manila Times, February 24, 1956.    
88 Mina Roces, “Gender, Nation and the Politics of Dress in Twentieth Century Philippines,” in Mina 
Roces and Louise Edwards (ed.), The Politics of Dress in Asia and the Americas (Brighton and Portland: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2007, 2010), 30.  
 198 
the region. Christian aid groups who worked with the government also helped distribute 
hundreds of blankets to the Negrito tribesmen.89  Manila provided the local Negritos 
with carabaos to “till their fields,” and established agricultural schools in the 
neighboring barrios. Government also constructed a major highway to connect the 
Central Luzon provinces.90  
Magsaysay also believed in promoting local initiative.  In 1956, the President 
supported “granting greater autonomy to provincial executives,” since he believed that 
the “decentralization of powers and responsibilities . . . would be conducive to a more 
effective implementation of the rural development programs.”  The regional governors 
were receptive to the President’s message, but the governors argued with the central 
government for greater control over local constabulary forces.  The local governors 
agreed that the devolution of power from Manila to the provinces would lead to a “more 
effective collection of taxes, just and practical application of public works funds, and 
pork barrel funds (for local projects),” with less red tape and less government 
intervention in local affairs. One example of local initiative was an agreement between 
Surigao province in Mindanao Island and the government of West Germany for the latter 
to send expert scientists to process special molybdenum ores.91  Regional autonomy thus 
contributed, however counterintuitively, to state and nation-building.  
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Education and the Tagalog Language  
 Building a Filipino nation-state also involved investing in public education. The 
Magsaysay administration increased government funding for public schools across the 
country.92 Debates opened up over revisions to the Filipino public school curriculum. 
But revising the educational curriculum meant going up against the Catholic Church. 
According to Constantino and the other scholars of the neo-colonial school, the extent of 
the Catholic Church’s influence on the state was evident under Magsaysay. Magsaysay 
was heavily backed by the Catholic Church. When choosing cabinet members after his 
election as President in 1953, Magsaysay even reserved the position of Education 
Secretary for a candidate, Pastor Endencia, who was recommended by the archbishop. 
Endencia’s successor, College of Law Dean Gregorio Hernandez, was similarly backed 
by the Catholic hierarchy. The Church not only had a presence in education but in 
politics, even fielding political candidates during elections.93  Roxas and Quirino were 
Protestant Christians, while Magsaysay was a Roman Catholic, which may have 
accounted for the enthusiastic support he received among the Church hierarchy.94 
According to William Pomeroy, the Church was afraid of nationalism in the islands, 
since the hierarchy feared the independent religious movements that might take root, and 
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church-held lands and estates that might be endangered. The Church therefore directed 
its affiliated lay organizations to “actively work” for the Magsaysay administration.95  
The politician Claro Recto believed in instilling a sense of history and of 
nationalism amongst young Filipinos. He therefore sought reforms of the educational 
curriculum and pushed through the controversial “Noli-Fili” Rizal Bill in 1956. This bill 
made the two novels, Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not) and El Filibusterismo (The 
Reign of Greed), written by the patriot Jose Rizal, required reading in Filipino schools. 
This was despite opposition from the Church hierarchy.96 The Filipino Catholic Church 
argued that “the bill would violate freedom of conscience and religion.” The Church 
therefore used its pulpits to issue pastoral letters telling Catholic Filipinos to express 
their opposition to the bill. The Church threatened to “close Catholic schools” across the 
country. Recto believed that government should nationalize all schools in the islands to 
ensure that students would be required to read the two novels as part of their educational 
curriculum.97 The Bill eventually passed due to a substitute measure made by other 
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senators such as Laurel, who supported passing the Rizal bill into law, though took into 
account “the objections of the Catholic hierarchy.”98 Thereafter, through an Act of the 
Filipino Congress in 1956, “all schools are required to teach the life and works of Rizal,” 
even if Rizal’s novels were still in the Index of prohibited books by the Roman Catholic 
Church.99   
Taylor also alluded to the presence of “a Filipino intellectual elite” present in all 
sectors of Filipino society.100  Claro Recto was one of those intellectuals, even if his 
politics tended to alienate him from many Filipinos. According to a US Embassy 
Foreign Service document, Recto publicly expressed concern that the Filipino Catholic 
Church interfered too much on “matters of state.” Therefore, the iconoclastic politician 
came up with a “constitutional amendment” measure that prevented any church 
hierarchy (whether they be Muslim, Catholic, Protestant or the breakaway Iglesia ni 
Cristo Philippine Independent Church sect), members of sectarian schools and 
organizations, from interfering in elections.  The proposed amendment also sought to 
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prevent “bigoted instruction,” and “would require every faith and denomination to 
contribute to the support of the state.” Recto was concerned that the 1955 midterm 
congressional elections took place where members of the Church hierarchy gave 
“several candidates for the Senate their imprimatur and their blessings.”  A 1958 US 
embassy document took the view that all these propositions by Recto were simply a 
result of his disillusionment in the aftermath of the 1957 presidential election, which the 
ultranationalist politician had lost. Recto believed that the Filipino Catholic Church had 
conducted a whisper campaign that depicted him as a “communist” in the Filipino 
public’s eyes, which led to his poor showing in that presidential election.101 That Recto 
was defeated during the 1957 presidential election was not surprising. A vast majority of 
Filipinos were devoutly Catholic and had an aversion to communism. Recto was running 
against an incumbent President who unexpectedly succeeded Magsaysay earlier during 
the year. The government, especially under Magsaysay, and the Church, were staunchly 
anticommunist and used schools and churches as a platform to “inoculate” people from 
being influenced by communism.102 Nevertheless, an ultranationalist like Recto also 
contributed to nation-state building. 
The state also promoted cultural nationalism by requiring language education. 
All schools were required to teach Tagalog “for a minimum of forty minutes a day in all 
elementary and secondary grades.”103 According to an August 1955 article by Filipino 
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linguist and writer Jose Villa Panganiban in The Saturday Mirror Magazine, “a national 
soul cannot exist where there is not a common language . . . We shall never have any 
genuine national pride until we have a language of our own. We shall always have that 
sign of inferiority.” Panganiban’s article also showed that in 1937, only 12% of Filipinos 
were speaking Tagalog. By 1955, this had increased to 35%.104 More Filipinos were 
using the national language than previously both at work and at home.  
A special report in This Week magazine also looked at the current state of 
Tagalog as the national language in the islands in 1958. The article noted that “12 years 
after Tagalog was officially declared the national language,” Tagalog had indeed 
become so in everyday use. The reasons for Tagalog’s adoption included “the 
prominence of Tagalog in national literature, Tagalog as the language of the majority 
and Tagalog as the common language of Manila.”105 The changes in Filipino linguistic 
habit were interesting. During the 1948 census, English and Tagalog were spoken 
equally by 37.1% of the population. A commentary stated that, “the fact that Manila, the 
capital and government center of the Philippines, is in the midst of the Tagalog-speaking 
region of the country was an important factor in the choice of Tagalog as the basis of our 
national language.”106 Tagalog also came increasingly into use in government, as 
compared to English, although English continued to be prized as a foreign language of 
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choice by Filipinos. That more Filipinos came increasingly to use Tagalog meant that it 
was becoming a common language.    
Tagalog also was increasingly taught in schools in the native Tagalog-speaking 
and non-Tagalog speaking regions. According to the Filipino educator Andrew 
Gonzalez, it was said that even in the Tagalog regions, “native Tagalog speakers often 
failed the national language class because they found the grammatical study difficult and 
the reading selections incomprehensible.”107 The national government knew that many 
Filipinos continued to use English. But Tagalog was used in schools. For instance, in 
February 1954, Professor Gregorio F. Zaide, teaching a class entitled “Research in 
Filipino Culture,” had a student translate Tagalog riddles into English for his research to 
be turned in to class. A page of the report said “The riddle is a blossom of Filipino 
culture. It is distinctly native in origin, nourished by the grace of imagination, and 
blessed by the labor of clever ingenuity. The Tagalogs, Visayans, Ilocanos, Pampangos, 
Bicolanos, etc. have their own riddles expressed in their native tongue.”108 This report 
showed that language and literature possessed great potential for unity.  
Articles from This Week magazine in 1959 looked at Tagalog as a means of 
recapturing Filipino history. Amado Inciong, in an article in the magazine entitled 
“Spanish and Filipinos,” argued that the history of the Filipinos needed to be reclaimed 
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from four centuries of colonialism, which supposedly erased Filipino pre-history from 
Filipino memory. According to Inciong:  
 
All the records about the archipelago before and after 1521 were virtually 
written in foreign languages. Only through Spanish could the Filipinos 
acquire a sense of history or imbibe new ideas and desires, which, 
because they could not be satisfied within the brutal colonial framework, 
might propel them to really intelligently behind the reform movement. 109  
 
According to Inciong, the Spanish made sure that their Filipino colonial subjects in the 
islands did not get the opportunity to learn the Spanish language because the Spanish 
colonizers feared that indigenous Filipino knowledge of the colonizer’s language would 
enable the natives to find a way to express their agency and then unite against Spanish 
colonial rule. The Spanish therefore denied the learning and the use of Spanish by the 
colonized natives as an “anti-nationalist weapon” the Spanish used, to forestall any 
native uprising.110  
The Filipinos who were engaged in nation-state building during the Third 
Republic therefore learned that language can be a powerful tool for unity and for 
expressing indigenous agency. If the Spanish used language for colonial domination, the 
Third Republic utilized it for nation-state building. Tagalog served to unite and to 
familiarize. One advantage that Tagalog enjoyed was that its words could be found in the 
vocabularies of the other regions. 60% of Tagalog words could be found in the 
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Pampango vocabulary, 48% of the words could be found in the Cebuano vocabulary, 
40% in the Bicolano vocabulary and 31% in the Ilocano vocabulary. More interesting 
still, the use of Tagalog did not appear to submerge native dialects.111 
Tagalog also spread through wider use by people across the islands over time. 
The provinces enjoyed access to Manila, since the “thousands of officials and 
employees” of the government lived in the capital but returned to their respective 
provinces with the knowledge of Tagalog. “Thousands of students” studied in various 
colleges and universities around Manila and who spent a “greater part of the year in the 
city.” People in the trades also learned Tagalog. Professionals such as “teachers, 
lawyers, medical practitioners, and others” ended up “disseminating” and “propagating 
the Tagalog language to people they worked with, interacted with, or who were simply 
around them.” The cities attracted job seekers who learned Tagalog, so that they would 
have access to more opportunities. As the language of business (and of upward 
mobility), knowledge of Tagalog “spelled the difference between employment and 
unemployment.”112 The motion picture industry, the vernacular press, and even the 
advertising industry increasingly used Tagalog, as did business and education.113 The 
data by 1959 showed that 11 million or 50% of Filipinos spoke Tagalog; 6 million were 
native speakers, while 5 million had acquired the language.114 Taylor argued that 
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Filipino leaders during the later 1950s increasingly needed to communicate in Tagalog 
to be understood by Filipinos.115 Schools, educational curriculum, livelihood, business, 
politics, communications, sheer necessity and the myriad formal and informal 
interactions among people spread the language and promoted unity.  
 
Evaluating the State as Agent: The End of the Magsaysay Presidency   
An article in Bataan Magazine, published in 1956, evaluated the Third 
Republic’s foreign relations during its first ten years of existence. The article piece 
described the Filipino experiment as a success, that its “ship of state steered its way 
through the difficulties inherent in young nationhood, with a foreign policy guided by 
the special circumstances which have made the islands an independent nation.” The 
article also stated that, in the aftermath of colonialism, and in the midst of Cold War 
superpower rivalry, Filipinos “made an immediate choice to preserve her newly won 
freedom and to improve the well-being of her people by siding with the Western 
democracies.” The Third Republic chose to ally with America and participate in the 
United Nations.116 According to the article, the country possessed innumerable 
accomplishments in foreign relations. Filipinos expanded ties with other countries, 
having engaged in various forms of cooperation, such as SEATO. Filipinos also believed 
that “it is an essential organization for maintain peace in the Southeast Asia area and for 
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the security of the Philippines.” Filipinos reached out to non-Western countries through 
the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955, “wherein nations believing in all creeds 
met to discuss common problems in this part of the world.” The Philippines, under the 
Third Republic, participated in the International Monetary Fund and in the Colombo 
technical cooperation scheme, “to train technical men in various fields to develop the 
productive capacity of under-developed member countries.” According to the article, 
Filipino international participation could be attributed to the realization that, “as a small 
nation, she (the islands) can only find security and peace in the support of international 
organizations.” These expressions of indigenous Filipino agency extended to Filipino 
participation in the United Nations, where the country “championed the principle of anti-
colonialism and has espoused the cause of under-developed people and their struggles 
for equal treatment with big powers.” The Third Republic sent a contingent to the 
Korean War, and entered into treaties with many countries. The 1956 article also argued 
that Filipinos contributed significantly to world affairs despite its challenges as a young 
nation.117 Similarly, Vice President Garcia believed that Filipino “nationalism must keep 
abreast with the swift advance of time. . .We cannot therefore retreat within ourselves.” 
In Garcia’s eyes, “our ten years of international relationship as an independent 
democracy is a record we can justly be proud of.“118    
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Magsaysay’s quest to reform the Filipino military brought good results. A US 
National Security Council Report (NSC 5413/1), dated January 1957, listed the 
reorganization of the Filipino military as one of Magsaysay’s major achievements. The 
report stated that the Filipino military was already capable of maintaining internal and 
external security throughout the islands. The Republic could also undertake regional 
defense for external threats coming from the Asian mainland.119 This enabled the islands 
not to become too reliant on the United States military for the security needs for 
Filipinos. In addition, the Huks had been fully defeated and outlawed by 1957, with their 
numbers drastically reduced from “10,000 well-organized men in 1950 to just 500 
scattered and disorganized individuals by 1958.”120  
Magsaysay and the people around him appeared to have had big plans for the 
future of the islands. The 1935 Filipino constitution then in force at the time, mandated 
that the Filipino President be elected to serve for a four-year term, then be eligible for re-
election once to serve for another four years.121 A Manila Times article dated March 
1956 showed that congressional leaders proposed that Magsaysay serve for a total of 12 
years as President-- extending his first term from the constitutionally-mandated 4 to 6 
years, and changing the rules to allow re-election, so the President could serve until 
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1965.122 A declassified US National Security Council report in January 1957 also 
observed that Magsaysay enjoyed widespread support amongst the Filipino public and 
had consolidated both the Nacionalista and Democratic parties in the House and the 
Senate. Magsaysay enjoyed huge support amongst the Filipino press.123  
Magsaysay died prematurely in March 1957, in a plane crash while touring the 
islands to prepare for national elections later that year. Filipino economic life was 
booming by the late 1950s, as seen by a burst in manufacturing, and in agricultural and 
mineral exploitation. The Filipino share of the new investments rose to 88 percent. 
Industrialization and urbanization rapidly took place, with economic growth and activity 
in Manila and in other urban areas.124 But the foundations of nation-state building had 
been built. Nation-state making took place alongside Magsaysay, who played an 
outsized and critical role. In many respects, Magsaysay proved to be the apotheosis of 
the Filipino nation-state building during the first generation of Filipino independence.  
  
Conclusion 
By the late 1950s, the Filipino nation-state building project was reached a stage 
of maturity. Filipino state policy and state power, coupled with voluntary participation of 
many actors in society, led to the formation of collective national experiences that 
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together created the Filipino nation from the energies and capacities of the Filipino 
people. Government and barrio workers served as critical agents in bridging the urban 
and the rural. Magsaysay and the instruments of the Third Republic, including both 
military and civilian officials, replaced middlemen who often used local power less 
effectively or more corruptly. The most remarkable achievement during the Magsaysay 
years was the fostering of unity between elites and non-elites.    
Filipinos also expressed indigenous agency through international relations. Apart 
from becoming a member of SEATO, the Philippines promoted Asian unity by leading 
(and becoming part of) an anti-communist bloc of nations. Romulo demonstrated at 
Bandung that Filipinos could serve as a “bridge” between the East and the West. While 
Filipinos critiqued the United States for its unwillingness or inability to recognize Asian 
(and Third World) nationalism and for being perceived as supporting European 
colonialism, the conference ended up as a critique of Soviet expansion across the world. 
Filipinos added their voices and established their own imprint during conversations over 
the legacies of European colonialism and the dangers posed by the communists.  
 The 1950s was also an intense time for Filipinos where passions ran high. 
Magsaysay and the people around him knew that they needed to take the lead in 
upholding Filipino interests, when dealing with countries such as the United States. 
Debates over the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1954 expressed Filipino desire to 
increase control over their economy and to reduce reliance on outside powers such as the 
United States. Filipinos also took advantage of their relationship with the United States 
by using the Cold War as leverage to obtain economic benefits for Filipinos and obtain 
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concessions from the United States. The negotiations exhibited independent Filipino 
stances, and as a by-product, further expressed indigenous agency.    
The debates over bases revealed how tenuous the military presence of the United 
States was in the archipelago—much more so than was often assumed. US military 
forces had to abide by what Filipinos wanted, as base negotiations showed. The bases in 
the islands became a sensitive issue, and were often used by nationalists as one of many 
sources of unity. Even the most pro-American Filipinos, such as Magsaysay, believed 
that the United States must not overstep its bounds when it came to the rights of ordinary 
Filipino citizens living near the US bases in the islands. That the United States 
eventually backed down over sovereignty in the base areas signified that it was willing 
to abide by Filipino concerns in the islands. The country was a treaty ally and no longer 
a colony.  
The Third Republic also knew that opportunity should be given to all Filipinos, 
regardless of background. The state encouraged Filipinos to have a greater share in 
sectors such as retail trade at the expense of the Chinese-Filipinos, who were nonetheless 
given opportunities to participate in nation-state making. Despite Filipino suspicions of 
the Chinese-Filipinos, even the ardently anti-communist Magsaysay believed that all 
ethnic minorities could be integrated. The state ensured that the right and the welfare of 
aboriginal Filipinos, such as the Negritos of Central Luzon, were protected and that they 
were given the opportunity to earn a living by themselves, eventually. The promotion of 
local autonomy and of self-sufficiency was meant to promote initiative. The state 
 213 
therefore played a critical role in bringing people together in the task of unifying all 
Filipinos in the islands.   
The state promoted cultural nationalism in schools and in wider society through 
reforms in educational curriculum and through Tagalog as the national language. 
Reforms in the educational curriculum revealed the involvement of the state, the church, 
civic organizations, of ordinary Filipino families and of nationalist politicians such as 
Recto in shaping the society during the Third Republic. For instance, debates over the 
Rizal Bill demonstrated how the state and the church were bound together by a common 
anti-communist ideology. The ordinary Filipino, both elite and non-elite, had a natural 
aversion against communism and against collectivism in the islands. These collectively 
ensured that the islands were hostile ground where those considered “alien” ideologies 
did not find roots to embed themselves in. Tagalog also became a major vehicle for 
unification, since not only was Manila and the surrounding areas Tagalog-speaking, but 
all the other dialects across the archipelago had a lot more in common with Tagalog than 
with one another. Tagalog, therefore, was the universal language.  According to a This 
Week article, dated February 22, 1959, “Tagalog . . . now possesses an adequate tradition 
and vocabulary for the effective expression of nationalist thoughts and urgings, as well 
as of progressive ideas, be it economic, political, cultural or religious. “125 This was 
despite challenges, such as negative attitudes which a few elite Filipinos held towards 
                                                 
125 “Spanish and the Filipinos.”  
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the use of Tagalog, and who continued to prefer English as a matter of social status.126 
According to George Taylor, by the 1960s, not only was Tagalog, “the informal 
language of the home, society, school or business,” but that supplanted English as the 
language of the nation.127   
An American official with the US Department of State noted in 1957 that, “it is 
true that the Philippines is changing. Nationalism is finding increasing expression by all 
elements and Filipinos are becoming more self-reliant.”128 By the 1960s, many 
American businessmen in Manila believed that, “the Filipinos are now in control of their 
economy and are quite capable of running it” without US or even government 
interference.129 As Taylor had written back in 1964, “he who captures Filipino 
nationalism captures the Philippines.”130 The initiative belonged to elite and non-elite 
Filipinos who were willing to seize the opportunities and work together to build the 
Filipino nation-state. Building unity was inherently participatory and entailed the 
                                                 
126 Outsiders such as Pakistani writer Shahid Ahmad Dehlvi, remarked that “some Filipinos seemed 
ashamed to speak their own language. . . ” Dehlvi gave the advice to Filipinos that “You must have a 
strong national language to develop a strong nationalism.” The Pakistani writer also noted that the 
Philippines “has more English than Tagalog literature.” “Filipinos and their National Language,” This 
Week, August 16, 1959, 21. 
127 Taylor, The Philippines and the United States, 168. 
128 “Statement for use by Mr. Murphy in reply to Senator Humphrey’s letter on the Philippines,” 2, 
January 31, 1957, Record Group no. 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Far 
Eastern Affairs, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs. Office of the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, 
Office Files, 1948-1957, Box 1, Folder B6, Philippine Attitudes towards the United States, NARA,  
Declassified No. NND897210.       
129 Taylor, The Philippines and the United States, 295. 
130 Taylor, The Philippines and the United States, 170. 
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expression and articulation of multiple Filipino voices, issues being discussed and 
debated in the public forum by all, the state using its power to enjoin citizens to 
participate in public life, and encouraging people, regardless of background, to harness 
their creative energies for the good of the nation and its members.  
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CHAPTER 6                                                                                                      
CONCLUSION: UNEARTHING AGENCY   
 
People had grown accustomed to thinking of Filipinos as lacking agency, due to 
Cold War-based assumptions. The re-told narratives and experiences of Filipinos of 
various backgrounds changed all that, especially by the Magsaysay years, which served 
as the culmination of all these early efforts. The big questions in all of these included: 
Where were the Filipinos in the narrative of Filipino nation-state building after 
independence? Why were Filipinos often submerged in Cold War literature that also 
covered the Philippines? Perhaps an answer lay with what the diplomat Carlos Romulo 
said in the aftermath of the Bandung Conference. Romulo explained that there was often 
a tendency amongst Americans to assume that what was often good for the United States 
was automatically good for Asians, such as Filipinos.1 Filipinos believed that even if 
American and Filipino objectives and undertakings dovetailed, Filipinos are doing it to 
ultimately benefit all Filipinos. Many outsiders often could not discern the differences 
between American and Filipino agency due to their fixation with the Cold War. Works 
by writers such as William Pomeroy, Renato Constantino, Benedict Kerkvliet, and even 
Daniel Immerwahr had often depicted Filipinos as helpless, passive subjects who were 
subject to overwhelming American power, with the CIA, US bases, and the Cold War as 
the favorite acronyms, buzzwords, and strawmen. These scholars also had often assumed 
                                                 
1 Carlos P. Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1956), 44. 
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that only through artificial categories such as class could one express agency. More 
pressing issues such as integrating the various ethnicities, Tagalog, Filipino foreign 
policy, and a domestic aversion to communism in the islands, were often lost in the mists 
as a result. The multiple voices of Filipino state and society across the islands that lay 
submerged underneath needed to be unearthed to include and restore Filipinos as part of 
a wider struggle of the “darker peoples” in their struggle against colonialism and 
communist expansion.    
The nation-state-making narrative during the first decade of Filipino 
independence exhibited how Filipinos expressed agency in the islands. The sources of 
Filipino unity included-- a natural aversion to communism in the islands, integrating the 
Huks and the Chinese-Filipinos, recasting Filipinos as Asian and belonging to the Third 
World through SEATO and Bandung, opposition to corruption and incompetence, an 
emphasis on economic development, rural self-help, Filipino control of its own 
economy, the Tagalog, and the revision of educational curriculum. Debates surrounding 
the US bases and the Laurel Langley Act served as sources of Filipino unity. . 
Personalities such as Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos Romulo played critical roles in 
articulating Filipino nationalism. 
 The main challenges to Filipino unity domestically centered on how to integrate 
the Huks, the Filipino-Chinese, and the non-elite Filipinos. The state-- through 
Magsaysay, the government, the PACD and PRRM programs, and the military-- helped 
bridge the gap between elite and non-elite Filipinos. Government and barrio workers 
replaced local officials as middlemen in integrating the barrios with the big cities. 
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Subaltern voices came to the fore and shaped public consciousness with images and 
conditions of rural community life reaching homes in Manila. The rural played a role in 
shaping the big cities, laying bare the divides amongst Filipinos. The Third Republic 
also looked for ways to coopt the Huks and the Chinese-Filipinos. The Huks laid down 
their arms, surrendered to the government, and became peaceful farmers. The Chinese-
Filipinos contributed economic resources to state projects, and sought to integrate their 
thoughts and actions, such as by weeding out perceived and actual sympathies with 
communism and other forms of social disorder, such as crime, prostitution and extortion, 
which dated back to the colonial period. These groups ended up self-identifying as 
Filipinos with a stake in the collective visions of Filipinos.  Magsaysay played a critical 
role in using the State and its agencies to integrate these groups. Magsaysay, a staunch 
anti-communist and anti-corruption leader, opened spaces for the ex-Huks and the 
Chinese-Filipinos. In so many ways, Magsaysay was indeed a transformational figure, 
who enjoyed massive support from broad swathes of Filipino society not only because 
he was personally charismatic but because his government articulated Filipino visions, 
and attempted to realize them effectively.    
Much had been made regarding the role of the Moros in Filipino nation-state 
building during the 1900s. The Moros, apart from local clan rivalries and internecine 
warfare, did not pose a problem to Filipino nation-state building, until the end of the 
1960s. Mindanao scholar T.J. S. George argued that Magsaysay’s supposed “lack of 
appreciation of the Mindanao problem” lay with Magsaysay’s tendency to sometimes 
conflate Filipino security aims, and American Cold War objectives. The Filipino 
 219 
President’s “anti-communist campaign,” which dovetailed with Washington’s 
“missionary anti-communism,” did not see clan rivalries and warlords in the Moro South 
as a threat, as opposed to the Huk guerillas and the Chinese-Filipinos. As far as Manila 
and Washington were concerned, George argued in his work, the Huk peasant rebellion 
in the north was a far graver danger to Filipinos.2 Agreeing that communism was the 
foremost threat to all Filipinos was where Filipinos used the Cold War to suit their 
purposes.  
The state was a critical instrument in the expression of indigenous identity and 
unity. Filipino nation- state building had always involved the challenges of dealing with 
ethnicity, power, and nationalism. These practices dated back to the colonial legacy of 
dividing Tagalog lowlanders and hill mountain tribesmen, the Chinese, the Moros, and 
the non-elite Filipinos. These groups were somehow viewed as “less Filipino” than those 
who were in Manila and in the surrounding lowland provinces. The inability to resolve 
questions of unity would have led to questions regarding the “authenticity” of the 
Filipino national project, and would have cast doubts on the “official nationalism” 
expressed by the Third Republic.3 Prasenjit Duara, in his work Sovereignty and 
Authenticity, argued that the exercise of “disciplinary power,” by entities such as the 
Filipino Third Republic, needed to be seen as “authentic” by the people. The nation-state 
building project, according to Duara, only worked if it involved various “social 
                                                 
2 T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 117, 118.  
3 Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 15.  
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organizations” that “mobilize the social or the national body” to exercise authority.4 This 
form of state-centric nationalism was said to have been the only way for “individuals to 
attain a self-conscious unity” that enabled a nation to obtain “mastery over the future.”5 
The government therefore involved other sectors and members of society such as the 
Huks, the Chinese-Filipinos and the non-elite Filipinos, to legitimize the Third Republic 
as the ultimate expression of Filipino indigenous agency.  
The notion that it was impossible for Filipinos to be unified because of the 
disparate regions, ethnicities, religions, kinship ties, the business and personal interests 
involved, therefore lacks validity. Filipinos saw the need to reclaim history, as seen in 
cultural debates over Tagalog and over the separation of Church and State, in debates 
over revisions of the educational curriculum. Duara argued that “history becomes the 
history of a people or nationality and a territory”—in this case, only when the Filipinos 
themselves collectively asserted their own identity and vision. These could only be done 
after independence since Filipinos needed a “historical claim arising from the idea of a 
sovereign people evolving within a delimited territory.” Duara argued in his work that, a 
“three-way relationship between a people, territory, and a history produces the rights of 
nations and distinguishes nationalism from other types of movements that preceded it.”6 
State-building and nation-building therefore could not occur without all Filipinos 
                                                 
4 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 24, 25. 
5 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, 26, 27.  
6 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, 27.  
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coming together. This was what many scholars of the American Exceptionalist or the 
class-oriented neo-colonialists have often overlooked.  
Elite Filipinos, despite being much maligned, played a critical role in Filipino 
nation-state making. Sociologist Julian Go, in American Empire and the Politics of 
Meaning, argued that not only did postcolonial entities, such as the Third Republic, 
inherit the geographical confines of the former colony. The elites and the interest groups 
working with them used patronage networks and kinship ties across the islands, such as 
their control of “elite newspapers and journals,” to articulate an “imagined community.”7 
With Filipino sovereignty over their own territory after 1946, elite Filipinos used 
patronage networks to promote their own versions of official Filipino nationalisms from 
the top. But the elites saw that without the non-elite participation, any nation-making 
project would have been untenable. Magsaysay was crucial since he co-opted the elites 
and brought the non-elite Filipinos to the center stage of public participation.  
 The divide between elite and non-elite Filipinos was just an arbitrary construct. 
In reality, little separated the elite Filipino from the non-elite Filipino. Each group, when 
they self-identified as Filipino, were aware of their common destiny. Personalities such 
as Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Romulo, Recto and Laurel, among others, defined 
Filipinos as a people who needed to collectively strive for national unity and 
development. From “making people to “awakening them into being” had always been 
                                                 
7 Go, Julian. American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and 
Puerto Rico during US Colonialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 279.  
 222 
the age-old question in nation and state building, argued Duara.8 These provided an 
interesting counterpoint to historians such as Constantino, who tended to obscure 
indigenous agency in societies such as the Philippines that tended to reduce non-elite 
Filipinos to playing roles as supposedly passive, helpless victims of elite Filipinos and of 
the United States after independence.  
Many Filipinos also found that the Americans tended to conflate American 
interests with Filipino interests. But as works such as Cullather’s Illusions of Influence 
had illustrated, Filipinos had their own visions of unity and were after their own 
interests. When Filipinos negotiated for, or signed security and trade treaties with 
powers such as the United States, Filipinos were asserting their interests. When Romulo 
articulated his criticisms of American support for European colonial powers, and the 
dangers coming from all forms of colonialism, including communist expansion, Romulo 
had Filipino interests in mind. Filipinos possessed their own agency and were not acting 
as mouthpieces for the United States, a distinction often missed.     
Filipino nation-state building also evolved over time. During the Roxas 
administration, Filipino nation-state building took on a character of a weak center with 
strong peripheries in the provinces. Milton Walter Meyer, in A Diplomatic History of the 
Philippine Republic, observed that “it was remarkable that [Roxas] succeeded the way 
he did,” given the damage the islands suffered in the immediate postwar environment 
and despite that fact that Roxas only served as President for a little over two years. 
Roxas was to be given credit for obtaining economic assistance from the United States to 
                                                 
8 Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity, 26, 27. 
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benefit Filipinos. Another great accomplishment was Filipino membership in the United 
Nations in 1946.9 The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 was a form of a voluntary 
agreement between the two countries. It must be remembered that American 
policymakers had rated the islands as a “low security” risk, and were considering other 
basing areas in the Pacific. Filipinos invited the United States in because it benefited 
Filipino security in the islands.    
Quirino, whose administration was viewed in a negative light due to images of 
corruption and mismanagement, was guided by a coherent nation-building ideology. 
Quirino’s foreign policy centerpiece, the Pacific Pact, which was a regional union with 
anti-communist Asian countries such as Nationalist Republic of China, helped establish 
the Philippines as a regional Asian leader. It also showed that Filipinos were not 
necessarily “subservient” to American interests.10 The Philippines sent troops to the 
Korean War, and also desired Indian involvement in Asian affairs.11 Quirino helped 
pioneer a growing neutralist “Third Force” that established the foundations for anti-
communist regional Asian unity, even if the proposed Pacific Pact of 1950 was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Domestically, the Third Republic weathered the crisis years and 
warded off the Huks not only by winning in the battlefield but by bridging the gap 
amongst the various sectors in Filipino society.  
                                                 
9 Milton Walter Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic (University of Hawaii Press, 
1965), 79, 80, 81.  
10 Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, 159, 160, 161.  
11 Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic, 160, 161, 162. 
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The economy was beginning to turn around by the early 1950s. Quirino’s 
appointment of Magsaysay to the Defense Ministry had helped turn the tide against the 
Huks, organized clean elections in 1951 and in 1953, and brought Manila to the barrios. 
Nation- state building domestically was by no means the monopoly of the state or of 
Manila. Filipino opinion was decidedly supportive of state and nation-building efforts, 
and concerned by the specter of the “twin evils” of communism and of corruption. 
Electoral watchdog groups during the 1951 congressional and the 1953 presidential 
elections such as the NAMFREL, even if they were funded and initiated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, manifested the desire of Filipinos for honest and clean elections. 
Benedict Kerkvliet argued that Filipinos did not expect much from their politicians and 
had a cynical view of provincial and of national elections, even if they were clean. But 
elections were part of nation-making. Elections enabled the voting public, even if they 
were motivated to obtain something for themselves and their families, to have a stake in 
nation and government. Filipino election campaign and the results reflected how 
personalities and connections, rather than issues, mattered more in Filipino political 
culture.12 As Defense Secretary, Magsaysay knew that for the state to be an effective 
vehicle for nation-making, non-elite Filipinos needed to take an active role. Magsaysay’s 
contribution to Filipino nation-making was to strengthen key government agencies and 
                                                 
12 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Contested Meaning of elections in the Philippines,” in R.H. Taylor, The 
Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge and New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144, 145, 146.  
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institutions, and to reach out to local, rural communities. Magsaysay knew that the 
Filipinos were the nation.   
 Magsaysay’s presidency was sustained by his ability to promise reforms and to 
deliver them when they mattered. Magsaysay enjoyed close ties with the United States 
and was an ardent anti-communist, in line with the sentiments of the vast majority of 
Filipinos in the islands. The 1950s was a highly nationalistic time and there were many 
controversies, such as the US bases and the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which served as 
sources of unity.  Despite the best efforts of the United States to negotiate favorable 
terms for America, the American negotiators found Filipinos holding their ground. 
Filipino foreign relations had changed dramatically in the decade since independence.   
There were questions as to whether Magsaysay was too much of a centralizer, 
even if he worked to unite all Filipinos. Abinales and Amoroso, in State and Society in 
the Philippines, had looked at the pitfalls of relying too much on one person to 
supposedly guide the nation-state. Their work argued that Magsaysay wanted to 
“strengthen the state, as well as his stature as a leader,” through social mobilization of 
Filipinos from both the cities and the rural areas. They also argued that his ability to 
implement reforms was too invested in his person and in his position.13 In short, the 
ability to obtain national unity and to implement reforms, appeared too dependent on one 
strongman’s rule. But scholars may have been misreading Filipino political culture. Any 
                                                 
13 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005), 181, 182.  
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“strongman of the people,” no matter how popular or how competent, found that he 
needed the support of all the other participants of the nation-state building project.  
This project to define and express Filipino identity through nation-state building 
continued on beyond Magsaysay. Carlos Garcia was an old-style Filipino leader. Garcia 
further promoted Filipino control of key economic sectors. Garcia’s policies further 
reduced the involvement of Chinese-Filipinos and the Americans from retail trade. They 
enabled a large number of Filipinos to build up small and medium enterprises. These 
government efforts enabled the majority of the Filipinos to increase their share of dollar 
allocations.14 What came to be called Carlos Garcia’s “Filipino First Policy,” resulted in 
Filipinos possessing 51 percent of foreign exchange allocations by 1959, “liberalized 
credit to new businesses,” and in an increase from 55 percent of new investments in 
1959 to 88 percent by 1961, by the end of Garcia’s term.15  
The Garcia administration, like its predecessor, heavily involved itself in the 
home and community life of the ordinary Filipino. The Third Republic stressed the 
family “as a stronghold against the threats of communism,” and as the “last refuge of 
property.” Drawing on foreign examples, Garcia illustrated how families were eradicated 
in Bolshevik Russia “as a means of uniformly rearing and conditioning the youth at an 
early age.”16 The communist threat also lingered on at the fringes. Despite the demise of 
                                                 
14 Abinales, Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 182, 183. 
15 Luis Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: The Overlook 
Press, 2010), 215.  
16 “Garcia lauds PI families, Tells meet delegates filial unity strong weapons against Reds,” The Manila 
Times, December 8, 1957.   
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the armed Huk units, there was an increase in the number of peasant and urban groups 
that agitated for social reform. But any potential unrest coming from “lower class” 
Filipinos, in cooperation with a “political intelligentsia,” was headed off by government 
and by all sectors of Filipinos society.  Abinales and Amoroso argued that it was only 
massive corruption under the Garcia administration that actually hampered effective 
Filipino state and nation-building.17 Communism, seen as a threat by the vast majority of 
Filipinos to the Filipino way of life, was practically dead and buried in the islands by the 
end of the 1950s. But there was discontent over corruption, which posed new challenges 
for the next generation of Filipinos.  
The Garcia administration, like the previous ones, also possessed its own ideas 
on nation-state building. Its policies included a war on graft, economic development, 
land reform, industrialization, research and modernization. Garcia’s administration also 
believed in the “moral and spiritual reformation and strengthening, especially among the 
youth, and building of a clean, formidable, national character as the best challenge to 
communism,” or at least its re-emergence. The Garcia administration possessed a foreign 
policy oriented towards stopping Japanese rearmament, “to enhance historic relations 
with the United States based on equality, mutuality of interests, and community of 
ideals,” to “preserve friendship with Spain and the Latin American republics with whom 
we are tied by indissoluble cultural, spiritual, and historic bonds, ”to follow-up the good-
neighbor policy with Asian friends for the mutual benefit of the Philippines and friendly 
neighbors,” as well as “strengthening” both the United Nations (for peace) and the 
                                                 
17 Abinales, Amoroso, State and Society, 183, 184. 
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SEATO regional defense organization.18 Filipino state and nation-building during the 
time of Garcia further built on the efforts of earlier administrations.    
The Garcia administration discouraged Filipinos from relying too much on the 
government to solve the “country’s present economic ills.” Garcia would have preferred 
that Filipinos had emulated Americans, “where people resolve their own difficulties and 
think of ways to help the government.” Garcia believed in “hard work as the key to 
success.” The Filipino President believed that Filipinos needed to develop some form of 
detachment and courage in the face of adversity.19 What Garcia had in common with 
Magsaysay, was the belief that indigenous agency lay not only with the state but with the 
people, which suggested an increasing turn towards inclusiveness and non-elite 
participation. The earlier Magsaysay administration must be given credit for having laid 
the groundwork in nation-state building for succeeding administrations to build on.  
The Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo articulated a coherent, all-encompassing 
Filipino ideology. Romulo’s addresses, delivered in Tagalog in January 13, 1960, laid 
out a new doctrine for Filipino nationalism for a new generation of Filipinos. The 
address stressed points such as modernization, industrialization, and the attainment of 
security in freedom. In Romulo’s view, the most important aspect of nationalism 
entailed Filipinos learning to act in their own land for the well-being of their people. 
Romulo believed that Filipinos must not rely solely on the presence of the US bases for 
                                                 
18 Vicente F. Barranco, “Will war on graft, promote ties, Lists 8-point plan for home front, will rally PI to 
free peoples,” The Manila Times, December 31, 1957.  
19 “Filipino burden government with their problems-Garcia,” The Manila Times, April 2, 1958. 
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their security, and of favorable free trade terms with America, for Filipino well-being. 
The objective of Filipino nationalism, in Romulo’s eyes, must be to “build” national 
self-reliance, eventually. Filipinos needed to mobilize their resources well and that it 
must be the goal of Filipinos to seek the “good life,” through “democratic institutions.”20  
In another speech, Romulo called for the unity of small nations such as the 
Philippines to collectively exert “great influence.” The diplomat argued that Filipinos 
and the other Third World peoples all shared a similar “nationalist history” of fighting 
against colonialism, but that their disparate “national interests” could pit them against 
one another. Romulo recognized that great powers tended to be “selfish” and that the 
“bargaining power” of “small nations” had always been weak. Romulo believed that 
Filipinos needed to develop “strength” and “self-reliance,” because enjoying the 
“protection” of a great power, such as the United States, was unsustainable in the long 
term, as all nations have their own interests in mind.21 Romulo, in another speech, 
believed in the realization of “. . . strength and unity born of common interests and of 
common aims . . . “22 The diplomat might have been referring in this speech to Asian 
unity, but knew that these challenges could also be applied domestically. Only by uniting 
all the ethnicities and by taking advantage of the diversities amongst them did Filipinos 
                                                 
20 H.L.T. Koren, “Ambassador Romulo on Nationalism,” Foreign Service Dispatch, January 13, 1960, 1, 
2, Microfilm Room, Library of Congress, Washington DC.   
21 “Ambassador Romulo on Nationalism,” 2.   
22 Carlos P. Romulo, speech before the Manila Rotary Club, Manila, January 27, 1949, Archives Section, 
Ayala Museum.  
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realize the strengths they possessed, and their capacity to realize a common vision and 
destiny for all Filipinos. 
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